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GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE

1915—1939

Information Department Papers No. 20A

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AND ENLARGED*

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NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition of this Paper, issued on January 7, 1937, and exhausted some months ago, described the principal factors in the Palestine problem and developments from 1915 down to the arrival of the Royal (Peel) Commission in November 1936. The present edition has permitted certain revisions to be made in the original text, account to be taken of the new material relevant to the McMahon pledge, which has recently become available, and the insertion of later figures in the economic sections. It also continues the record and carries it down to the issue in May 1939 of the White Paper setting out the United Kingdom Government's decision regarding the basis for a final settlement of the Palestine problem. Beyond a brief indication of the immediate reception of the proposals by the Jewish and Arab communities, no attempt has been made to deal with their further reactions or with developments (such as the Debates in Parliament or the proceedings of the Permanent Mandates Commission) subsequent to the publication of the White Paper.

The difficulty of finding a suitable point at which to conclude a survey of a problem still in the process of evolution must always be great, but the publication of the White Paper clearly marks the end of one phase and the beginning of another in the history of Palestine. It would, therefore, appear to mark a suitable point at which to pause and take stock of the situation.

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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PALESTINE

THE most serious aspect of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine is the fact that the two communities are not local entities but form part of two groups with religious and racial affinities all over the world. Any conflict in Palestine, therefore, at once takes on international dimensions. It affects 15,000,000 Jews dispersed through most countries in the world; it is a matter of intimate concern to the new Arab States and to Egypt; it is a vital problem for Great Britain as Mandatory Power, and for the whole British Commonwealth, with its tradition of friendship with both communities and its Moslem population of 100,000,000. Further, Palestine, under whatever régime it is governed, is as important as Egypt from the point of view of British Imperial communications. Strategically, it is the eastern outpost against any potential threat to the Suez Canal; it is the outlet of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk; it is a halting place on the international air route to India and beyond, and it is a starting point for the desert motor road to Iraq.

Something more fundamental is at stake, moreover, than merely the fulfilment of British promises made during the World War or under the terms of the Mandate. It is the psychological problem of how to reconcile two powerful movements—the time-old yearning of the Jews to return to the Promised Land and to possess a home which is theirs as of right, and the Palestinian Arab desire for promotion to national status. The Arabs are afraid that the Arabs in Palestine will be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers and by the superior wealth, organization, and economic power of the Jews.

Although the root cause of the problem is to be found in Palestine, outside influences have had, during recent years, an increasingly important effect on the situation. In the first place the emancipation of neighbouring Arab States has stiffened Arab resistance. The Palestinian Arabs attribute the enviable independence of Transjordan to the absence of the Jews; they have witnessed the British treaty with the Emir in 1928, that with Iraq in 1931, and that with Egypt in 1936. Especially bitter feeling was aroused by the Treaty of September 9, 1936, between France and the Mandated Territory of Syria (which the French later, in January 1939, refused to ratify), since the Palestinian Arabs could not believe that the events of the last few years in Syria justify so marked a differentiation from themselves, or that a country is ready for self-government when the signing of the treaty is accompanied by the dispatch of reinforce-

ments.¹ In addition a certain restlessness was engendered in all the States of the Near East by the Italo-Abyssinian war, as they watched with interest a clash not only between a European and a non-European people, but also between two Mediterranean Great Powers. The success of Italian aggression, despite attempts to restrain it by the League of Nations (led by Great Britain) made a strong impression on the Arab world. But the important part played by the Arab States in recent endeavours to find a solution of the conflict in Palestine suggests that Italian aspirations in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean may to-day produce a different reaction.

The foundation of the Third German Reich in 1933, with its violent anti-Semitism and the resulting persecution of the Jews of Central Europe, emphasized not only the longing of the Jews to return to Palestine, but also the vital necessity of some land or lands of refuge, which increased the importance in their eyes of the National Home. It intensified also foreign pressure on Great Britain as Mandatory Power. Eastern European States with a large Jewish population, and those into whose territories refugees sought admission, alike watch every move in Palestine with close interest. The United States, with a Jewish population of four and a half million, is a Great Power which can never be indifferent to the manner in which the Mandate is administered, or to any change of policy on the part of the Mandatory Power. President Roosevelt has himself given expression to "the sympathy of the American people with the great purposes of a national Jewish Home in Palestine."²

Lastly, an increasing state of tension in Europe, which coincided with the period of discontent and disorder in Palestine, has contributed in a marked degree to the difficulties of the situation in that country. It is not necessary to assume that the disorders have been engineered from outside Palestine in order to see that to Great Powers anxious to obtain or maintain control in the Eastern Mediterranean, for example, conditions in Palestine are of no little importance. The violent and militant nationalism of the totalitarian Powers has had, moreover, by example and by design, a discernible effect upon the growing nationalism of the Near East. The sympathy of these Powers with "Arab victims of British aggression and Jewish machinations" is now openly and repeatedly proclaimed in their press and by their wireless stations.

(1) See *The Times*, September 11, 1936.

(2) Message to the National Conference for Palestine, on February 1, 1936.

If it is true that the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine can only be solved by agreement between the two communities, it is equally true that the consequences of that conflict to-day reach far beyond the frontiers of Palestine.

II. THE WAR-TIME PROMISES TO JEWS AND ARABS

THE Arab fear of Jewish predominance which has become so evident during the last three years is not a new development; it is an intensification of the unrest and resentment which have simmered for years, and which date back to undertakings given by the Allies during the World War.

The Pre-War Situation

Jewish colonization was known to the Palestinian Arabs long before the War. The Holy Places have always held their special significance for many creeds. Zionism is as old as the Captivity, and even before the foundation of the Zionist Organization in 1897¹ Jewish agricultural colonies were being planted in different parts of the country. The first estate, near Jaffa, was bought as early as 1855 by Sir Moses Montefiore; and from then until the end of the century colonization "was carried on by young Jews from Russia and Rumania, enthusiastic Zionists who came to Palestine without sufficient means or knowledge, but found a patron in Baron Edmond de Rothschild," who helped them with money and expert guidance and gave their work a definite direction.² After 1900 the administration was entrusted by Baron Edmond to the Jewish Colonization Association,³ and independent settlement was conducted by the Zionist Organization. These agricultural settlements, which were self-governing, accounted for some 12,000 of the 85-90,000 Jews in Palestine in 1914; a full half of these lived in Jerusalem for religious reasons, next in importance being the communities in the "holy cities" of Safed, Tiberias, and Hebron.⁴

The post-War period, however, may be distinguished from the pre-War by two new developments in the situation. For on the one hand, while the settlement of Jews in Palestine had always been actuated by a peculiar blend of nationalist and religious sentiment, it was not until after the establishment of the Mandate that the political aspect of Zionism began to be emphasized. On the other hand, the War awakened a spirit of nationalism throughout the Near East, and the post-War Arab population is fired with sentiments to which the pre-War generation did not aspire.

(1) See below, p. 18.

(2) For further details of the types of colonization practised, see Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World*, pp. 173-7, from which the passage is quoted.

(3) This Association, usually known as the I.C.A., was founded in 1881 by Baron Maurice Hirsch for the purpose of settling Jews in agriculture all over the world.

(4) Revusky, *The Jews in Palestine*, pp. 19-20. The number is approximate; there was no census under Turkish rule; the total population of what is now Palestine was at the time about 650,000.

In 1915 the Allies, bent on harrying the Turks from every possible quarter, held out to the Arabs the hope of becoming an independent nation. Advances were made both by the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and through the authorities in Egypt,¹ but by 1915 the differences between the various Arab elements in Arabia had rendered the efforts of the former abortive, and the task of securing Arab co-operation was left to the Cairo authorities.²

The question of Arab independence was chiefly discussed in a long drawn-out correspondence in 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Cairo, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca. The British authorities did not publish the correspondence until as late as March 1939,³ though its gist was widely known and much discussed.⁴

The area over which independence should function was the Sharif's main concern, and, acting on behalf of that nebulous political entity "the Arab people," he made a very comprehensive demand in a letter dated July 14, 1915. The area, he said, should be bounded:

"on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat, Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina"

i.e. the whole of the Arabian peninsula (except Aden) and all of what is now Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Syria, running up to the borders of Persia on the east and slightly into the present Turkish State on the north.

Sir Henry's reply, dated October 25, 1915, contains the passage which was regarded by the Arabs as their Magna Carta:

"The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

"With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

"As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the

(1) For a summary of the negotiations carried on by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Cairo, and Sir Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, see Philby: *Arabia* (Modern World Series), pp. 231-60.

(2) For an interesting account of the energy and imagination which they applied to this task, see T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

(3) British White Paper, Cmd. 5957. See Appendix I i.

(4) e.g. *History of the Peace Conference* (ed. Temperley), vol. vi, p. 14; Graves: *Land of the Three Faiths*, pp. 50-1; Philby: *Arabia*, pp. 242-3; Loder: *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria*, pp. 19-20; Sotyanovsky: *The Mandate for Palestine*, pp. 5-7.

name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

“Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.”¹

Since the “boundaries proposed by the Sherif” had included the Mediterranean as the western limit, and since Damascus (which is in Syria) was the southernmost point mentioned in the first paragraph, the Arabs assumed that Palestine was included in the independence area. Indeed, if the British intended to exclude Palestine from this area, then of the wording of the McMahon correspondence it must at least be admitted that “the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time.”²

But the British Government have always contended that their intention had from the first been to exclude Palestine from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledges; this was stated by Mr Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a Memorandum on the Palestine Mandate dated June 3, 1922³; while, in letters written in 1922 and 1937, Sir Henry McMahon himself placed on record the fact that he had intended to exclude Palestine.⁴ There is also evidence that the British Government had in fact made their intention plain, in an interview between Commander Hogarth and King Hussein in January 1918,⁵ and that the King appeared to acquiesce in the exclusion of Palestine from the area of Arab independence. Moreover, Hussein’s son, the Emir Feisal, is reported to have stated at the Paris Peace Conference⁶ that “Palestine for its universal character should be left on one side for mutual consideration of all parties interested,” although in 1921 he made a claim

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 5957. In addition to the McMahon Correspondence, “Statements made on behalf of His Majesty’s Government during the year 1928 in regard to the Future Status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire” were also published as a White Paper (Cmd. 5964) in 1939. See Appendix I 2.

(2) During the Palestine Conference held in London in February–March 1939, a Committee of British and Arab representatives was set up to consider the McMahon Correspondence and failed to reach agreement upon the question of its interpretation. The United Kingdom representatives informed the Arabs that H.M. Government had always regarded the phrase “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo” as embracing all that portion of Syria (including what is now called Palestine) lying to the west of (*inter alia*) the administrative area known as the Vilayet of Syria. They agreed that “Arab contentions regarding the meaning of the disputed phrase have greater force than has appeared hitherto,” but maintained nevertheless that “on a proper construction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact excluded” from the pledge. Cmd. 5974, p. 24. See map at end.

(3) British White Paper, Cmd. 1700. See below, Appendix III.

(4) Graves, p. 53, and *The Times*, July 23, 1937.

(5) British White Paper, Cmd. 5964.

(6) Hunter Miller: *My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. xiv, p. 230.

(which he afterwards withdrew) in a conversation at the Foreign Office on January 20, 1921, that Palestine had been included in the area within which the British Government recognized Arab independence.¹ But the Palestinian Arabs do not accept this view and have since persistently brought forward the original argument in their petitions and complaints.²

It should be noted that in 1915, when Sir Henry was in correspondence with the Sharif, there was as yet no question of a promise to the Jewish people. Nevertheless the Allies were alive to the importance of the Holy Places—the question is raised in many of the secret treaties between them—and it is regrettable that the British negotiators did not from the start make the point clear to the Arabs.

The first two of these secret agreements—in March 1915, between Britain, France, and Russia, and in April 1915, between the three Allies and Italy³—did not specifically mention Palestine; they merely referred to future definition of the “rights” or “spheres of influence” to be allocated during any subsequent negotiations over the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire.

*The Secret
Treaties*

The task of definition was delicate. The British Government had to inform its French allies of its undertakings to the Sharif, and to obtain their support for its action. “At this time the clash of interests between France and the Arabs and, therefore, between France and Britain, threatened to become acute”⁴; hence the secret negotiations towards the end of 1915 between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot which culminated in the agreement of May 1916 which is usually known by their names.

The Sykes-Picot agreement provided for the division of the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf into five distinct regions. Part of the area was to be under British control, part under French, part to be a British sphere of influence, part a French sphere of influence.⁵ Palestine was to fall into none of these categories; the agreement stated that

(1) *Hansard*, July 11, 1922, col. 1033.

(2) Notably in 1930. See *Statement by the Palestine Arab Delegation*, London, May 1930.

(3) The texts of all these treaties were found by the Bolsheviks in the secret archives of the Russian Foreign Office and published by them in the Russian press. The collected texts in English, in the form of translations from the Russian press, are to be found in F. S. Cocks: *The Secret Treaties and Understandings* (Union of Democratic Control, 1918). For later publication of official texts see *inter alia* A. Giannini: *Documenti per la Storia della Pace Orientale*, Rome, 1933; for the Secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, *British White Paper*, Cmd. 671, published in 1920.

(4) *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. iii, p. 15.

(5) For an excellent map, see Bowman, *The New World*, p. 102 (1922 edition).

"With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special régime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France, and Great Britain."

Secrecy was regarded as the essence of this agreement, which was communicated neither to the Sharif nor to the Italians. It did not become known to these until the Bolsheviks, in November 1917, published¹ a secret memorandum dated March 6, 1917, covering the negotiations which had taken place "in London and Petrograd" in the spring of the preceding year.

*The Balfour
Declaration*

The claims of a world-wide movement such as Zionism meant that the Sykes-Picot ruling could not be regarded as the final word on the subject of the future of Palestine.

Attempts to provide a home for the Jewish people had already been made by the British Government; in 1903—when it was seemingly impossible to obtain from the Sultan of Turkey a concession which would enable the Jews to return to the Promised Land—it had offered them territory in Uganda. But Palestine—the historic Jewish Land—was the only place which could fulfil Jewish desires, and the 1905 Zionist Congress rejected the offer.²

The Zionist cause was not furthered by the Allies in the early years of the War for the obvious reason that Russia was one of their number, and Zionism was not viewed with favour by the Imperial Russian Government.

But in February 1917 the Russian revolution had begun. During that month Sir Mark Sykes entered into close relations with Dr Chaim Weizmann, a leading Jewish intellectual, who was Reader in Chemistry at Manchester University, but had been seconded to the Admiralty for special purposes.³ As early as 1906 Dr Weizmann had interested Mr Balfour in the possibility of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and these two men were the leading figures in the negotiations between the Zionist Organization and the British Government which were carried on throughout the summer of 1917. These, which had the full approval of the United States Government,⁴ culminated on November 2, 1917, in

(1) In *Isvestia*, November 24, 1917; reprinted in the *Manchester Guardian*, January 19, 1918, and in *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, p. 16. The contents of the agreement were revealed to the Sharif by the Turks; Italy, who was apparently acquainted with its terms by the beginning of 1917, was compensated by the St Jean de Maurienne agreement of April 17, 1917, which later proved abortive.

(2) See Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*, pp. 112–16. Zionist opinion, however, was divided on this question, many leaders favouring acceptance of Uganda, at least as a temporary refuge.

(3) He had, while there, invented an important process yielding the acetone required for manufacturing cordite. See Melchett, pp. 120–2.

(4) See Stein, *Zionism*, pp. 90–1.

the so-called Balfour Declaration, which was in point of fact a letter written by Mr Balfour to Lord Rothschild which contained the following statement:

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.”

The French Government expressed its approval of the scheme on February 14, 1918¹; the Italian Government also approved it, and the sentiment which prompted it received the warm support of public opinion in the United States.

The suggestion is often heard that the declaration was made to induce the rich American Jews to use their influence to make the United States Government enter the War. Dr Weizmann denies this, ascribing the promise to “recognition of the yearning of an old race” and to motives of redress for the position of Jews in the world. He also disclaims the suggestion that the British made the offer for imperialist reasons, pointing out that “when the British Government agreed to issue the famous Balfour Declaration, it agreed on one condition: that Palestine should not be the charge of Great Britain.”²

Undoubtedly altruistic motives, stimulated by deep feelings on the subject of the Holy Land, contributed to the British Government’s decision, for they inspired the enthusiasm and energy of men like Balfour.³ But at a time when victory at all costs was a paramount consideration it is hardly likely that the War Cabinet would have taken the decision from wholly disinterested motives. “It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion from information we received from every part of the world⁴ that it was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community.”⁵

The value of the Declaration as a War measure is obvious if one studies the concern it caused among the enemy Powers, Germany and Turkey, the former being affected not only because of the large

(1) Hunter Miller, vol. v, p. 20.

(2) “Palestine To-day,” *International Affairs*, September–October 1936, p. 673.

(3) For an account of the rôle he played, see Blanche E. C. Dugdale: *Arthur James Balfour*, vol. ii, chapter xi; for his personal feelings on the subject, see in particular a speech quoted on p. 217.

(4) For proof that the Allies were exercised as to the attitude of the Jews of the United States, see the reports of the British Ambassador, *Letters and Friendships of Cecil Spring Rice*, vol. ii, pp. 420–2.

(5) Mr Lloyd George in the House of Commons. *Hansard*, June 19, 1936, col. 1343.

Jewish population within the Reich but also because of the high percentage of Jews in the parts of Eastern Europe—Ukraine, Poland, and Rumania—occupied by German troops.

Rival offers were therefore contemplated. On December 31, 1917, Talaat Pasha told a correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* that he was prepared to offer German Zionists some form of chartered company with local self-government of a limited character and rights of immigration into Palestine; the resultant negotiations in Berlin yielded a new combination of Jewish societies called *Vereinigung Jüdischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte des Ostens*, the German Government finally securing the concessions in Constantinople in July 1918. But by this time Palestine was in the hands of the Allies, and a Zionist commission which had begun work in March was, thanks to the tact of Dr Weizmann, already on good terms with the Arab leaders.¹

Meanwhile Arab hopes were raised by a joint Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918, which defined the War aims of the Allies in the East and promised "administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations, in Syria and Mesopotamia."² This was felt among Arabs to supersede or at least to qualify the Sykes-Picot agreement.

It is often pointed out that this declaration omits Palestine; to this the reply of the Palestinian Arabs is that they did not take it as such, the main reason which they give for their interpretation being that they did not use the name Palestine, and knew the whole region as Syria, and that the declaration was distributed throughout the whole of Greater Syria (i.e. including what is now Palestine) and Mesopotamia.

There seem to have been high hopes at the Peace Conference that the promises to Jews and Arabs could be implemented simultaneously. The Jews were fully prepared that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."³ The Arabs, represented by the Sharif's son, the Emir Feisul, and by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, were equally conciliatory.

"In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk

(1) The first meeting between Dr Weizmann and the Emir Feisul took place at the latter's camp at Gueira, between Aquaba and Maan, at the beginning of June 1918.

(2) For text of main passages, see *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, p. 141.

(3) "Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine," Hunter Miller vol. v, p. 15.

assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.”¹

According to Dr Hunter Miller’s notes, Feisul also stated, at the meeting of the Supreme Council to which he presented the Arab demands for fulfilment of the promises of the Allies, that “Palestine, for its universal character, should be left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum.”²

An incident of January 1919 illustrates the cordiality and optimism prevalent on all sides.³ Feisul, then in London with Lawrence, met Dr Weizmann, of the Zionist Organization. They had met several times in the previous six months, but this time committed to paper an agreement⁴ promising “the most cordial goodwill and understanding.” Both were convinced that this was possible, for Article IV read:

“All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.”

Looking back upon this incident, it seems unfortunate that neither party represented a body sovereign in Palestine. Feisul, as the son of the Sharif, doubtless felt entitled at the time to speak for the Arab peoples of Asia. But as their lands were subsequently divided he came, in spite of his and Lawrence’s hopes, to represent Iraq only. It would seem from the wording of a reservation to the agreement that he and Lawrence foresaw this possibility; it runs:

“If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of January 4 addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement;

(Signed) Feisul ibn Hussein.”

As things turned out, Feisul could not be “answerable”; his agreement with Dr Weizmann therefore becomes a personal document of purely historic interest.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established

(1) “Memorandum by the Emir Feisul,” Hunter Miller, vol. iv, p. 297.

(2) Hunter Miller, vol. xiv, p. 230.

(3) Described by Dr Weizmann in *The Times*, June 10, 1936.

(4) The text was quoted at length in *The Times* of June 10, 1936.

the Mandates system, the guiding principle of which is that "the well-being and development" of the inhabitants of certain enemy colonies and territories shall be a "sacred trust for civilization" under the tutelage of a Mandatory on behalf of the League.

The reception of this arrangement by the Jews and Arabs is interesting. Feisul's willingness to accept "the effective superposition of a great trustee" was doubtless due to the influence of Lawrence, who held this view. Not all Arabs thought likewise, and President Wilson, realizing this, attempted to fulfil the clause in the Covenant which lays down that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory" by securing the appointment of an Allied commission to ascertain their wishes. When the British and French failed to fall in with his plan, he sent a private American commission—under H. C. King and C. R. Crane—which received petitions and interviewed delegations all over Palestine and Syria in June–July 1919.¹

The chief points in the report affecting Palestine were (i) "Strong sentiment favourable to complete independence for a united Syria (including Palestine) but if supervision was necessary, the United States was preferred, then Great Britain . . . (ii) Strong opposition to the Zionist proposal was also indicated."² But the King-Crane report was not published until 1922 and was in any case unofficial, so Feisul's was the last word for the Arabs.

The Zionist Organization was more specific:

"We ask that Great Britain shall act as Mandatory of the League of Nations for Palestine. The selection of Great Britain as Mandatory is urged on the ground that this is the wish of the Jews of the world, and the League of Nations in selecting a Mandatory will follow, as far as possible, the popular wish of the people concerned."³

The allocation of the Mandate was for several reasons a slow process. In the first place it hung upon Anglo-French agreement as to the validity of the Sykes-Picot arrangements for the whole of the ex-Turkish territories, and this was held up by discord over Syria and Mosul, involving discussions *très vives de ton*⁴ between Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George. As a result of the compromise Palestine, which had under the Sykes-Picot plan been destined for international administration, in the end passed by mutual consent into British tutelage. The next delay was caused by the United States, which

(1) For details see Stannard Baker: *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. ii, pp. 205–22, and also "the important minutes of March 29, 1919, in which the whole noisome business of the partition of Turkey was poured out in a secret session of the Heads of States;" vol. iii, pp. 1–19.

(2) Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, p. 45.

(3) Hunter Miller, vol. v, p. 21.

(4) The description is Monsieur Tardieu's; see *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920.

through "participation in the victory" asserted its right to an equal voice in deciding the Mandates over Turkish territory,¹ but at the same time was not participating in the League meetings upon the subject. Finally, Italy objected to the confirmation of the Palestine Mandates until certain questions outstanding between France and Italy in regard to Syria had been disposed of.

These obstacles account for the late date of the completion of the Palestine negotiations. The Supreme Council, sitting at San Remo, allocated the Mandate to Great Britain on April 25, 1920, adding a rider to the effect that the Mandatory Power should be responsible for giving effect to the Balfour Declaration. The terms of the Mandate were the next problem; the long discussion involved included a bitter controversy as to the composition and functions of the International Commission to which it was proposed to refer certain questions relating to the Holy Places, and the draft suggested called forth criticisms from the Papacy and from various Moslem organizations for being too pro-Jewish, from Jewish organizations as imposing too rigid a limit on Jewish privileges, and from the British House of Lords as being contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine.

The final draft was tentatively confirmed by the League Council on July 22, 1922. But it was felt undesirable to promulgate it in advance of the French Mandate for Syria, and since this was held up pending the composing of certain Franco-Italian differences, the final entry into force of the two Mandates did not take place until September 29, 1923.

The terms of the Mandate² endeavoured to fulfil the promises made:

*The
Provisions of
the Mandate*

Article 2.—The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

The Balfour Declaration to the Jews was further implemented by the promise of a recognized Jewish Agency to advise the Administration on the establishment of the National Home, and by undertakings to facilitate immigration and encourage close settlement of Jews on the land, subject to the rights and position of other sections of the population. The Mandatory also promised the

(1) Note from Secretary Hughes to the Allied Powers, August 1921, quoted in Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, p. 54. This book deals fully (pp. 48-56) with the whole incident of American delay.

(2) For the full text of the Palestine Mandate, see Appendix II, ii.

encouragement of local autonomy and undertook all responsibility with respect to rights and access to the Holy Places.

The only complication arising out of the War-time promises and the Mandate seemed to be the fact that the Mandatory differed from the Palestinian Arabs as to the meaning of the McMahon undertaking, and that many Arabs therefore denied the validity of the Mandate. Apart from this, there appears to have been every hope that the Mandatory would implement its triple promise under the Mandate: namely, to safeguard Arab rights, to provide a National Home for the Jews, and to secure for the joint community self-government.

NOTE ON TRANSJORDAN

Under the terms of Article 25 of the Mandate,¹ Transjordan was included in the Mandated Territory of Palestine, but by virtue of a saving clause in the Article the Mandatory was empowered to withhold application of any clauses of the Mandate which he might consider to be inapplicable to Transjordan, and to provide it with such administration as he might think fit.

In the British view, Transjordan did (whereas Palestine did not) fall within the area in which the McMahon promise of independence applied, and in September 1922 the British Government therefore secured the League Council's approval of a memorandum² proposing that Transjordan should be exempted from all those clauses dealing with the Holy Places and the Jewish National Home. On the strength of this, Jews have been refused the right to acquire land in Transjordan, a step which they resent as being an infraction of the Article of the joint Mandate which provides against discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or language.³

Transjordan is therefore somewhat detached from the problems with which this memorandum deals, and apart from the brief outline of its subsequent history given below, is not further dealt with.

(1) See Appendix II, ii.

(2) See British White Paper, Cmd. 1785. In the Jewish view, there is no justification for this contention. If the phrase "the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus . . ." is held by the British Government to "embrace all that portion of Syria (including what is now called Palestine) lying to the west of *inter alia* the administrative area known as the Vilayet of Syria," it follows, in the Jewish view, that the territories lying to the east of the Jordan which were in the same longitude (i.e. part of what is to-day Transjordan) must *ipso facto* have been included in the reservation. They therefore hold that the area in which the National Home was to be established was arbitrarily and unjustifiably reduced by Article 25 of the Mandate. (See map at end.)

(3) See Weizmann, "The Palestine White Paper," *Week End Review*, November 1, 1930. Article 15 is the article in question.

There had been no British occupation of Transjordan after the Armistice, and no supervision except in so far as local chiefs were loosely guided by a handful of British political officers. The first step towards fulfilment of the independence promise was taken in February 1921, when the British authorities in Jerusalem negotiated an agreement under which the Emir Abdullah—son of the Sharif and elder brother to the Emir Feisul—was recognized as “administrator” under the Mandate. This arrangement was confirmed by a Conference which met in Cairo under Mr Winston Churchill, and, in 1922, by the British Cabinet. It was followed in 1923 by the recognition of an “independent Government” under British tutelage, as in Iraq.¹ In 1928 the British Government signed with the Emir Abdullah a treaty² laying down the principle of indirect administration:

Article 2.—“The powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area under Mandate known as Trans-Jordan by His Highness the Emir through such constitutional government as is defined and determined in the Organic Law of Trans-Jordan and any amendment thereof made with the approval of His Britannic Majesty.”

In matters such as foreign relations, financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners, and freedom of conscience, the Emir agreed to be guided by British advice. This advice is exercised through the representative of the Mandatory in Transjordan—the British Resident appointed under Article 1 of the 1928 Treaty, who acts under the direction of the High Commissioner for Transjordan (who is also High Commissioner for Palestine.³) The 1928 Treaty was, in June 1934, supplemented by an agreement⁴ which enabled the Emir to appoint consular representatives in neighbouring Arab States. In May 1939, the British Government announced its agreement in principle to the formation of a Council of Ministers (or Cabinet) in place of the existing Executive Council of Transjordan; each member of the new Council will be in charge of a department and will be responsible to the Emir. The existing restrictions upon the Emir’s power of raising and maintaining military forces in Transjordan would, it was further announced, be deleted from the Treaty.⁵

(1) See Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, p. 362.

(2) British White Paper, Cmd. 3069.

(3) The Annual Reports of the Mandatory for Transjordan to the Council of the League of Nations are bound in with the reports for Palestine, in which they form a separate section. For collected information, see Luke and Keith-Roach, *Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan* (3rd edition) 1934.

(4) British White Paper, Cmd. 4999.

(5) *The Times*, May 17, 1939.

III. THE CONTRASTING COMMUNITIES

APITFALL to be avoided when weighing up the issues in Palestine is the assumption that each community is an unmixed entity. Actually the social, political or economic differences within both sections of the population often account for the development of events; so, sometimes, do their religious or political connections with communities outside Palestine. It is therefore worth while to describe the two communities before embarking on the history of Palestine under the Mandate, in spite of the drawback that to do so breaks the sequence of the chronological story.

I. POLITICAL CONTRASTS

(a) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JEWS

The bulk of the Jews in Palestine¹ belong to or are in agreement with the Zionist Organization—the world-wide body whose membership is open to all who advocate the creation of a Jewish Home in Palestine secured by public law.

*General and
Orthodox
Zionists*

An influential group in Palestine is that formed by the General and Orthodox (*Mizrachi*) Zionist Parties, which differ only on religious grounds, and which, between them, account for perhaps 40 per cent of the community. They consist mainly of middle-class settlers, of intellectuals, and of the professional classes.

*The Labour
Party*

At present the largest group supporting the Zionist Organization is the Labour Party—colloquially known as the Poalim—which now comprises at least 50 per cent of the total Jewish population.² It directs in great part the activities of the *Histadruth*, or Jewish Federation of Labour, whose membership of over 100,000 in 1937 comprised at least 80 per cent of the Jewish workers of Palestine, and included farmers and members of the professional classes as well as labourers and industrial workers. The *Histadruth* is far more than a trade union; besides managing co-operative societies and organizing labour banks and credit unions it also acts as a colonizing agency, and helps to train young settlers; it also at times acts as a contracting undertaking.

As originally conceived, the *Histadruth's* policy departed on two points from that of the General Zionists. In the first place, its aim was a progressive labour policy, that is, the combination of social reform with any settlement scheme:

(1) The Jewish population, as estimated on June 30, 1938, was 401,600.

(2) The party is growing in influence not only in Palestine but throughout the world. At the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in 1933 Labour had for the first time more delegates than any other party.

"The *Histadruth* considers it its duty to create a new type of Jewish worker and to see to it that, while colonization is developing, the Jewish worker, who came into being as a result of this very colonization process, shall be assured the place which is his due."¹

In the second place, it stood for a policy of comparative moderation towards the Arabs; indeed, its leaders at one time tried to organize trade unions among them, partly in the hope of raising the Arab standard of living and thereby removing the threat to Jewish labour.²

Apart from the Zionists there are only two groups of any importance. The first are the Right Wing Revisionists under the leadership of Vladimir Jabotinsky, who in 1935 withdrew from the Zionist Organization and founded the New Zionist Organization. The size and influence of this party has tended to vary in inverse proportion to the rate of immigration; at present they claim to constitute about 17 per cent of the Jews in Palestine. Zionists, however, estimate their numbers at somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent. They also hold (probably with truth) that their ideas are shared by many who are not in their organization. The Revisionists fiercely and constantly attack any policy of moderation; they hold that the promise embodied in the Balfour Declaration is one of a Jewish state, and aim at setting this up as speedily as possible in both Palestine and Transjordan. Their proclaimed objective is the production of a Jewish majority in Palestine and they therefore look upon immigration as transcending all other issues; only when the Jews are in a majority is Palestine to receive self-government, "so that under a democratic rule the Jewish point of view shall always prevail."³ The claims of the Revisionists have undoubtedly aggravated Arab fears.⁴

*The
Revisionists*

The second group outside the Zionist Organization is the *Agudath Israel*, comprising the strictly religious and wholly non-political Jews. These now claim to represent 20 per cent of the total

*Non-Zionist
Jews*

(1) Revusky, p. 237. The quotation is from the programme adopted at the first *Histadruth* Convention in November 1920.

(2) Revusky, pp. 239-40.

(3) Statement by Mr Jabotinsky, quoted in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 265.

(4) This is hardly to be wondered at when one reads the extravagances of Revisionist extremists, which the Zionist Organization is the first to deplore; for instance, the Arab paper *Palestine and Transjordan* recently quoted the following statement as coming from a Revisionist leader: "Our Zionist imperialism will flourish under the protection and support of any Power on condition that that Power will show no mercy to the Arab population and uses an iron fist under which the Arabs shall not be allowed to move." This instance is quoted by Sir Ernest Bennett in the *Nineteenth Century*, September 1936, p. 335.

Jewish population and are in part the remnants or offspring of the 55,000 Jewish inhabitants of Palestine at the time of the Armistice, many of whom were non-Zionist. They have so far remained outside the jurisdiction of the General Council of the Jews of Palestine,¹ with whom they differ on matters of ritual and education, and at their own request do not form part of the community as recognized under the Ordinance of 1927. Indeed, they have at times gone so far as to appeal unsuccessfully to the Mandatory and to the League for official recognition as a separate community.² Their appeal failed, and their relations with the newcomers for years remained very bitter. But there seem to be some signs that this separation is breaking down; negotiations for the inclusion of the *Agudath Israel* within the recognized Jewish community took place in 1934-5 and the Administration has since reported that "the differences between the two bodies have been notably less acute . . . Political and economic unity may without much difficulty be achieved between them."³ In the spring of 1939 the *Agudath Israel* co-operated with the Zionist Organization and the Jewish delegation that took part in the Palestine Conference with the British Government.

Since at least 80 per cent, if not more, of the Palestinian Jews endorse the policy of the Zionist Organization, no description of the Jewish Community there is complete without some indication of the views held by this important world-wide body.⁴

The ideal of a return to the Promised Land has long been cherished by Jews:

"The Jews have always hoped—it was an article of faith for religious and even for non-religious Jews—that a day might come when they would be allowed to return to the land of their ancestors. They have never given up this claim. They prayed for it. They fasted for it. And events have proved that it was not merely a romantic attachment on the part of a dispossessed people to a country of which they were deprived two thousand years ago."⁵

But the Zionist Organization proper was not founded until 1897, when the anti-Jewish outbreaks which occurred at the time of the Dreyfus case inspired the founder, Herzl, with the idea of an organized movement for a Jewish home. His conception found its strongest support where persecution was severest, that is to say in

(1) See below, p. 21.

(2) Petition from the Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community of Jerusalem: Permanent Mandates Commission: *Minutes of the Seventh Session*, pp. 181-3.

(3) *Report on the Administration of Palestine for 1935*, p. 18.

(4) For a short account of the movement and its relation to the Palestine situation, see Israel Cohen, *The Progress of Zionism* (4th edition) 1938. For a popular history, see Stein, *Zionism*. See also Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*.

(5) Weizmann, "Palestine To-day," *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 671.

Eastern Europe,¹ but the more moderate practical Zionism prevalent elsewhere has always dominated the movement.

At the time of the allocation of the Mandate in 1922, the General Zionist Party—a moderate centre group under Dr Chaim Weizmann—was in control, claiming no less than 306 out of a total of 445 delegates at the Twelfth Zionist Congress of 1921. They continued to enjoy this supremacy for many years, thanks partly to Dr Weizmann's personal prestige—which was all the greater because he was known to command the confidence of the middle-class Jews on whose generosity the colonization of Palestine depended—and thanks also to the generous support which he received from the important Labour elements in Palestine itself. He lost authority in 1930 when the publication of a British White Paper² on policy in Palestine convinced many Jews that moderation did not pay, and that the Revisionists had been right after all. The disappointment of the Jewish people as a whole was reflected in Dr Weizmann's temporary eclipse, his place as head of the Organization being taken by his friend Dr Sokolow, but the former was reinstated at the Nineteenth Zionist Congress in 1935, and was again re-elected at the Twentieth Congress in August 1937.

At the same time it should be noted that, despite all his efforts, Dr Weizmann's influence was not sufficient to carry a vote in favour of partition at the Zionist Congress which followed the publication of the Peel Report. Here, in face of persecution, new alignments were discernible among the Jews, dependent less upon party considerations in Palestine than upon the risks to be faced in the world without.³ An analysis of the vote on that occasion shows that whereas the persecuted Jews of Central Europe followed Dr Weizmann in desiring partition, the devout Zionists turned down "Zionism without Zion," and were able to carry the day thanks to the vote of the assimilated Jews from the Western Democracies, who feared that the creation of a Palestinian State might rob them of their prized American and British citizenship.⁴

The failure of the Revisionist group to retain the support it had won as a result of the 1930 White Paper perhaps requires a word of explanation. At first, it could be accounted for by the prosperous and comparatively peaceful condition of Palestine between 1930 and 1935, and by the growth of the Zionist Labour movement;

(1) For the effect of this upon immigration into Palestine, see below, pp. 60-2.

(2) See below, pp. 49-52.

(3) For an account of the views expressed at the Congress, see below, pp. 91-2.

(4) See H. Beeley, in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, pp. 543-4.

later, by the murder of Dr Arlosoroff, a Labour member of the Zionist Executive, at Tel-Aviv in 1933. (Although the three Revisionists who were put on trial were all acquitted, many Jews continued to believe that it was the Revisionists who were responsible for the murder.) Next came the Revisionists' complete break with the other Zionist parties in 1935; and finally, when the serious troubles of 1937 and 1938 led some of them to perpetrate reprisals, they brought down upon themselves the wrath of all but a hot-headed minority.

Under Article IV of the Mandate "an appropriate Jewish Agency" was to advise and co-operate with the Administration on the establishment of the National Home, and from 1922 until 1929 the Zionist Organization acted as such. But the same Article IV also provided that steps should be taken to secure the co-operation of *all* Jews who were willing to assist in the establishment of the National Home, and Zionism did not represent the whole of Jewry—particularly not the Jews of Western Europe and America who, being assimilated to the countries of their adoption, were mainly non-Zionist.

Negotiations towards the creation of an enlarged Jewish Agency proceeded from 1924 onwards,¹ and in 1927 the President of the Zionist Organization visited the United States, where he reached agreement with the head of the non-Zionist American Jews. After consultation with the Mandatory Power, the two branches of Jewry set up a Joint Palestine Survey Commission to report on the conditions in Palestine, and to draw up a programme of development. Finally, in 1929, after the report of the Commission had been examined, the new Agency came formally into being. It consists of a Council on which Zionists and non-Zionists are equally represented, and of a standing executive in Palestine. The President of the Zionist Organization is *ex officio* President of the Jewish Agency.²

Although it was satisfactory both to the Mandatory and to the Jewish people that there should now be a Jewish Agency which represented the whole of Jewry excepting a few extremist groups, this did not mean that there was any great practical change. Long before 1929 non-Zionist Jews—particularly in the United States—had contributed considerable sums towards the Palestine Foundation Fund for the development of Palestine. Nor has the presence of the non-Zionists on the Council of the Jewish Agency appeared to

(1) See Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, p. 385.

(2) For full details see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, pp. 245-51.

exercise much influence on the policy of the latter. This has been mainly determined, as it was before 1929, by the various parties of the Zionist Organization.

The powers of the Jewish Agency are considerable. Not only does it carry on all negotiations with the Palestine Government on matters which concern the Jewish community; it also controls to a very large degree the work of colonization and settlement. Its officials estimate the demand for labour which forms the basis of the Government's labour immigration schedules. It trains and selects the immigrants admitted under the schedule; it governs the policy of the two most important Jewish colonization funds, the Jewish National Fund for buying land, and the Palestine Foundation Fund (*Keren Hayesod*) for the establishment of settlers.¹ The Jewish Agency and its branch organizations have founded schools, hospitals, and agricultural and medical research stations, and in this way have maintained a far higher standard of living for the Jewish community in Palestine than would otherwise have been possible. This policy has been criticized by the Revisionists, who consider that it is the Government who should provide these services, and that the whole funds of the Jewish Agency should be devoted to immigration and colonization. The falling off of subscriptions to the *Keren Hayesod* in the slump years, and the consequent embarrassment of the Jewish Agency in carrying out the work it had begun, lent point to the Revisionist argument, but since 1934 these subscriptions have revived and have consistently proved greater than was estimated.

*The Work of
the Agency*

Some of the social services established by the Jewish Agency are now run by the Palestinian Jews themselves; for example, the education service which was transferred from the control of the Jewish Agency in 1933. The Jewish community in Palestine has its own assembly of representatives elected on a wide franchise, which appoints yearly the Jewish General Council (*Vaad Leumi*). In 1927 these organizations were officially recognized² and the Jewish community was granted a certain measure of self-government, including the right to levy taxes for education and other communal purposes through the *Vaad Leumi*.

(1) The total amount spent in Palestine out of these two funds between 1917 and June 1936 was £9,409,000, of which £6,214,000 came from the *Keren Hayesod*. The total expenditure of funds from Jewish sources by the principal Zionist institutions over the same period was £14,037,000; this figure does not, however, represent total Jewish expenditure in Palestine, since it is exclusive of certain non-Zionist funds, notably the P.I.C.A.

(2) Jewish Community Regulations, 1927.

(b) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARABS

Organization
of the
Community

As opposed to the orderly picture afforded by the Jewish political organization, the Arab community presents a shifting scene. It has never been organized on a basis comparable to that of the Jews. The Mandatory Power is often blamed for this,¹ in the Mandates Commission and elsewhere, but it is not altogether for lack of effort on its part that there is no Arab Agency to match the Jewish Agency.² The Arabs do not enjoy any equivalent of the Jewish General Council (*Vaad Leumi*).

Religious

Of the 87,000 (approximately) Christian Arabs the majority are members of the Greek Orthodox Church under the leadership of the Orthodox Patriarch. They have no religious organization comparable with that of the much larger Moslem Community, whose religious affairs are governed by the Supreme Moslem Council, formed as the outcome of regulations drawn up by an Arab Assembly in 1921 and approved by the High Commissioner. The Council, which wielded considerable power (until the day in 1937 when the British authorities, suspecting it of sedition, deprived it of its funds and its leader), consisted of a President, and of four members elected for four years, two of whom represent Jerusalem, and the other two Nablus and Acre. Originally these members were elected; but, on account of irregularities which marked the elections held in 1925, the High Commissioner, in the thirteen years which followed, himself nominated the five representatives. The fact that the Council was nominated, not elected, and was therefore not composed of "men enjoying the confidence of their own community," was more than once criticized by the Permanent Mandates Commission.³

Nevertheless, the Council enjoyed considerable scope, owing to its control, subject to Government approval, of the Moslem Religious Courts (which have sole jurisdiction in matters of personal status of Moslems), and to its funds derived from its control over the Moslems *waqfs* (private or public endowments). Tithe from *waqf* lands "forms 55 per cent of the revenue of the Moslem religious endowments in Palestine, and the *waqf* tithe is approximately 12.75 per cent of the total tithe revenue of the country."⁴ While the Supreme Moslem Council is required to submit its budget for the expenditure of these funds to the Government "for

(1) See e.g. P.M.C., *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, pp. 148-9.

(2) See below, p. 37.

(3) See P.M.C.: *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 148.

(4) Luke and Keith-Roach, p.44.

information," the latter have, normally, no effective means of checking such expenditure; and in fact the Mufti of Jerusalem has been widely accused—notably by one of the leaders of the National Defence Party, Fakhiri Bey Nashashibi¹—of using his official position and the funds of the *Waqf* to build up and arm his following and to promote terrorist activities.

It was belief that these funds were being used for political purposes that caused the British authorities on October 1, 1937, to deprive the Mufti of Jerusalem of his office of President of the Council, and to take over the administration of the *waqf* coffers, thus depriving the body of its livelihood and of an impetus which it has never since regained.²

While the Arab community has always, for various reasons, been far less developed intellectually—and therefore politically—than the Jewish, a radical change has taken place in the last few years, and is still in process—although clear-cut political divisions and doctrines have yet to be evolved. Indeed, the impact of Western civilization—which began long before the War, but which was increasingly felt under the Mandatory régime—from the start influenced Arab political and religious life. For it awoke the social force "which convulsed and devastated the Ottoman Empire in its latter days . . . —the Western conception and consciousness of nationality."³ The importance of this profound and widespread movement in the countries of the Near East—not only in the Mandated Territories but in Egypt and the autonomous States of the Arabian peninsula—was described by Hans Kohn in his *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, and, more recently, by Mr George Antonius in *The Arab Awakening*. Political

In Palestine, as elsewhere, the rise of the spirit of nationalism vitally affected the status of religion. Religious feeling was not necessarily weakened, but it was altered and no longer remained supreme. The deep division between Christian and Moslem Arabs which existed under Turkish rule in Palestine disappeared, and Christian and Moslem began to work together, sharing the same aims of independence and unity. "To-day the Mohammedan is primarily a member of his nation or a citizen of his State, and only afterwards a Mohammedan."⁴ Religion, however, has at times been a useful rallying cry.

(1) In a memorandum sent to the High Commissioner on November 15, 1938. (See *The Palestine Post*, January 6, 1939, and *Report for 1937*, p. 21.)

(2) See below, pp. 99–100.

(3) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 252.

(4) Kohn: *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, p. 24; cf. the analogous

But in spite of this trend, the Arab leaders in Palestine have rarely succeeded in creating such a solid nationalist movement as has existed in Egypt. Although religious barriers had broken down, the old feuds between the leading families of the Arab aristocracy—particularly the Husseini and the Nashashibi—still persisted. In fact,

“It was only at times of the most violent disturbance, when the nationalist movements concentrated in armed revolts, that a powerful united front was created and the agitation penetrated far into the masses.”¹

*The Arab
Executive*

The body which, until 1936, was at the head of the nationalist movement in Palestine, and which usually handled the Arab case against the Government, was the Arab Executive elected by the Palestine Arab Congress. The first Congress was held in 1920 as a result of the growth of the joint Moslem-Christian associations led by leaders of the Husseini family. Until 1925 the Arab Executive, which denied the validity of the Mandate, pursued a policy of non-cooperation with the Government, but later its aim changed. The Seventh Arab Congress held in Jerusalem in 1925, at which all the chief Arab political parties were represented, issued a memorandum demanding the establishment of a democratic parliamentary system of government. To this demand, as circumstances came to require, was later added the claim for the cessation of Jewish immigration.

*The Arab
Higher
Committee*

From 1935 onwards the growing Arab uneasiness was expressed in a tendency to crystallize into regularly constituted parties. The consolidation of six of these was noted in the Mandatory Power's Report for 1935, which enumerated their names and their leaders as follows:—

- (1) The Palestine Arab Party, under the leadership of Jamal effendi Husseini (a kinsman of the Mufti of Jerusalem).
- (2) The National Defence Party, under the leadership of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi (formerly Mayor of Jerusalem).
- (3) The Reform Party, with no president; of which one member of the Committee is Dr Khalidi (Mayor of Jerusalem).
- (4) The National Bloc, under the leadership of Abdul Latif Bey Salah of Nablus.
- (5) Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth, led by Yakub effendi Ghusein.
- (6) The Istiqlal (Independence) Party, under the leadership of Auni Bey Abdul Hadi.

By the autumn of 1935 these groups had in a quite unprecedented way sunk their difference in the interests of nationalism, and with the exception of the Istiqlal, had together approached the High

movement in Turkey which culminated in the Bill of April 9, 1928, which brought about the final disestablishment of Islam as the State religion.

- (1) Kohn, p. 115.

Commissioner with certain national demands.¹ In April 1936 the party leaders combined to form an Arab Higher Committee. This body, which superseded the Arab Executive as the chief mouth-piece of the Arab cause, conducted negotiations on behalf of the whole population throughout the disturbances of 1936, and appears to have been in closer touch with the rank and file than any previous Arab body—contact being maintained by means of a new organization in the form of local Arab national committees. These, which constituted cells of the national movement, attended to strike action and relief² with a competence which convinced some observers that the handiwork of a new type of young and educated Arab was discernible.

Immediately after the publication of the *Peel Report* on June 22, 1937, however, a cleavage became apparent within the Arab Higher Committee. Although the latter was composed of representatives of all six parties, it was dominated by Jamal Husseini's Palestine Arab Party—the most important group, not only owing to its size but to its family connections. For Haj Amin Husseini was Mufti of Jerusalem, and the group to which he belonged enjoyed authority thanks to his prestige among Moslems as controller of their Supreme Council and of their *Waqf* endowments. This domination was particularly resented by the Nashashibi National Defence Party, which, on July 21, 1937, seceded from the Committee and proceeded to publish a separate memorandum on the *Peel Report*. This differed little from that of the Arab Higher Committee in its uncompromising rejection of the solution of partition; and the rift would appear to have been due to a recrudescence of the old rivalry between the feudal families, rather than to any serious political differences.

*Party
Quarrels,
1937-9*

Shortly afterwards (October 1937) the Government found it necessary to dissolve the Arab Higher Committee and all National Committees, and to deport six Arab leaders.³ The Mufti of Jerusalem, deprived at the same time of his offices of President of the Supreme Moslem Council and Chairman of the General *Waqf* Committee, fled to Lebanon, from whence he directed the terrorist

(1) The Istiqlal, which is affiliated to the Pan-Arab Istiqlal (Independence) movement, had for some time been inactive and disorganized, but towards the end of 1935 the High Commissioner reported that it became more active, associating with independent extremists in its denunciation of the Administration. For details of the demands of the five parties, see below, p. 74.

(2) For a description of their work, see *Daily Telegraph*, September 21, 1936. By September 1936 the organization was sufficiently formed to allow of the calling of a Congress of Local Committees, details of which are given below (see p. 81).

(3) See below, p. 99.

activities which continued throughout 1938; while the National Defence Party gradually acquired a reputation for moderation—in its methods, if not in its aspirations—which helped to draw down upon many of its members attacks no less dangerous than those which the Mufti's followers inflicted upon the Jews and British officials.¹ By the beginning of 1939 party differences seemed more than ever to be developing into a personal struggle between the Mufti and the Nashashibi family for supremacy over the Palestinian Arabs. The Mufti, from outside the country, strove to maintain his leadership. The Nashashibi, possessing the advantage of being within its frontiers, endeavoured to wrest that leadership from him. But just as in 1937 the National Defence Party had been at one with the Arab Higher Committee in rejecting the idea of partition, so during the London Conference of 1939, the Palestinian Arabs were ultimately able to subordinate their divergent views and personal rivalries at least to the extent of presenting a united demand for the creation of an independent Palestinian State.²

2. CONTRASTS IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

(a) THE ARAB COMMUNITY

Though the impact of the West is now profoundly influencing the Arab political scene, it has so far little affected the social structure of the Arab community; the economic structure it has only affected in parts.

The life led by the community is not unlike that of medieval Europe; it is a feudal organization consisting of a small number of landowning families and a backward peasantry, partly nomadic (*bedawi*) and partly settled (*hadari*) and chiefly engaged in agriculture. This situation is in the main a legacy of Turkish rule,³ under which the Arab aristocracy, principally on the strength of their long-established local position, were taken into the governing class (the so-called *effendi* class) of the Ottoman Empire.

To-day the Palestinian Arab community is still predominantly agricultural, about 64 per cent of the total Moslem population

*Nature of
Population*

(1) Among other examples may be cited frequent attempts on the life of Fakhri Bey Nashashibi and the murder of his cousin, a boy of sixteen, shot while watching a football match (*Manchester Guardian*, March 6, 1939).

(2) For a further account of Arab party quarrels, see below, pp. 106-7.

(3) The Turks won Palestine from the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt in 1516-17. The Arab invasion had taken place in the seventh century.

being dependent on agriculture.¹ The nomadic element survives but is probably dwindling. The Beduin were estimated at 103,331 in the 1922 census, and though this is thought to have been an over-estimate, the number recorded had fallen to 66,553 in 1931.

The backwardness of the agricultural population can be put down to a number of factors, among them the barrenness of much of the country,² and the heavy indebtedness of the peasants,³ but up till now one of the fundamental obstacles to agricultural development has been the Arab system of land tenure⁴ and the prevalence of the system known as *Mesha'a*.

Under *Mesha'a*, which is the Arab equivalent of the Open Field System in feudal England, the whole of the village property is held in common. Each cultivator has a right to a fraction of the whole, but has no separate parcel of land allotted to him permanently. Within each tribal division of the village, the shares are as a rule re-allotted every two years. This is the great evil of the system; for no cultivator is likely to improve land simply for the benefit of his successor. But this situation is improving; in recent years considerable progress has been made with the partitioning of *Mesha'a* land.⁵

Another serious bar to development is insecurity of tenure. Here the lack of detailed statistics (which has been strikingly evident in many departments of Palestinian life until quite recently)⁶ makes it hard to be precise, for the relative proportions of land held by owner-occupiers and by tenants are not known. But it is clear that "very large areas are held by resident and non-resident landlords."⁷ As a rule the Arab holds his land on a yearly tenancy, terminable by the landlord at will. The danger of this situation in view of the large Jewish demand for land was soon obvious; early

Bars to
Development
(1) Land
Tenure

(2) Insecurity
of Tenure

(1) 1931 census figure; the (approximate) 73,000 Christian Arabs were predominantly engaged in industry and commerce. See 1931 Census Report, vol. i, diagram 44. For further statistics regarding the predominance of agriculture, see below, p. 45.

(2) See below, pp. 46-7.

(3) See below, p. 70.

(4) This view was held by both the experts who have reported on land development, Sir John Hope Simpson in 1930 and Mr Lewis French in 1931. For the circumstances in which these reports were issued, see below, chapter v.

(5) It was estimated by Mr French in his Report that the proportion of *Mesha'a* villages had fallen from 56 per cent in 1923 to 46 per cent in 1930 and to less than 40 per cent in 1931. The system is being further broken up in the course of the present Government Land Settlement Survey, which has achieved the amicable partition of further villages; the remainder will be partitioned as the Land Settlement Ordinance (1928-32) comes into operation.

The progress made with this is recorded each year in the *Report on the Administration of Palestine*.

(6) A Department of Statistics was established in 1936.

(7) *Palestine Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development*. By Sir John Hope Simpson, 1930 (Cmd. 3686), p. 34. [This Report is cited later as "Hope Simpson Report."]

attempts to remedy it¹ proved more or less abortive, but recent legislation has improved matters,² and a measure has lately been promised guaranteeing to all cultivators the inalienability of a minimum holding (*lot viable*).³

In respect of land tenure, therefore, it would seem that improvement, though it must be slow, is on the way. The next question is: How capable is the fellah of profiting by the change? Opinions differ as to his industry and intelligence. Sir John Hope Simpson, for instance, maintained that the Arab cultivator was endowed with both qualities and that "were he to be given the chance of learning better methods, and the capital, which is a necessary preliminary to their employment, he would rapidly improve his position"⁴; others do not agree that a capacity for application is a characteristic of the whole of the Arab population.

But however this may be, two further drawbacks are bound to retard Arab development, the first a lack of capital, the second a shortage of educational facilities.

(3) *Lack of Capital*

The Arab community enjoys no land improvement funds with which to improve conditions⁵; here it is at a great disadvantage as compared with the Jews, for without funds it cannot surmount another obstacle to development—the lack of irrigation. The Government has taken some steps to promote this, and in the case of the Huleh concession⁶ Arab cultivators have been allocated land irrigated with Jewish funds, but it would appear that the Arab community must for many generations be at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the Jews in this respect. Lacking capital, the Arab cultivator inevitably resorts to the moneylender and thereby aggravates his difficulties. Credit and thrift societies are the obvious remedy and a beginning has been made with these, though the Arab co-operatives, 128 in all, are as yet small in number and influence by comparison with the 868 societies in the powerful and self-reliant Jewish movement.

(1) The Transfer of Land Ordinance of 1920-1, and the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929.

(2) See below, p. 54.

(3) For the circumstances of this promise and its importance in view of the Arab demands, see below, p. 74.

(4) Hope Simpson Report, p. 66.

(5) On the other hand, it has been frequently pointed out that the Arab landlords to whom large sums have been paid over for purchase of land since 1919 have neglected to spend these funds on the improvement of their remaining property; that the Arab landowning class is capitalist (and often "absentee") while the Jewish community is co-operative; and that the *Waqf* funds have too often been spent on political activities instead of on education or land improvement.

(6) See below, p. 73.

The Arab is, and will be for some time to come, at an educational as well as a material disadvantage compared with the Jewish settler. Practically 100 per cent of the Jewish children are educated, almost entirely with funds provided from Jewish sources, whereas the Arabs are largely dependent on the Government schools, which in 1930 sufficed only for 13·2 per cent of the Arab children, but had by 1936 come to accommodate 42,765 out of an estimated school-age population (non-Jews) of 260,162.¹

The Mandatory spends more on Arab than on Jewish education²; nevertheless, 40 per cent of the Arab applicants for admission to the schools in 1935 were turned away for lack of room.³ This fact was strongly criticized by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its Twenty-ninth Session,⁴ especially in view of the large surplus of revenue.⁵ Both sections of population are anxious to obtain greater education facilities, and the Arabs who cannot offer financial help have shown their eagerness to co-operate in many cases by building the school houses themselves; but progress is hampered by a shortage of funds due to "the claims of other Government services,"⁶ and by a lack of teachers.

The two chief changes in the economic structure of the Arab community have occurred: (i) among a slowly forming and still small middle class, consisting chiefly of better-to-do owner-cultivators in the plains, and of the commercial and professional element in the larger towns, and (ii) among the industrial population. But compared with the numbers engaged in agriculture the figures here are insignificant. According to the 1931 census, about 3 per cent (25,000) of the total Moslem and Christian population gained a livelihood in industry (as compared with 19,000 Jews, although the Jews formed then only one quarter of the total population). The example of Western capitalism is only just be-

(1) *Report for 1937*, pp. 137-9. Non-Government Arab schools accommodated 35,434 pupils.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 138. The net expenditure of all departments was distributed as follows:

Arab education	£P245,702
Jewish education	£P 52,770
Administration (Arab and Jewish)	£P 18,604

(3) *Report for 1935*, p. 137; see also *Palestine Royal Commission Report, 1937* (Cmd. 5479), pp. 337-44. [This Report is cited later as "Peel Report."]

(4) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 162.

(5) The relevant figures for 1934-5 are: Total spent on education £P200,000 (representing an increase of £P22,000 on the previous year)

Total Government expenditure	£P3,230,000
Budget surplus	£P2,223,000

(6) Reply by the Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission; *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 162.

ginning to work a change; but it is interesting to note the germ of a middle class and of a proletariat as yet almost unorganized, but whose numbers and influence will certainly increase in the years to come.

The effect of Jewish immigration upon the prosperity of the Arab population, both rural and urban, is surveyed in a subsequent chapter on immigration and economic development.¹

(b) THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

*Material
Advantages
over the
Arabs*

The post-War Jewish population has one or two characteristics unusual among immigrants. One is the remarkably high percentage of newcomers of independent means²; this, together with the funds provided by the central Jewish organizations, places the Jewish settler at an advantage which has already been referred to, and which is bound to have psychological repercussions upon Arabs who are confronted with the irritating spectacle of improvements they themselves cannot afford. A second unusual characteristic is the predominance of a far higher intellectual standard than is common among settlers; the percentage of immigrants who have received a secondary education is striking. This fact, coupled with the enthusiasm stimulated by the ideal motive of a return to the soil of the Promised Land, explains the following quotation:

"The great majority of early settlers were youthful idealists of both sexes, many of whom had abandoned their Universities or professions in Central or Eastern Europe to devote themselves to manual labour in Palestine. As time went on the *Halutzim* (Pioneers) no longer played as predominant a part as they had done at the outset, but they still formed the backbone of the Jewish immigrant population and especially of the new agricultural settlements."³

Though this high intellectual standard has not been maintained throughout, a new stimulus has been the influx of highly educated refugees coming from Germany since the inauguration of the Nazi régime.⁴ In Palestine itself the level tends to be maintained owing to the high level of education already referred to.

*Jewish Land
Tenure*

Besides material and intellectual advantages, the Jewish cultivator enjoys far greater security than does the Arab. He secures a long lease from his colonization society, and in the case of the oldest organization—the P.I.C.A.—is allowed to purchase his land.

(1) See below, chapter vi.

(2) For statistics, see below, p. 62.

(3) Stein, "Development of the Jewish National Home," *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, p. 374. Cf. also Report of Sir John Campbell, one of the experts employed by the Jewish Joint Survey Commission in 1927, quoted and endorsed by Mr Snell in his reservation to the Shaw report, p. 179.

(4) For figures showing the increase in the number of refugees coming from Germany, see below, p. 62.

The agencies responsible for Jewish colonization in Palestine fall into four main classes:

- (1) The Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.).
- (2) The Colonization Department of the Zionist Organization.
- (3) Commercial Land or Settlement Companies, e.g. Palestine Plantations, Limited.
- (4) Private societies, e.g. Benei Benjamin.

Of these, the P.I.C.A. is the most important, holding nearly half of the Jewish land in Palestine. It is the legacy of the work begun in 1882 under the guidance of Baron Edmond de Rothschild,¹ and it had by 1930 established thirty-four colonies, chiefly in the Maritime Plain, and Upper and Lower Galilee. The P.I.C.A. is not a political organization, and the relations of the P.I.C.A. colonists with their Arab neighbours and workmen for a long time contrasted favourably with those of the Zionist settlers.

*P.I.C.A.
Colonies*

The P.I.C.A. itself buys land and installs settlers. The Colonization Department of the Zionist Organization simply acts as a settlement agency, the land being purchased for the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*) by the Palestine Land Development Company. The Zionist colonies also differ somewhat from the P.I.C.A. colonies in their relations with the Arabs. This was partly due to the more strict adherence of the former to the "principle of self-labour." For whilst the P.I.C.A. colonies for some years employed Arab as well as Jewish labour and have helped to develop Arab land, Zionist settlers are limited to the quantity of land which the individual or the group concerned can cultivate. Since the outbreak of serious trouble, however, and the increase of antagonism between Jews and Arabs, this differentiation has tended to disappear. Some of the Zionist settlements are *Kvutzoth* or communal farms. In these the land is held in common, and the adult population live in communal houses with a separate children's house run by nurses; the produce belongs to all the members collectively, and is shared out in kind. The other Zionist settlements are mostly made up of small holdings. It is argued by the Zionists that financial reasons make peasant settlements of this type essential, and that even the P.I.C.A. can no longer afford to settle the "planter" type of colonist.

*Zionist
Colonies*

However this may be, two other principles of Zionist colonization, both incorporated in the constitution of the Jewish Agency, are deeply resented by the Arabs. These are: (i) the principle that Jewish property is inalienable; no Zionist settler may dispose of his

(1) See above, p. 4.

lease to any one but a Jew; (ii) the principle, carefully safeguarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of Labour, that only Jewish labour may be employed in Zionist colonies. The net result is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a purchase, the Arabs lose not only the land, but also any chance of being employed on it.

Finally, there is a fundamental distinction between the Zionist and the P.I.C.A. colonies in the matter of financial independence.

"Of the agricultural settlements it may be said that none of the Zionist settlements are self-supporting in the sense that they would be able to maintain themselves without further assistance and pay back to the *Keren-Hayesod* a reasonable amount towards satisfaction of their debts, and to the *Keren-Kayemeth* an economic rent. It is indeed admitted that no such consummation is anticipated. Many Zionist settlements would cease to exist if further support were not forthcoming. The P.I.C.A. colonies include in their number several old colonies which are radically established, and which will unquestionably flourish in the future. Even of the P.I.C.A. colonies, however, there are a number, including some of the older colonies, which still require support and in some cases reorganization. I understand that this reorganization is in progress."¹

In 1936 a few of the Zionist colonies for the first time made small repayments of loans.

*Jewish
Co-operatives*

Another factor which assists Jewish development and which contrasts strongly with the situation among the Arabs is the highly organized nature of the Jewish co-operative movement. There are 868 Jewish co-operative societies in Palestine,² connected with every branch of agriculture and industry. There are co-operative societies, for banking, credit and insurance, producers' and consumers' societies, co-operatives for contracting, transport, marketing, irrigation, and land purchasing. Among the most important are the *Tnuva* which markets Jewish agricultural produce and whose sales totalled £552,883³ in 1936, and the *Pardess*, the largest co-operative society of orange growers, which sells over a million cases annually. A great many of these co-operative societies are managed by the *Histadruth*, the Jewish Federation of Labour.

*Contrast in
Methods of
Cultivation*

It is evident that there are wide divergences in the methods of cultivation employed in Palestine. Many of the Jewish colonizers practise modern methods of farming, and an increasing number of Arabs are following suit, although not all of them with success. Obviously the more intensively the land is farmed, the larger the agricultural population which it can maintain, although it must be remembered that intensive cultivation requires increased capital, and also that ultimately the agricultural capacity of the country must depend on the amount of cultivable land available.

(1) Hope Simpson Report, pp. 48-9.

(2) Report for 1937, p. 293.

(3) Report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1937, p. 559.

3. SOME FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES

Even these brief facts about the two communities are enough to show how difficult is the Mandatory's task—how hard it is to deal with two such different entities simultaneously or to explain policy to them in the same terms. Nor can the situation be remedied at any speed on account of the material and educational divergences which must persist for some time to come.

It is often mistakenly supposed that religious animosity between the parties is another of the factors which aggravate the Mandatory's task. This is not so, for two reasons. On the one hand, modern Zionism is not a religious but a political movement. On the other, among the Arabs nationalism has come to transcend religious feeling; for instance, Moslem and Christian Arabs now work together. The antagonism is one between national, not between religious movements¹; nor is it racial, for both Jews and Arabs belong to the Semitic race.

Perhaps one reason for the difficulty experienced by British observers in understanding the Palestine problem is a profound psychological difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Semitic races. The former, unlike most others, admires a capacity for compromise; for instance, a newspaper would not tend to sell in London with the title "*L'Intransigeant*." But with the latter an uncompromising nature is the ideal. "The Semites had no half tones in their register of vision. They knew only truth and untruth, belief and unbelief, without our hesitating retinue of finer shades."² These words were written of the Arabs, and are obviously not true of the whole of the Jewish branch of the Semitic race. But they are truer of the Jews of Eastern Europe than of the "assimilated" Jews of the west, so many of whom are non-Zionist; and it should be noted that the "eastern" Jews form the bulk of the Palestinian immigrants.³

This reasoning may explain why the Mandatory contemplates fulfilment of its obligations to both parties as so much more easily feasible than do the communities themselves.

(1) The only serious show of fanaticism—the Wailing Wall disturbances—was designed to annoy politically, not religiously.

(2) Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935 edition), p. 38.

(3) See below, p. 61.

IV. THE WORKING OF THE MANDATE

1920-1930

*The Military
Occupation,
1918-20*

FOR nearly two years after the Armistice, Palestine, pending the allocation and confirmation of the Mandate, was under British military authority. The arrangement was a legacy of the situation at the cessation of hostilities against the Turks.¹ The supreme power lay with Lord Allenby; General Sir Arthur Money was appointed Chief Administrator, and much was done to organize a government of the occupied territory, to restore the essential services, to relieve distress and, as far as the limitations of an occupation allowed, to begin the work of reconstruction.² The military administration also promoted the first recognized body for the relief and organization of the Jewish community.

*The 1920
Disturbances*

The contemporary happenings in Syria, where the French and the Arabs were struggling for control, were the chief grounds for Palestinian unrest during this period. When (by an agreement of September 1919) the British garrisons were replaced by the French in Syria, and when all hope of the United States as Mandatory for both territories waned with the withdrawal of America from participation in the peace settlement, Arab nationalism grew into a demand for a united and independent Palestine and Syria. In these circumstances,³ the Emir Feisul and other Arab leaders supported this claim, which was enhanced, among Palestinian Arabs, by fear of being swamped under a wave of organized Jewish settlement. This fear accounts for the first clash of Arab and Jew, which took place on Easter Sunday 1920, when the Arabs looted the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem with some loss of life. The Report of the Military Commission of Inquiry on these disturbances was never published.⁴

*Inauguration
of Civil
Administra-
tion*

Following the allocation of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain⁵ the military régime was superseded by a civil administration as from July 1, 1920, with Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner.

The task of implementing the Balfour Declaration now began in earnest. The first Immigration Ordinance was enacted in Septem-

(1) By the Armistice of Mudros, October 30, 1918.

(2) For further detail see Bentwich, *Palestine* (Modern World Series), pp. 82-4.

(3) For a summary of the friction with the French in Syria, see Stoyanovsky, pp. 14-18, and (in greater detail) *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, pp. 134-69.

(4) See, however, the Peel Report, pp. 50-1.

(5) See above, p. 12.

ber 1920, and the High Commissioner authorized the admission of Jews in accordance with a first year's quota of 16,500¹ fixed by the Administration. The Arabs at once began to manifest considerable alarm. It was popularly supposed among them that their land was to be expropriated for purposes of Jewish colonization and that large-scale immigration would render the population of Palestine overwhelmingly Jewish; land and immigration, the two vexed questions upon which almost all subsequent trouble has hung, were prominent stumbling blocks from the first.²

These Arab fears were reflected in propaganda which was at its most violent during the visit of the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Winston Churchill, to the territory early in 1921; some of it can be put down to the efforts of the Arab *effendi* class, which feared that it would lose its feudal position in the course of the social change which was likely to accompany the Jewish influx. A few months later, the orthodox Easter Sunday—a moment of fervour among the Arabs—unfortunately coincided with Labour Day, May 1. A collision between rival demonstrations of Jewish Communists and Jewish Socialists occurred in Tel-Aviv. Arabs from the neighbouring suburbs of Jaffa joined in the fray and “when the disturbance had once begun, an already acute anti-Jewish feeling extended into an anti-Jewish riot” in which the Arabs were “generally the aggressors.”³

The trouble did not spread. Martial law was declared, and Jewish immigration stopped for a short period, while a Commission of Inquiry reported that the cause of the disorders was Arab hostility “connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents.” After detailing the grounds for this hostility the report adds:

“But for the considerations set forth above we feel convinced that there would be no animosity towards the Jews as such; that there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial, or religious. We are credibly assured by educated Arabs that they would welcome the arrival of well-to-do and able Jews who could help to develop the country to the advantage of all sections of the community.”⁴

This account of the 1921 disturbances is set out at some length because of the similarity of their causes with those of the disturbances of 1929, 1933, 1936, and 1938.

To reassure the Arabs and to make the position clear to both parties, the Colonial Office on June 3, 1922, published a statement

*The Churchill
Memorandum,
1922*

- (1) *Report on Palestine Administration, July 1920–December 1921*, p. 127.
- (2) For a full discussion of these problems, see chapters v and vi below.
- (3) *Palestine. Disturbances in May 1921. Reports of the Commission of Inquiry, 1921* (Cmd. 1540), p. 59.
- (4) *Ibid.*, p. 54.

of British policy¹ giving a more precise interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. This statement, which, since Mr Winston Churchill was at the time Colonial Secretary, is usually known as the Churchill Memorandum, stressed:

(i) That His Majesty's Government did not contemplate either the creation of a wholly Jewish Palestine or the disappearance or sub-ordination of the Arab population, language, or culture in Palestine;

(ii) That the terms of the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine;

(iii) That, for its development on these lines, it was essential that it should have in Palestine a status of right and not of sufferance and that it was for this reason that it should be formally recognized in the Mandate;

(iv) That, for the fulfilment of the policy, the Jewish Community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration, it being understood that such immigration should not exceed what might at the time be the economic capacity of the country, that the immigrants should not be a burden on the people of Palestine as a whole and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

The Zionist Organization formally accepted the policy set forth in the memorandum; the Arabs, through the mouth of the Palestinian Arab Delegation which was at the time setting forth their case in London, declined to concur in it.²

*Attempt to
promote Self-
Government,
1922*

One of Sir Herbert Samuel's early measures, in October 1920, had been to set up a nominated Advisory Council to function pending the establishment of some elected body. This consisted of ten British officials and ten Palestinians, of whom seven were Arabs (four Moslems and three Christians), and three were Jews. It sat for two years and with some success, for "on no occasion did the Government find itself unable to accept the considered opinion of the non-official members."³

When the promulgation of the Mandate was at hand, "it was thought advisable to confer upon Palestine a Constitution of a more representative character"³; in August 1922 Sir Herbert Samuel therefore propounded a Constitution⁴ which, as a first step towards self-government, would have substituted for the Advisory Council a Legislative Council consisting of the High Commissioner and twenty-two members, ten official and twelve elected, of whom ten were to be Arabs (eight Moslems and two Christians) and two Jews. The elected members were also to form a

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 1700. For text see Appendix III.

(2) The relevant correspondence is published in Cmd. 1700, pp. 21-9, and is summarized in Appendix III.

(3) *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5*, p. 44.

(4) Palestine Order in Council, 1922. *Statutory Rules and Orders No. 1282* of 1922. Reprinted in Stoyanovsky, pp. 363-84.

standing committee to advise the Government on all questions of immigration.

But the Palestinian Arab Executive opposed this, refusing to participate unless the Council contained a clear majority of Arabs over all others. They boycotted the elections to the Council, and Sir Herbert was obliged to abandon the proposed Constitution. He returned to the nominated Advisory Council system, but composed in the same proportions as had been intended for the elected Council. But the Arab members appointed were induced one by one to resign within a very short time. The Government, therefore, abandoned the idea of non-official participation; since 1923, therefore, legislation has been effected by the High Commissioner in consultation with an Advisory Council composed entirely of British officials; but except where immediate action is judged to be in the public interest, all ordinances are published sufficiently in advance to enable the various interested committees to discuss them and, if necessary, to request amendment.

At the same time a further effort was made to secure Arab co-operation. Recognizing that the special position accorded to the Jewish Agency under Article 4 of the Mandate placed the Jews upon a footing which the Arabs did not enjoy in dealing with Arab matters, the Government offered the Arabs a parallel Arab Agency. The offer was put to a "fully representative meeting of Arab notables" by the High Commissioner on October 11, 1923. "After an interval for discussion, they expressed themselves unable to accept the proposal, as falling short of the demands of the Arab population."¹ This attitude was explained to the High Commissioner in a letter from the President of the Executive of the Arab Congress:

*Refusal of an
Arab Agency,
1923*

"The object of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine is not an Arab agency analogous to the Zionist Agency. Their sole object is independence. The Arab owners of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal which tends to place them on an equal footing with the alien Jews."

It had become obvious that the Arab objection was not to the way in which the Mandate might be worked, but to the whole policy of the Mandatory, however exercised, and that by no concession, however liberal, were the Arabs prepared to be reconciled to a régime which recognized the implications of the Balfour Declaration. The British Government gave up heart. "Towards all these proposals the Arabs have adopted the same attitude—refusal to co-operate. His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly

(1) For a full statement of the proposal and an account of the interview, see British White Paper, Cmd. 1989.

driven to the conclusion that further efforts on similar lines would be useless and they have accordingly decided not to repeat the attempt.”¹

Despite these rebuffs, the Mandate began to work fairly smoothly in the hands of successive High Commissioners,² and the six years 1923-8 were a period of appeasement and development during which it seemed legitimate to hope that the two communities would settle down side by side. The best indication of the prevailing optimism was the Mandatory Power’s policy in regard to security. In 1926 the British armed forces in Palestine were reduced to one squadron of the Royal Air Force and two companies of armoured cars; the police force was simultaneously reorganized and reduced.³ These conditions, which continued until the disturbances of 1929, did not receive the entire approval of the Permanent Mandates Commission. At its Ninth Session in 1926 it drew the attention of the Mandatory to the “danger of not maintaining adequate local forces”⁴; at its Sixteenth Session, in July 1929, the High Commissioner reassured it that the “resources at the disposal of the Government” were sufficient to deal with any situation that was “likely to arise”⁵; at its Seventeenth Session—the special session on the 1929 disturbances—it was therefore in a position to reprimand the Mandatory for the “inexplicable fact” of failure to heed its “increasing warnings.”⁶

Apart from the reduction of the armed forces, perhaps the most striking feature of the period was the severe economic depression which lasted from the end of 1925 until 1928. This was later put down both by the Shaw Commission on the 1929 disturbances and by the Government to the exceptional volume of immigrants in the preceding years, and can in part be attributed to the collapse of the Polish currency in 1925 which stranded many immigrants without resources.⁷ It is significant that the Peel Commission reporting in 1937 saw in “the sharp decline in the fortunes of the

- (1) The concluding paragraph of British White Paper, Cmd. 1989.
- (2) The full list is as follows:—
1920-1925 Sir Herbert Samuel.
1925-1928 Lord Plumer.
1928-1931 Sir John Chancellor.
1931-1935 Sir Arthur Wauchope.
1935-1937 Sir Arthur Wauchope.
1937-1938 Sir Harold MacMichael.
- (3) For full details see *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929* (Cmd. 3530), pp. 13-14. [This Report is cited later as “Shaw Report.”]
- (4) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Ninth Session*, p. 184.
- (5) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Sixteenth Session*, p. 80.
- (6) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Seventeenth Session*, p. 28.
- (7) See below, pp. 60-1.

National Home" the main cause of Arab quiescence during this period.¹ At the same time, the opinion is held by some that this quiescence was due to the firm administration of the then High Commissioner, Lord Plumer.

The calm which prevailed enabled the Mandatory to proceed with administrative reforms, the chief of which, so far as the fulfilment of the Mandate was concerned, was the Municipal Franchise Ordinance of 1925; the resultant municipal elections took place in 1927, and "aroused keen popular interest and, in many places, a factious spirit, but were carried out in an orderly manner."²

In 1928, and again in 1929, Arab delegations petitioned the High Commissioner for the establishment of an elective parliament, and during the summer of 1929 Sir John Chancellor returned to London to discuss the matter with the Colonial Office.

It was during his absence that there took place the really serious disturbances—the first since 1921—which put an end to the illusion that all was going well. *Disturbances of 1928 and 1929*

The immediate result of the outbreak was the abandonment for the time being of all progress towards self-government; the long term result was the ventilation of sentiments which showed clearly that the conflicting claims of Arabs and Jews and the difficulties of the Mandatory in carrying out the dual trust had grown greater rather than less with the years.

The first obvious sign of unrest was the so-called Wailing Wall incident, which took place on the eve of the Day of Atonement, September 24, 1928.³ The Wailing Wall represents Holy Ground for Jews and Moslems alike—the Jews pray on one side because it formed part of the western wall of the Temple; the Arabs venerate the other because it is the part of the Haram-al Sharif where El Burak, the winged horse of the Prophet, was tethered in the night of his travelling. Under Turkish rule the Jews had established a certain limited right of access, and the Palestine Government felt bound to maintain the *status quo ante*. The Arabs complained that the Jews were attempting bit by bit to extend the bounds of this limited right, and their complaints caused the Administration to remove some Jewish innovations on the Day of Atonement itself, an act which engendered high feeling all round. *The Wailing Wall Incident*

(1) Peel Report, p. 64. See also chapter viii below.

(2) Report for 1927, p. 4.

(3) For a full report see *The Western or Wailing Wall in Jerusalem: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1928* (Cmd. 3229).

The incident was the prelude to much more serious disturbances which took place in August 1929. Looking back, many people have criticized the Mandatory for having failed to read the signs of the times, and for being so unready for what took place.

On August 15 a Jewish demonstration, organized by enthusiasts from Tel-Aviv, was held at the Wailing Wall. On the next day, Arab demonstrators, led by enthusiasts from Nablus, did likewise. Tel-Aviv and Nablus are the strongholds of Jewish and Arab nationalism respectively, and the demonstrations took place in an atmosphere of considerable excitement, stimulated by the protests against Jewish action in connection with the Wailing Wall which the Supreme Moslem Council, through the mouth of its President, the Mufti of Jerusalem, had been making for some months past.¹ Disturbances subsequently took place all over the country, the most serious outbreaks occurring at Hebron, Jaffa, and Haifa, where the Arabs attacked Jewish hospitals and synagogues. These were countered by Jewish attacks on mosques in Jaffa and Jerusalem. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded, and six Jewish colonies were totally destroyed, while there were 116 known Arab deaths. During the subsequent proceedings before the court of final instance, twenty-six death sentences were confirmed, twenty-five of them upon Arabs, one upon a Jew. All but three of these sentences—all on Arabs—were commuted to terms of imprisonment.

The two disturbances caused a long and complicated series of inquiries by the British Government, both on its own initiative and at the request of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and ink flowed from the Government and the League, the Jews and the Arabs all through 1930.

On September 1 the High Commissioner, who had been on leave when the disturbance took place, but had returned in haste to Palestine, issued a proclamation deploring the outbreak and announcing the suspension of the discussions on constitutional changes which, in accordance with an undertaking given to the Arab Executive, he had initiated with the Secretary of State.

On September 14, the Colonial Office announced that a Commission of Inquiry, with Sir Walter Shaw as chairman,² would at once proceed to Palestine "to inquire into the immediate causes of

(1) For details see Shaw Report, pp. 31-4.

(2) Sir Walter Shaw had been a prominent colonial Chief Justice; the other members were Sir Henry Betterton, Bt., M.P. (now Lord Rushcliffe); Mr M. Hopkins Morris, M.P., and Mr H. Snell, M.P. (now Lord Snell). Their report (Cmd. 3530) was published on March 12, 1930.

the recent outbreak and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid recurrence." It was stressed that the terms of reference of the Commission did not extend to considerations of major policy.¹

With regard to the past, the Commission found that the outbreak had its fundamental cause in the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews arising from the fear that, by Jewish immigration and land purchase under the Jewish National Home project, the Arabs might be deprived of their livelihood and eventually pass under Jewish domination; the similarity with the findings of the Commission on the 1921 disturbances is interesting.²

*Shaw Report
Findings*

The Report explicitly stated that in the opinion of the Commissioners the Arab attack was "neither provoked, premeditated, nor directed against the British Administration." It found that the Mufti of Jerusalem and the Arab Executive in their collective capacity did not plan or incite the disturbances, that the Mufti should not have launched his campaign on the Wailing Wall issue, and that he and his Executive should have controlled their followers before the explosion. (Mr Snell, in signed reservations annexed to the Report, attached greater blame to the Mufti.) It also exonerated the Administration from blame in its handling of the dispute before reinforcements arrived from Egypt and Malta. Certain of these findings were later to be peremptorily questioned by the Permanent Mandates Commission.

As to the future, in the light of the disturbances and of its extensive inquiries in Palestine, the Shaw Commission's chief recommendations were:—

*Shaw Report
Recommendations*

1. That the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy defining the meaning it attached to the passage in the Mandate concerning the safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish communities and laying down more explicit directions as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land tenure and immigration;

2. That the Government should make a clear statement regarding Jewish immigration, and should review the machinery for its regulation and control with the object of preventing a repetition of the "excessive" Jewish immigration of 1925 and 1926.³ That non-Jewish interests should be given some voice in the discussions on immigration;

3. That a scientific inquiry should be held into land cultivation and settlement possibilities. That pending this inquiry the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked⁴;

4. That as regards the Zionist Organization the Government should reaffirm the statement made in 1922 that the Organization's special position did not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government of Palestine. That the Government should if possible lay down some precise definition of the meaning of Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate;

(1) By Mr Henderson at the Labour Party Conference on October 2, 1929.

(2) See above, p. 35.

(3) See below, p. 61.

(4) See below, pp. 53-4.

5. That it was essential to the peace and security of Palestine that a Commission should be appointed to determine the rights of both parties at the Wailing Wall;
6. That the Government should introduce press legislation enabling them to obtain convictions on articles tending to a breach of the peace;
7. That appropriate advisers of His Majesty's Government should advise as to the most suitable form of garrison for Palestine. That no reduction should be made till then in the existing garrison. That an independent inquiry should be made into the Department of Police. That the Palestine Government should be instructed to inquire into and report on the possibility of forming a reserve of Special Constables.

*The Wailing
Wall
Commission*

By the time the Shaw Report was published, in April 1930, the recommendation regarding the Wailing Wall had already been put into effect.

In November, 1929, the British Government had delivered to the League for communication to the Permanent Mandates Commission a proposal for a Commission appointed under Article 14 of the Mandate "to study, define, and determine the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall." (An earlier attempt to implement Article 14 by the appointment of a Holy Places Commission had failed in 1922, when the League Council had—owing to failure to secure agreement as to the representation of the confessions upon such a Commission—turned down the British proposal.) But with reference to the immediate issue of the 1928–9 disturbances, the plea was more successful, and on May 15, 1930, the Council approved the appointment of MM. Lofgren (Sweden), Barde (Switzerland), and van Kempen (Netherlands). Their report, which, generally speaking, confirmed the *status quo*, was published in June 1931¹; their recommendations were implemented by an Order in Council in accordance with which order at the Wall has since been maintained.

*Jewish and
Arab
Demands,
1929–30*

Throughout the period of composition and presentation of the Shaw Report, it was clear that every move would draw the fire of one or both sides.

On September 23, 1929, immediately after the disturbances, the British Prime Minister had received through Dr Weizmann the main demands of the Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency. These included a demand that the persons and property of Jews in Palestine should be safeguarded, and the suggestion that an adequate number of Jews should be introduced into the Defence Force of the country.² Further it suggested that the Mandatory, in order

(1) Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London. 58–9096. 1931. For a full summary of the appointment and proceedings of the Commission see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, pp. 284–86.

(2) As early as 1921 the Revisionists had drawn up comprehensive plans for an exclusively Jewish defence force to form part of His Majesty's forces in Palestine, but the Government was always averse to passing legislation permitting this. After the 1929 disturbances sealed armouries were permitted in Jewish colonies, the key being entrusted

to fulfil the promise contained in the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, should take economic steps to allow for increased Jewish immigration and colonization for which a further economic opening up of the country was necessary.

The Arab demands were put forward by a delegation, selected by the Palestine Arab Executive and consisting of four Moslems and one Christian, which arrived in London on March 30, 1930. On May 12, 1930, the Delegation issued a statement to the effect that the British Government had rejected its demands, namely: (i) cessation of immigration; (ii) a declaration that Arab lands were inalienable; (iii) the establishment of democratic government with representation on a population basis. On May 13 the British Government declared that the "sweeping constitutional changes" demanded by the Arabs were incompatible with the requirements of the Mandate.

On April 3, 1930, the Prime Minister (Mr Ramsay MacDonald) made a statement of policy in the House of Commons¹ which was no more than a reiteration of the terms of the Mandate. He added that the Government was studying the Shaw Commission's recommendations, and was in the meantime immediately providing adequate police forces.²

As is its practice when unusual occurrences disturb the peace in a Mandated Territory, the Permanent Mandates Commission decided to hold an extraordinary session on the Palestine disturbances in June 1930, and to this meeting the British Government submitted a special statement with regard to policy,³ reiterating the Mandatory's intention to fulfil the triple pledge inherent in the Mandate, but pointing out the difficulties of promoting self-government in current circumstances.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, which had before it this statement, the Shaw Report, and the supplementary information supplied in committee, strongly criticized the British Government's execution of its task. As regards the Shaw Report, it rejected the view that the outbreak was unexpected and unpremeditated, and that it was not directed against British authority. It held that with a little foresight many incidents could have been avoided, and that the inaction of the Mandatory Power was the fundamental

*Criticisms
of the
Permanent
Mandates
Commission*

ed to a responsible leader of the community, and during the 1936 disturbances some 2,800 Jews were enrolled in the Special Constabulary in order to defend Jewish settlements. See below, p. 77. See also Melchett, pp. 249 and 255-6.

(1) See *Hansard*, April 3, 1930, coll. 1466-7.

(2) See below, p. 44.

(3) British White Paper, Cmd. 3582.

cause of a disturbance of such dimensions. It substantiated this accusation with some more general criticisms of British policy. Insufficient attention had been paid, it said, to "the social and economic adaptation of the Arab population to the new conditions due to Jewish immigration"; the Arabs had every cause for dissatisfaction on this score. Moreover, despite its warnings, the Mandatory had maintained forces so inadequate as to fail to secure "the essential condition for development of the Jewish National Home, security for persons and property." It also argued that more might have been done to bring about that economic "fusion of interests which is the best possible means of developing a sense of solidarity and blunting the edge of antagonism."

The report embodying these "somewhat serious criticisms of British policy" was published in London and Geneva on August 25, 1930, together with the British Government's reply.¹ The latter stated that the Commission scarcely appreciated the complexity of the problem as encountered on the spot, and that its previous comment on British policy could not be said to have foreshadowed these serious charges. It was doubtless to atone for some rather heated wording in this document that Mr Henderson, speaking on Palestine before the League Council in the following September, stated that the British Government fully appreciated it was "the duty of the Permanent Mandates Commission to criticize."

Meanwhile, two important steps had been taken to put the Shaw recommendations into effect; between January and March 1930, the Palestine Police Force was reorganized under the supervision of Mr (now Sir Herbert) Dowbiggin of the Ceylon Police. Substantial increases were made in the British personnel, and special steps were taken to protect exposed Jewish settlements. Two British infantry battalions were for the time being retained in Palestine; in fact the garrison remained at this strength until the disturbance of 1936.

The second important step was the appointment in May 1930 of Sir John Hope Simpson, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, to inquire into land settlement, immigration, and development. Pending the publication of his report, the undistributed balance of immigration certificates under the 1930 schedule was suspended. This last measure was strongly resented in Zionist circles, the Jews appealing to the British Government "to reopen the Gates of Palestine and thus reaffirm the rights of the Jews to return to their National Home."

(1) League of Nations Document, C.355, M.147, 1930, vi.

*Re-
organization
of Police*

*Inquiry into
Land
Settlement*

V. THE LAND SETTLEMENT CONTROVERSY

1930-31

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON spent three months in Palestine, and this Report, together with an accompanying Government Statement of Policy¹ based on its conclusions, was published on October 20, 1930.

*The Hope
Simpson
Report
and
accompanying
White Paper*

The contents of the Hope Simpson Report are only to some extent important, for its basic premise was questioned, and only a few of its recommendations have been acted upon. But it is interesting to summarize its main points; (i) because it was the first detailed attempt to assess the population capacity of Palestine, and (ii) because a knowledge of its points is essential to an understanding of the controversy which followed, and which is an illustration of the problem facing the Mandatory Power.

The arguments on both sides in this controversy cannot be properly assessed without some conception of the geography of Palestine.²

*The
Geography of
Palestine*

"Within the limits of a province, it offers the varieties of soil and climate of a continent. It is a country of mountain and plain, of desert and pleasant valleys, of lake and sea-board, of barren hills, desolate to the last degree of desolation, and of broad stretches of deep, fruitful soil."

The country is approximately 160 miles long and at no point more than seventy miles wide. It is therefore slightly larger than Wales and slightly smaller than Belgium.

It is still predominantly agricultural. There are only four large towns—Tel-Aviv (150,000), Jerusalem (125,000), Haifa (100,000), and Jaffa (52,000); Nablus, the Arab centre, which is the next on the list, has a population of only 17,000. Although the towns have grown rapidly—particularly Tel-Aviv, the all-Jewish town, which contained only 15,000 inhabitants in 1922 as compared with 150,000 to-day—the rural population has expanded equally rapidly, and at the 1931 census still represented roughly 60 per cent of the total, the same proportion as in 1922.

*Continued
Predominance
of Agriculture*

The country is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the east by the river Jordan, these two being divided by a range of hills running from north to south for practically the entire length

*Geographical
Divisions of
Palestine*

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 3692.

(2) For general details see Luke and Keith-Roach, Part I, in which the passage which follows is quoted from a Government report.

of Palestine. Geographically it falls naturally into four main divisions:

- (1) The Hill Country of Galilee (in the north) and of Samaria and Judaea.
- (2) The Five Plains.
 - (a) The Maritime Plain between the coast and the hills.
 - (b) The Acre Plain between Acre and the hills.
 - (c) The Vale of Esdraelon (south-east of Haifa).
 - (d) The Huleh Plain (extreme north-east).
 - (e) The Plain of the Jordan.
- (3) The Beersheba area (the south-west).
- (4) The arid desert areas in the south-east.

(1) *The Hill Country*, which covers roughly one-third of Palestine, offers very limited possibilities for the future. Indeed, the eastern part of the hills, running steeply down to the Jordan, is an uninhabited wilderness. The soil is almost all poor, and irrigation for the most part out of the question. There is room for some improvement by the use of manure and better seeds, and by some substitution of fruit-growing for cereals. But the possibility of any considerable expansion of the present population here is very doubtful; the standard of life of the inhabitants is extremely low, and the area is probably already suffering from over-population.

(2) (a) *The Maritime Plain* covers the whole area between the coast and the hills except the small section north of Haifa. In the south it is about twenty miles wide but gradually narrows to a few hundred yards near Haifa. This is the great orange-producing district, having a mass of the wind-blown sand suitable for this purpose. All but a small part is not only cultivable, but irrigable.

(b) *The Acre Plain*, which includes the land between the coast and the hills north of Haifa, is also irrigable. Here, however, the soil is heavy and black, suitable for mixed farming, but not for oranges.

(c) *The Plain of Esdraelon*, which runs south-east from Haifa towards the Jordan Valley in the shape of a triangle, is mostly cultivable, and is probably the most fertile part of Palestine. Its alluvial clay is particularly suitable for cereals.

(d) *The Huleh Plain* in the extreme north-east consists partly of rich alluvial land. But over one-third of it is undrained marsh, of which the greater part is included in the Huleh Concession.¹

(e) *The Plain of the Jordan* is perhaps rather more than half cultivable. The land in the north is very fertile; that in the south could be so if irrigated. The average width of this plain is about three miles.

(3) The possibilities of the *Beersheba region* (about one-tenth of Palestine) are at present unknown. Given irrigation, it could provide a large supply of cultivable land. But it remains to be seen

(1) See below, p. 73.

whether fresh water can be found there; so far only salt water has been obtained.

The distinction between the Hill Country and the Plains (where the great bulk of the Jewish colonies are established) is quite fundamental to the problem of land settlement in Palestine; for it is only in the Plains that irrigation is possible on any large scale, and irrigation is an essential condition for that intensive form of cultivation introduced by the Jews which provides the only hope for any real expansion of the agricultural population of Palestine. Even in the Plains, however, irrigation depends on water being available; there is the possibility of an exhaustion of the existing supplies. According to Sir John Hope Simpson, the suggestion that the water-table in the Maritime Plain had fallen was disposed of by an expert Committee; but Mr French, the Director of Development appointed in 1931, was unable to find that any expert Committee had ever investigated the matter; a survey of the water supply nearly complete at the end of 1936 appears to show that there is no diminution.

*Distinction
between Hill
Country and
Plains*

Intensive development on any considerable scale is likely to be chiefly concentrated in Beisan (in the north of the Jordan Valley), Huleh, and Beersheba. With irrigation, the Beisan lands might accommodate 2,500 families in addition to the 950 there already.¹ The development of Huleh depends on drainage of the marsh, which should now be accomplished, since the Arab concessionaires who lacked the necessary capital have at last disposed of their concession to the (Jewish) Palestine Land Development Company.² Huleh and Beisan are of importance in that they alone of all the State lands referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate as suitable for Jewish settlement offer any possibilities of further development; the remainder are already fully occupied by Arab tenants or squatters. Finally, the considerable possibilities of the Beersheba region must remain unrealized unless fresh water is discovered there and "even if good fortune attend this (well-boring) experiment, years must elapse before we should be in a position to place settlers on the land."³

*Likely
Fields for
Development*

The basic premise of the Hope Simpson Report was its estimate of the total cultivable area of Palestine; the figure accepted by Sir John represented a drop of almost 40 per cent on most previous estimates—6,544,000 dunums⁴ as opposed to the 10,592,000

*The Hope
Simpson
Conclusions*

(1) *Reports on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*. By Lewis French, 1931, p. 28. [Cited later as "French Reports."]

(2) See below, p. 73.

(3) French Reports, p. 29.

(4) Excluding Beersheba.

dunums¹ arrived at a few months earlier by the Commissioner of Lands.

Starting from this premise, Sir John dealt with the immediate course to be pursued under three heads: land settlement, development and immigration.

(1) *Land Settlement*: Sir John stated that even if the land not occupied by Jews were divided equally among the Arab population there would not be enough to support each Arab family at a decent standard of life; that "it is an error to imagine that the Government is in possession of large areas of vacant lands which could be made available for Jewish settlement," and that with the exception of the large reserve of undeveloped land held by the Jewish authorities, there was "at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation" no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants.

(2) *Development*: Sir John's basic conclusion was that the only way in which the Mandate could be carried out was by the agricultural development of rural Palestine by means of:

(i) Large-scale irrigation, combined with a thorough survey and regulation of water supplies.

(ii) The partition of the considerable quantity of Arab land still communally held into permanent individual holdings, i.e. the abolition of the *Mesha'a* system.²

(iii) The substitution of intensive for extensive methods of cultivation (e.g. grapefruit and tobacco in place of cereals).

(iv) Education: "The educational budget is far too small for the requirements of the country"; the Report emphasizes that it is useless to expect the Arab to benefit from agricultural education unless he has previously received elementary education.³

(v) The encouragement of Arab as well as Jewish Co-operatives, particularly Credit Co-operative Societies.

This policy was to be executed under the supervision of a Development Commission, consisting of a British Chairman, one Arab, and one Jew. "It is my personal belief," Sir John concluded, "that with thorough development of the country there will be room not only for all the present agricultural population on a higher standard of life than it at present enjoys, but for not less than 20,000 families of settlers from outside."

(3) *Immigration*: Broadly speaking, therefore, Sir John's con-

(1) Excluding Beersheba.

(2) See above, p. 27.

(3) See above, p. 29.

clusion was that, taking a short view, agricultural immigration should not be permitted, but that taking a long view, there should be room for 20,000 families.

As regards other immigrants, he maintained that "if there are suitable Arab workmen unemployed it is not right that Jewish workmen from other countries should be imported to fill existing posts." But Sir John made one important exception to this general rule, which loomed very large in subsequent discussions: he pointed out that since Jewish capital was only imported with the definite object of employing Jewish labour, the Arabs had nothing to gain by stoppage of the inflow of the labour and therefore of the capital. In fact they were better off if they allowed it to continue, "as the expenditure of that capital on wages will cause, ultimately, a demand for the services of a portion of the Arab unemployed."¹

The Government Statement of Policy accompanying the Report, which was published as a White Paper,² was divided into two parts. The first, which dealt with general principles, stressed the necessity for co-operation and pointed out that the British Government had received no assistance from either Jews or Arabs in their attempts to achieve this; it also reiterated the statements in the Churchill Memorandum of 1922 regarding the Jewish National Home, the Jewish Agency, and immigration, and argued that the promises to the two sections of the population were of equal weight and were not irreconcilable.

*British
Statement
of Policy,
October 20,
1930*

The second part considered "the practical problems to be faced" and stated policy as regards: (i) *Security*: "His Majesty's Government have decided to retain in Palestine for the present two battalions of infantry; in addition to these, two squadrons of air-craft and four sections of armoured cars will be available in Palestine and Transjordan"; (ii) *Constitutional Development*: "The time has now come when the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine (i.e. the Legislative Council envisaged in the Churchill Memorandum of 1922) must . . . be taken in hand without further delay"; and (iii) *Economic and Social Development*: This section, which covered the vexed questions of land, immigration, and unemployment, was largely an almost verbatim recapitulation of Sir John Hope Simpson's conclusions, with one or two notable omissions.

Both the Hope Simpson Report and the White Paper, but particularly the latter, provoked a storm of protest, primarily from the

*Storm of
Criticism*

- (1) Hope Simpson Report, p. 136.
- (2) British White Paper, Cmd. 3692.

Jews, but also from Conservative Opposition leaders and others.

The fundamental objection to Sir John Hope Simpson's Report related to his estimate of the area of cultivable land, which was regarded as based on entirely inadequate evidence.¹

It was pointed out that the differences between his figures and those of the Commissioner of Lands related chiefly to the Hill Country, where Sir John's estimate was based on aerial surveys of only one-tenth of the total area. The assumption that the relative proportions of cultivable and uncultivable land in this one-tenth were the same throughout the whole area was more than arbitrary. In any case, though it might be possible to distinguish cultivated land from an aeroplane, it would hardly be possible to distinguish the cultivable but as yet uncultivated tracts. Moreover, Sir John himself had given examples of the successful cultivation of "rocky hillsides" such as he dismissed as uncultivable in other parts of his Report.

The White Paper was naturally attacked for accepting Sir John's figure and the deductions drawn from it, particularly as it omitted his reservations. But two of its other principles met with equal criticism:

(i) It stated that "in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine at any time account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in determining the rate at which Jewish immigration should be permitted." But it did not except, as Sir John had done, the "special case" where Jewish capital was imported solely for the employment of Jewish labour—which, as the Jews pointed out, was not so much a "special case" as the general rule.

(ii) It laid down that any State lands becoming available should be reserved for the settlement not, as prescribed in Article 6 of the Mandate, of Jews, but of landless Arab cultivators. But it made no qualification that these should have been dispossessed as a result of Jewish purchases, or even that they should previously have possessed any land.

The Jewish authorities accordingly argued that the White Paper of October 1930 was "inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate, and in vital particulars marks the reversal of the policy hitherto followed by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish National Home."²

(1) See e.g. Stein, *Memorandum on the Palestine White Paper of October 1930*, Jewish Agency for Palestine, November 1930.

(2) Dr Weizmann's second letter to Lord Passfield, October 29, 1930.

Fundamentally, however, the Jewish objections were directed against the tone and temper of the document, and what was regarded as its implied criticism of all previous Jewish activities in Palestine. These objections were, moreover, later borne out by the Peel Commission which wrote that the White Paper had "betrayed a marked insensitiveness to Jewish feelings . . ." the tone of the document suggesting a rather more definite inclination towards the Arab side of the controversy, although H.M. Government had not in fact gone beyond the decisions and proposals of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports.¹

*The
fundamental
Objection*

The publication of the Hope Simpson Report and White Paper had immediate and serious consequences. Dr Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency, informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, that he had resigned on the issue. Both the late Lord Melchett and Mr Felix Warburg also resigned, the former from the chairmanship of the Council and of the Political Committee of the Jewish Agency, the latter from the chairmanship of the Administrative Committee. On October 30, 1930, three leading members of the Opposition—Mr Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Mr Amery, writing to *The Times*, deplored the Government's failure to fall in with Dr Weizmann's proposals for a Round Table Conference between Jews and Arabs and accused the Government of abandoning the policy embodied in the Mandate. General Smuts telegraphed a protest to the Prime Minister, and on legal grounds Sir John Simon and Lord Hailsham² also declared the Statement to involve a departure from the Mandate.

*Political
consequences
of the
White Paper*

It was evident that some attempt at conciliation must be made; and on November 14, 1930, it was announced³ that "doubts having been expressed as to the compatibility of some passages of the White Paper of October with certain articles of the Palestine Mandate, and other passages having proved liable to misunderstanding, His Majesty's Government" had "invited members of the Jewish Agency to confer with them on these matters." As a result of these discussions there was published⁴ on February 14, 1931, a letter from Mr Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, to Dr Weizmann, which completely changed the whole situation.

*Mr
MacDonald's
Explanatory
Letter*

This letter, which was published "in order to remove certain

(1) Peel Report, p. 73.

(2) *The Times*, November 4, 1930. A reply from Lord Passfield was published on November 6.

(3) *The Times*, November 14, 1930.

(4) *The Times*, February 14, 1931.

misconceptions and misunderstandings which have arisen as to the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Palestine," was to be regarded as the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper "on the matters with which it dealt." "A good deal of criticism has been directed to the White Paper upon the assertion that it contains injurious allegations against the Jewish people and Jewish Labour organizations. Any such intention on the part of His Majesty's Government is completely disavowed." On specific points, the "landless Arabs," who by the White Paper were given first claim on the state lands previously pledged in the Mandate for "close settlement by Jews," were now limited to "such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves, or other equally satisfactory occupation." "Further, the statement of policy of His Majesty's Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews... What it does contemplate is such temporary control of land disposition and transfers as may be necessary not to impair the harmony and effectiveness of the scheme of land settlement to be undertaken." "His Majesty's Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories." Finally, "His Majesty's Government do not in any way challenge the right of the Agency to formulate or approve and endorse" the principle that in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, only Jewish labour should be employed.

Ultimately, the real "difference between the new document and its immediate predecessor lay, not in its statements of fact or in its pronouncements upon policy, but in its concentration upon those particular facts and those particular points of policy which were agreeable to Zionists, and in its replacement of the phraseology which had given offence to the Jews by a phraseology which was courteous and considerate in its tone towards them almost to the point of being ingratiating."¹

Upon the publication of Mr MacDonald's letter the rôles of the Jews and of the Arabs were immediately reversed. Dr Weizmann announced that "this statement of policy . . . has, in my opinion, re-established the basis for that co-operation with the Mandatory Power on which our policy is founded." On the other hand, the President of the Palestine Arab Executive denounced the letter as a

*Jewish and
Arab
Reactions*

(1) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 302.

breach of faith, in which the policy of the White Paper had been thrown over.¹

Meanwhile the Mandatory Power was already taking steps to implement the policy of the "agricultural development of rural Palestine" recommended by Sir John Hope Simpson and adopted in the White Paper.

*Attempts to
implement
the Hope
Simpson
Recommendations*

On November 17, 1930, it was announced that the British Government would guarantee, and for the first few years provide, the service of a £2,500,000 loan, designed primarily to increase the general productivity of Palestine, £250,000 being reserved for the settlement of up to 10,000 Arab families. In fact, owing to the subsequent financial crisis in Great Britain, this loan was never floated. The project was reopened in 1934, when by the Palestine Loan Act the British Government guaranteed the service of a £2,000,000 loan; but largely, no doubt, owing to the series of budget surpluses enjoyed by Palestine in recent years,² no loan has yet been issued.

*Development
Loans*

In July 1931, Mr Lewis French, formerly of the I.C.S., was appointed as the promised Director of Development. But the potential importance of this step was largely nullified by the refusal of both the Arabs and the Jews to co-operate with Mr French. The Arabs demanded an assurance that the development scheme would not be based on the principles laid down in Mr MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann³; whilst the Jewish refusal represented a protest against the tightening up of the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance designed to restrict Jewish purchases of Arab land.⁴ In consequence, the Jewish and Arab advisers contemplated were never appointed; both parties refused to accept the proposals contained in the French Reports and Mr French resigned at the end of 1932.

*Appointment
of Director of
Development*

The most important part of Mr French's work was his investigation of the problem of "landless Arabs." The claims of this "discontented landless class," whose position was attributed to Jewish purchases of land, had been emphasized by the Shaw Commission. According to its Report:

*The "Land-
less Arab"
Investigations*

"Of the land purchased by the Jews, so Dr Ruppin informed us, relatively small areas not exceeding in all 10 per cent were acquired from peasants. The other areas have been acquired from the owners of large estates most of whom live outside Palestine."⁵

Broadly speaking, the Arabs who sold land to Jews, almost always

(1) Communication to the British High Commissioner in Palestine, February 17, 1931.

(2) See below, p. 64.

(3) See above, pp. 51-2.

(4) *Report of the Jewish Agency, 1933*, p. 33.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 114.

at good prices, fall roughly into three classes: the landlord (very often an absentee), the sale of whose land raised the problem of ejected tenant occupiers; the industrious peasant who sold part of his land and worked up the remainder on the profits; and the type who sold all his land, at prices beyond his dreams of avarice, and who failed to use the substance thus acquired in a way that would keep himself and his family.

The French investigations, if they did not quite, as is sometimes suggested, dispose of the "landless Arab" as a "myth," certainly established that far fewer Arabs had been dispossessed than had been suggested.¹ Of 3,280 claims up till the end of 1935 (of which only nine were lodged in that year) 2,607 were disallowed, and 664 heads of families were admitted to the Register of Landless Arabs.² Including dependants, this meant that perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 persons had become "landless" owing to Jewish purchases. By 1936, some 300 heads of families had accepted the holdings offered them upon Government estates, the remainder (and also, no doubt, a certain number who never put in their claims) having secured alternative employment elsewhere.

It is a fact that Jewish land purchases have not so far created a "landless" class of any dimensions. But it was to guard against the fear that they might do so in the future that Mr French, like Sir John Hope Simpson before him, recommended the passage of an Occupancy Tenants Ordinance to guarantee security of tenure, and a Homesteads Protection Ordinance to guarantee the inalienability of a minimum holding (*lot viable*) for every cultivator. Of these proposals, the first was implemented in 1933, whilst legislation along the lines of the second was promised early in 1936.³

(1) It may be noted that in investigating the landless Arab problem Mr French "thought it inadvisable to request Government to issue public proclamations inviting applications, since such notifications are apt to lead to idle claims. Accordingly, the District Officers were instructed to ascertain in what villages displacement of Arab cultivators had occurred . . ." Before any claim was finally approved by the Director, the Jewish Agency was given an opportunity to raise objections.

(2) *Report for 1936*, p. 90. It is perhaps interesting to give here the view of a critic of the Administration on this score: "The rejection of the remaining 2,607 applications appears to have been due to the Government's refusal to include in its definition of "landless Arab" any head of a family (a) who still retained enough land to provide him (in the Government's opinion) with a livelihood; (b) who, though he had lost all his land, had found work elsewhere. That is to say that landless Arabs who had drifted to the towns and become proletarians were left to the fate of proletarians: to have a job at two or three shillings a day when there was work going, and when there was none, to be destitute." *Labour Monthly Pamphlets*, No. 7; by a British Resident in Palestine, 1936.

(3) See below, p. 74.

VI. IMMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

THE account in the preceding chapter goes to show that land settlement, which is one of the two basic problems of the future of Palestine, should not be an insoluble question; immigration, which is the other, raises more fundamental difficulties.

From 1922 to 1937 the criterion for the regulation of immigration into Palestine was the "economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."¹ But how is it possible to determine economic absorptive capacity? First and foremost the decision must depend upon whether the development of an agricultural or of an industrial country is envisaged. So far as the agricultural capacity of Palestine is concerned, no more need be said; the subject has already been examined in the chapter on land settlement. But it is already clear that Palestine is not going to remain a purely agricultural country. For the Government "places its hopes for the future in the development of Palestinian industries."² Clearly, the more highly the country is industrialized, the larger the population which it can carry. "It is quite incorrect to believe that Jewish immigration is dependent on a market being already available; it is before all things Jewish immigration that creates the home market and conquers the foreign market."³ On the other hand, it is clear that even though it has been decided to encourage the partial industrialization of Palestine, the "optimum population" must still be a "complex product of many factors: the material assets of the country; the energy and enterprise and skill of its inhabitants, including future immigrants; the economic demand of the world at large for the economic assets which Palestine could offer; and the general level of world prosperity, on which the extent and effectiveness of this demand would depend."⁴ The foreign market for oranges, grapefruit, and manufactures, the *entrepôt* trade in oil and other products, and the inflow of capital, religious gifts, tourist receipts, and *rentier* income are the vital factors affecting Palestine's economic future.⁵

*Economic
Absorptive
Capacity*

(1) Statement in the Churchill Memorandum of that year. For text see Appendix III.

(2) Statement of the British Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, June, 1936, *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 156.

(3) Jewish Agency Memorandum quoted in the Hope Simpson Report, p. 114.

(4) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 230.

(5) See below, pp. 64-9.

The immigration statistics must be considered in relation to the population of Palestine, and to its natural and total rate of increase. The following figures are the official estimates of the numbers in the main religious groups on June 30 of each year; they exclude members of His Majesty's Forces, but include the nomadic Beduin population (66,553 in 1931). The racial distribution of the population in December 1938 was estimated as 997,000 Arabs, 411,000 Jews, and 27,000 others.

POPULATION OF PALESTINE¹

<i>Year</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>
1922	752,048	589,177	83,790	71,464	7,617
1923	778,989	609,331	89,660	72,090	7,908
1924	804,962	627,660	94,945	74,094	8,263
1925	847,238	641,494	121,725	75,512	8,507
1926	898,902	663,613	150,040	76,467	8,782
1927	917,315	680,725	149,789	77,880	8,921
1928	935,951	695,280	151,656	79,812	9,203
1929	960,043	712,343	156,481	81,776	9,443
1930	992,559	733,149	164,796	84,986	9,628
1931	1,023,734	753,812	172,028	87,870	10,024
1932	1,052,872	771,174	180,793	90,624	10,281
1933	1,104,884	789,980	209,207	95,165	10,532
1934	1,171,158	807,180	253,700	99,532	10,746
1935	1,261,082	826,457	320,358	103,371	10,896
1936	1,336,518	848,342	370,483	106,474	11,219
1937	1,383,320	875,947	386,084	109,769	11,510
1938	1,418,619	895,159	399,808	111,796	11,856

It is estimated that between 1922 and 1938 the population of Palestine expanded from 752,048 to 1,418,619, representing an increase of nearly 90 per cent, which is probably the highest rate of increase of any country in the world during the period. In absolute figures the non-Jewish increase (350,553) was slightly larger than the Jewish (316,018); but while the Moslem and Christian populations expanded by 52 per cent and 57 per cent respectively, the Jewish population increased by no less than 477 per cent. On the other hand, the remarkably high rate of natural increase of the Moslem population is in striking contrast both with its stationary character under the Ottoman régime and with the comparatively slow post war expansion of the population of Transjordan.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Jews were steadily gaining ground even before 1931; and since that date their relative position has advanced rapidly. The Jewish population, estimated at 55,000 in 1918, is now over 400,000. The Jewish proportion of the population has risen from 11 per cent in 1922 to 29 per cent in 1939.

(1) Source: *Report for 1938*, p. 226. These are mid-year estimates. Censuses were taken in October 1922 and November 1931.

Nearly 40 per cent¹ of this remarkable increase in the population of Palestine in the past fifteen years is accounted for by immigration. In the case of the Jews, particularly since 1931, the proportion has been far higher. In the case of the Arabs, the expansion of population largely represents a very rapid natural increase. For this there are three main reasons: (i) the cessation of conscription, which is said, under the Turkish régime, to have removed between 10,000 and 20,000 youths annually from the Arab villages²; (ii) the lower death rate due to the activities of the Public Health Department; and (iii) the stoppage of emigration due to the exclusion of Asiatics from Latin-American countries in recent years.³

*Proportion
due to
Immigration*

The Peel Report contains the following interesting estimates of the future population of Palestine on the assumption that no further immigration takes place. To the Jewish figure must now be added the 75,000 immigrants to be admitted in the course of the next five years under the British Government's Plan of May 1939, together with the consequent additional natural increase.

ESTIMATED FUTURE POPULATION OF PALESTINE⁴

			<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>
1936	943,000	370,000
1940	1,038,000	403,000
1945	1,163,000	448,000
1950	1,290,000	497,000
1955	1,425,000	552,000
1960	1,558,000	613,000
1965	1,691,000	681,000
1970	1,821,000	757,000

That the Palestine Government's estimates of the country's economic absorbing power have varied considerably from year to year is clear from the statistics of authorized immigration between 1920 and 1935.⁵

*Authorized
Immigration*

Of these recorded immigrants, the great majority were persons authorized to enter the country as permanent residents. The remainder, who in 1938 numbered 1,427 Jews and 421 non-Jews, entered Palestine in the first place as travellers or by evading the frontier controls, but were subsequently registered as immigrants.

(1) As compared with a rise in population of approximately 680,000 net legal immigrants, as shown in the table on p. 58, amounted to about 285,000.

(2) French Reports, p. 19.

(3) *Report for 1930*, pp. 36-7; *for 1933*, p. 37.

(4) Peel Report, pp. 281-2.

(5) Sources: *Report for 1935*, p. 214; *for 1938*, p. 231.

Year	Recorded Immigration		Recorded Emigration	
	Jews	Non-Jews	Jews	Non-Jews
1920 (September–October)	5,514	202	*	*
1921	9,149	190	*	*
1922	7,844	284	1,451	1,348
1923	7,421	570	3,466	1,481
1924	12,856	697	507†	604†
1925	33,801	840	2,151	1,949
1926	13,081	829	7,365	2,064
1927	2,713	882	5,071	1,907
1928	2,178	908	2,168	954
1929	5,249	1,317	1,746	1,089
1930	4,944	1,489	1,679	1,324
1931	4,075	1,458	666	680
1932	9,553	1,736	*	*
1933	30,327	1,650	*	*
1934	42,359	1,784	*	*
1935	61,854	2,293	396	387
1936	29,727	1,944	773	405
1937	10,536	1,939	889	639
1938	12,868	2,395 ¹	1,095	716
TOTAL	306,049	23,407	29,423	15,547

Illegal Immigration

* No statistics of emigration by race were compiled. † July–December only.

Apart from the authorized immigrants there is a considerable volume of illegal immigration. This reached its peak in 1933, and it was estimated that in the two years 1932–3 the number of unauthorized settlers rose to 22,400.² Three main classes of immigrant are involved: (i) those who evade the frontier controls; (ii) a far larger number who enter the country as travellers and stay without regularizing their position; and (iii) women who formally marry “professional” Palestinian husbands and subsequently divorce them. In 1934 intensified efforts were made by the Government to check these developments, and on December 1, 1934, the High Commissioner claimed that the numbers in the first class had been materially reduced to less than 100 per month, whilst the numbers in the second class had been reduced by at least half.³ Later statistics are now available covering the second class—the “travellers” staying beyond the period authorized:

NUMBER OF “TRAVELLERS” REMAINING ILLEGALLY IN PALESTINE⁴

	Jews	Non-Jews
1933 ⁵	10,376	2,653
1934	2,907	3,022
1935	4,618	3,256
1936	—	1,288
1937	93	1,679
1938	307	2,196

(1) Of these, only 473 were Arabs.

(2) *Report for 1933*, p. 15.

(3) *Report for 1934*, p. 11.

(4) Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report, 1938*, p. 22.

(5) *Report for 1933*, p. 34.

The number of persons deported from Palestine in the past two years for immigration offences is as follows:

NUMBER OF PERSONS DEPORTED FROM PALESTINE¹

			<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>
1934	772	1,635
1935	293	2,152
1936	152	1,887
1937	157	2,218
1938	46	1,904

It appears to be impossible to secure separate Arab statistics before 1935, as it was only in that year that the categories of "Jews, Arabs, and others" were substituted for "Jews, Christians, and Moslems." Nevertheless, the figures for total authorized non-Jewish immigration and emigration are of considerable interest, since they show that until 1931 non-Jewish emigrants exceeded non-Jewish immigrants in every year except 1924. In subsequent years there has probably been a net balance of immigrants. But in the peak year, 1938, only 473 of 2,395 authorized non-Jewish immigrants were Arabs.²

Thus, amongst legal immigrants, non-Jews are completely outnumbered by Jews. In the case of illegal immigrants, the two categories are more nearly balanced. Indeed, in the past three years the number of non-Jewish "travellers" remaining illegally in Palestine has very much exceeded that of Jewish "travellers." Here again, however, many of the non-Jews are not Arabs.

As regards the other type of illegal immigrant—those who evade the frontier controls—it is impossible to give statistics. Some of these are certainly Jews, but it may be that the proportion of Arabs is higher in this category than in the other two.

It is frequently alleged that the Hauran, in Southern Syria, and Transjordan are important sources of Arab immigration. As regards the first, *La Syrie* published on August 12, 1934, an interview with the Governor of the Hauran, in which he stated that in the last few months 30,000 to 36,000 Hauranese had entered Palestine and settled there. Questioned on the subject before the Permanent Mandates Commission, the British Accredited Representative maintained that the figures "must be grossly exaggerated, because the Palestine Government had taken special measures on the eastern and north-eastern frontier with a view to keeping out undesirable people."³

At the same session a question was asked as to the number of

(1) *Report for 1938*, p. 76.

(2) Many of the others were dependents of Army and Air Force officers.

(3) *Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Session*, p. 47.

Transjordanians, who enter Palestine for seasonal work. As regards these, the official answer is that "no reliable statistics are available, but it is believed that few remain in Palestine permanently. Most seek to make a little capital in Palestine with which to return to Transjordan and assist their livelihood there."¹

Since 1934 there has been a tendency, which has been exaggerated in some quarters, for cheap Arab labour to be attracted into Palestine by higher wages; no reliable figures are available.

From the statistics quoted above, it is evident that there have been two periods of intensive immigration, of which the first reached its peak in 1925 (31,000 net recorded) and the second in 1935 (63,000 net recorded). The first of these peaks was followed by an economic crisis which lasted until 1928. This crisis was definitely caused, according to the Shaw Commission, by immigration "in excess of the economic absorbing power of the country,"² which was also admitted by the Mandatory authorities to have been a contributory factor³; although it should be noted that a Jewish authority attributed the depression, not to the acceleration, but to the subsequent slowing down of the rate of middle-class immigration.⁴ In this latter connection an important factor was the collapse of the zloty and the imposition of currency restrictions in Poland and other Eastern European countries.

In the second peak period, which culminated in 1935, a far larger number of immigrants was admitted even than in 1924-6. Indeed, more than half of the Jewish immigrants into Palestine since 1919 have entered the country since the beginning of 1933. It might therefore have been expected that the economic structure would have shown still more serious signs of strain. In actual fact, however, the second inflow was accompanied by a wave of prosperity without parallel either in the previous history of Palestine or in the contemporary experience of the rest of the world.⁵ This apparent paradox can easily be understood if recent changes in (i) the origin, and (ii) the status of the Jewish immigrants are examined.

313,030 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine between 1919 and the end of 1937. These immigrants came from the following countries:

(1) *Report for 1935*, p. 50.

(2) British White Paper, Cmd. 3530, p. 106.

(3) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 244.

(4) Stein, "The Development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, 1918-26," *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i, p. 373.

(5) It is true that this prosperity did not extend to the Arab hill peasants, who have suffered exceptional hardships in the past few years. But their difficulties have definitely not been caused by the increase in immigration. See below, p. 70.

JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE, 1919-37¹

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Poland	131,249	42
Germany	35,346 ²	11
U.S.S.R.	30,718	10
Rumania	15,528	5
Lithuania	9,642	3
Yemen	9,181	3
U.S.A.	7,909	3
Others	73,457	23
TOTAL	313,030	100

The predominance of these countries is largely explained by two main facts. In the first place, two-thirds of the world's Jews are to be found in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The following table shows the chief countries in which Jews (according to religion) are to be found:

DISTRIBUTION OF JEWS IN 1938³

					<i>Proportion of total population</i>	
						<i>%</i>
U.S.A.	4,700,000	4
Poland	3,325,000	10
U.S.S.R.	3,180,000 ⁴	2
Rumania		800,000	4
Hungary	510,000	6
Germany (inc. Austria)	475,000	1
Palestine			440,000	30
United Kingdom		350,000	1
Czecho-Slovakia	290,000	2
France	280,000	1
Argentina	275,000	2
Canada	175,000	2
French Morocco		175,000	3
Lithuania	165,000	7
Others	1,561,000	
TOTAL					16,701,000	

In the second place, the "emancipated" Jews of the United States, France, and Great Britain are rapidly becoming "assimilated," whereas the position of many Eastern European Jews was still further worsened by the general upheaval caused by the Great War and the consequent territorial changes. It is to these Eastern European Jews that Zionism naturally makes such a strong appeal.

Except in one important respect, the percentage of immigrants coming from each country has not greatly varied with the years.

(1) *Report for 1938*, p. 231.

(2) Numbers previously resident in Germany, 43,764.

(3) *Encyclopaedia Britannica Year Book*, 1939, pp. 359-60.

(4) 1,700,000 in the Ukraine.

Nearly half of the immigrants have always come from Poland, but whereas in the earlier years the U.S.S.R. provided the second largest contingent, recently, owing partly to the difficulties created by the Soviet Government (for instance, £100 is demanded for permission for each adult emigrant to leave the country),¹ but still more to the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi régime, the second place has regularly been taken by Germany; since January 1933 over 35,000 Jews have come into Palestine from the Reich. The following table illustrates this change of source of Jewish immigration²:

Country of Previous Abode	1922-29	Percentage of Total			
		1935	1936	1937	1938
Germany	—	14	27	34	52*
Poland	46	46	41	35	25
Rumania	6	6	5	3	4
U.S.S.R.	20	1	2	3	1
Lithuania	5	3	3	2	1
U.S.A.	3	3	1	2	1
Others	20	27	21	21	16
TOTALS	100	100	100	100	100

* Including Austria.

(ii) *Status of Immigrants*

The remarkable feature of recent immigration has been the wealth of the Jews entering the country. This is strikingly shown by the increasing number and proportion of Jewish immigrants with a capital of £P1,000³ or more—usually considerably more.

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS WITH AT LEAST
£1,000 CAPITAL⁴

Year	Number (excluding dependents)	Percentage of total Jewish Immigration
1930	178	4
1931	233	6
1932	727	8
1933	3,250	11
1934	5,124	12
1935	6,309	10
1936	2,970	10
1937	1,275	12
1938	1,753	14

Nearly 75 per cent of these (comparatively) wealthy immigrants in 1938 were German Jews. The bulk of the remainder came from Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

- (1) *Report of the Jewish Agency*, 1935, p. 67.
- (2) Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1938, p. 14.
- (3) The Palestine pound (£P) is equivalent to the pound sterling.
- (4) Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1938, p. 15.

The total quantity of capital imported by immigrants into Palestine has been estimated at £10,000,000 in 1934¹ and £16,000,000 in 1935.²

“Capitalist” immigrants and their dependents³ account for nearly a quarter of the total immigration. Another third consists of dependents³ of Palestine residents. Practically the entire remainder are “persons coming to employment” and their dependents.³ Their numbers are determined by the Labour Schedule authorized by the Government for every six months beginning April 1st and October 1st. The Labour Schedule represents the Government’s estimate of the country’s absorptive capacity, less its estimate of the likely volume of illegal immigration over the period.⁴ Once the Government has decided the total size of the Labour Schedule, the allocation of the great majority of immigration certificates is left to the Jewish Agency. This policy was criticized by the Shaw Commission on the ground that immigrants were selected by the Jewish Agency on political grounds.

*The Labour
Schedule*

Even during the exceptional immigration year of 1935 the Jewish Agency maintained that a far larger Labour Schedule was required in order to meet the unsatisfied demand for labour, as the following figures show:—

ESTIMATES OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY⁵

<i>Period</i>	<i>Jewish Agency's Estimate</i>	<i>Certificates granted by Government</i>
April–Sept., 1935 ..	19,160	8,000
Sept. 1935–March 1936	10,900	3,250
April–Sept. 1936 ..	11,000	4,500
Oct. 1936–March 1937	10,695	1,800
April–Sept. 1937 ..	11,250	770
Oct. 1937–March 1938	3,000	1,780
April–Sept. 1938 ..	—	1,000
Oct. 1938–March 1939	4,625	1,000

It is the increased entry of German Jews, and the consequent larger imports of capital into Palestine, that largely explain the

(1) *Economic Conditions in Palestine*, Department of Overseas Trade Report, 1935, p. 77.

(2) Cohen, *Points about Palestine* (Zionist Federation of Great Britain), p. 9.

(3) The rise in the number of “dependents” has been a feature of recent Jewish immigration. In 1935 they represented 61 per cent of the whole as against 41 per cent in 1929. One reason for this is the practice of foreign women marrying “professional” Palestinian husbands outside Palestine and divorcing on arrival. The number of divorces per 100 Jewish marriages in 1938 was 49·9!

(4) This policy has been criticized by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which “cannot but ask itself whether the effect of the Mandatory Power’s action in reducing in advance the authorized immigration quotas—in which express allowance is made for illicit immigration—has not been to render the prevention of such immigration more difficult.” *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 208.

(5) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, vol. i, p. 580.

paradox referred to earlier in this chapter—the fact that the inflow of immigrants in 1924-6 precipitated an economic crisis, whereas the 1935 inflow caused an unprecedented trade boom.

The remarkable extent of this boom is shown clearly by various indices in the table overleaf. Government revenue more than doubled between 1931 and 1935, rising from £2·3 to £5·7 millions, thanks largely to the expansion in Customs receipts. Expenditure meanwhile rose only from £2·4 to £4·2 millions, and on April 1, 1936, the Government still had a surplus of £6·3 millions,¹ which has since been substantially reduced by exceptional military and other expenditure. The same story is told by the rise in the reserves and the note circulation of the Currency Board from £2·3 to £5·0 millions and from £2·3 to £4·7 millions respectively between the end of 1931 and the end of 1934. Solid justification for this currency expansion was provided by the doubling of railway goods traffic and the trebling of overseas shipping between 1931 and 1935.

First and foremost the boom was a building boom. It is estimated that £6 millions were invested in buildings in 1934, as compared with £2½ millions in agriculture and £1-1½ millions in industry.² The demand for houses and other buildings sent land values soaring. In 1936, however, there were clear signs that the building boom had passed its peak.³

But the most striking indices of all are the foreign trade figures. Both imports and exports nearly trebled between 1931 and 1935. But as the value of imports has always been three or four times that of exports from Palestine there was a remarkable rise in the adverse balance of trade, from £4·3 millions in 1931 to £13·7 millions in 1935. Hitherto the trade deficit had presumably been covered by such "invisible exports" as religious subventions, tourist receipts, British Government expenditure, and interest on foreign securities. But the huge recent deficits must obviously have been chiefly covered by imports of capital.

(1) Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*.

(2) "The Progress of Palestine," *Midland Bank Review*, November-December 1935.

(3) The monthly average floor area of new buildings authorized in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, and Tel-Aviv has been as follows:—

1932	359,000	sq. metres
1933	782,000	
1934	1,064,000	„ „
1935	1,215,000	„ „
1936	749,000	„ „
1937	577,000	„ „
1938	342,000	„ „

Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, March 1939, p. 121.

PALESTINE'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1929-38

(Figures are in £P millions unless otherwise stated.)

	Imports	Exports	Import Surplus	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus	Currency Board Reserves ¹	Note and Coin Circulation	Railway Goods Traffic (in million ton kilometres)	Overseas Shipping Tonnage cleared (in millions)
								(End of year)		
1929	7.2	1.6	- 5.6	2.3	2.1	-0.2	1.9	2.1	78	2.0
1930	7.0	1.9	- 5.1	2.4	2.6	+0.2	2.3	2.3	82	1.9
1931	5.9	1.6	- 4.3	2.3	2.4	+0.1	2.3	2.3	66	1.9
1932	7.8	2.4	- 5.4	3.0	2.5	-0.5	3.0	2.5	73	2.0
1933	11.1	2.6	- 8.5	4.0	2.7	+1.3	4.2	3.6	86	3.2
1934	15.1	3.2	-11.9	5.4	3.2	+2.2	5.0	4.7	103	4.2
1935	17.9	4.2	-13.7	5.7	4.2	+1.5	5.3	6.6	133	5.5
1936	13.3	3.6	- 9.7	4.6	6.1	-1.5	4.8	5.7	129	4.8
1937	15.3	5.8	- 9.5	4.9	7.3	-2.4	?	4.8	139	4.9
1938	13.6	5.0	- 8.6	4.5†	5.3†	-0.8	?	5.5	97	5.2

(1) March 31 of following year.

† Estimates.

Sources: *League of Nations Statistical Year Book*, 1937-8.

Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletins of Statistics*.

In the autumn of 1935 a definite check to the Palestine boom was caused by the tension in the Mediterranean arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. The disturbances after April 1936, and particularly the Arab strike, caused more serious damage. The trade figures for 1936 showed a pronounced decline in both imports and exports, though the latter more than recovered in 1937. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the economic consequences of the recent burst of immigration were very different from those of 1924-5 expansion. So far from depressing the country, the recent immigrants stimulated its economic life to an unprecedented extent, and the reason for this was clearly the large volume of capital which they brought with them.

The reality of the boom cannot be doubted. The only questions that remain to be answered are: (i) Did it represent a healthy form of economic development which could have been maintained? (ii) Did it benefit every section of the population? It is in affirmative answers to both these questions that the Government's recent immigration policy must find its economic justification.

*Has the
Economic
Development
been sound?*

In the normal course of events dependence upon such heavy imports of capital would be exceedingly dangerous, since these would involve a large addition to the external debt and a serious problem of future repayment. But the case of Palestine is unique, in that the great bulk of the capital imported is being provided by the immigrants themselves.

The rise in the import bill might also appear to be dangerous. But it should be noted that a great part of the expansion of imports consists of capital goods—notably building materials and machinery—which will not need replacing for some time; moreover, immigrants from Germany are only allowed to transfer their capital on condition that goods of an equivalent value are exported from Germany to Palestine.

The rapid development of heavily protected industries should gradually reduce the dependence upon some imported manufactures. On the other hand, it is clear that a larger population will require more imports; and it would be rash to count on a permanent stream of capital into the country with which to pay for these. Hence it is essential that the country should develop its export trade and other sources of foreign exchange.

At present exports are dominated to a dangerous degree by citrus fruits, which regularly account for over 80 per cent of the total value. Of these the bulk are Jaffa oranges, though the production of grapefruit, which matures more quickly and grows on

heavier land, is being rapidly developed. It is interesting to note that the Arab orange groves are very nearly as extensive as the Jewish. *Exports of Citrus Fruits*

EXPORTS OF CITRUS FRUITS¹

(in thousand cases)

	1934-5	1935-6	1936-7	1937-8
Oranges	6,625	4,992	9,191	9,573
Grapefruit	683	844	1,539	1,790

So far there have been no serious difficulties about marketing the increased export; the setback in 1936 was due to the prolonged sirocco of May 1935. But orange trees take some years to mature; and the serious problem created by the very extensive recent plantings is only just beginning to become evident. The orange crop is expected to rise rapidly from the present 10 or 12 millions to over 20 million cases in 1941. Where will they be sold?

There are complaints that the United Kingdom, which takes two-thirds of the crop, gives no preference to Palestine produce, the duty on grapefruit being particularly heavy. The difficulty is that Palestine, being an A Mandate, must be regarded as a foreign State, so that any preference given to her would have to be extended to every nation enjoying most-favoured-nation rights in their trade with Great Britain. Still greater obstacles are met with in Germany, which had been relied upon to provide a greatly expanded market. Germany's share of Palestine's citrus fruit exports fell from 24 per cent in 1933-4 to 7 per cent in 1934-5, owing largely to exchange regulations.²

Apart from citrus fruits and small quantities of other agricultural products (e.g. melons), a wide range of local manufactures are exported on a modest scale, notably potash and bromine, soap, wearing apparel, artificial teeth, olive oil, other edible oils, and wine. The exploitation of the Dead Sea potash deposits by the Palestine Potash Company is of growing importance; the manufacture of soap is a traditional Arab industry. In recent years the export of local manufactures has remained more or less stationary at rather less than £500,000. The question is whether it can be expected to expand materially. This is evidently the hope of the Mandatory Power, which "fully appreciates the seriousness of the possibility" that the inflow of capital may cease, but "places its hopes for the future in the development of Palestinian industries."³ Since 1927 a definite policy of protecting local industries has been followed.

Export of Manufactures

(1) Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, March 1939, p. 120.

(2) *Economic Conditions in Palestine*, D.O.T. Report, 1935, p. 49.

(3) Statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission: *Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 156.

There are certain favourable factors. Both management and labour can be of high quality in Palestine, and the country is well placed to compete in the considerable Near Eastern market. On the other hand, Palestinian costs are relatively high, and the markets of neighbouring countries are heavily protected. But perhaps the main difficulty with which Palestine is faced in the development of her trade is the Open Door provision in Article 18 of the Mandate, which prevents her from discriminating in her trade relations between States Members of the League. This excludes the possibility either of granting reciprocal trade concessions or of using the weapon of retaliation against such countries as Japan, which supply Palestine with a considerable quantity of produce, but take very little in return. It might seem that there is nothing to prevent discrimination against Japan, or indeed Germany, which are no longer Members of the League. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether Japan has not the legal right to claim economic equality in the Mandated Territories as a Principal Allied and Associated Power. In any case, relations between Palestine and Japan are governed by the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911, which contains the most-favoured-nation clause.

The expansion of Palestine's exports of citrus fruits and of manufactured goods is clearly essential. But of almost comparable importance is the restoration of her historic position as an *entrepôt*.¹ It has even been suggested that "Palestine's economic future depends on its development as a meeting-place of steamship lines, air routes, oil pipe-lines, and railways."²

A harbour for ocean steamers at Haifa—the third largest harbour in the Eastern Mediterranean—was opened on October 31, 1933; but, as ocean shipping calling at Palestine ports trebled between 1931 and 1935, there is already a demand for an expansion of the harbour at Haifa and the construction of a full-size port at Jaffa or Tel-Aviv. Palestine is traversed by railways connecting Egypt with Europe via Syria and Turkey. Gaza is used as a stopping place by both Imperial Airways and the Royal Dutch Air Lines in their Far Eastern service, and a new international aerodrome, more convenient for Palestine itself, is being constructed at Lydda. Oil already arrives at Haifa from Iraq (the Iraq Petroleum Company's field at Kirkuk) through the pipe-line opened on January 22, 1935; and it will presumably also come eventually from the British Oil

(1) Cf. the vivid discussion in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 263-6.

(2) *The Economist*, June 27, 1936.

Development Company's concession in Mosul.¹ Even more significant is the authority secured by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to build a pipe-line across Palestine from its Khuzistan oil field in southern Iran. Finally, there is the desert motor route from Haifa to Baghdad and on to Iran, which will presumably become of considerable importance when the road has been completed.

The importance of these developments is obvious; but from a strictly economic point of view it can easily be exaggerated. As sources of foreign exchange, capital imports, tourist receipts, income on foreign investments, religious gifts, and military expenditure, still more than the factors mentioned above, are likely to remain the vital "invisible exports" upon which Palestine will depend.

Whether the country can stand the rapid economic development to which it has been subjected in recent years depends, therefore, upon the very considerable expansion of the market for her citrus and other exports and on the maintenance of her invisible exports: in particular, a sudden check to her imports of capital would cause serious difficulties. It remains to examine whether this development has been achieved without detriment to any sections of the population.

*Has the
Boom had
any harmful
Effects?*

The demand for labour caused Jewish wages to rise by as much as 40-50 per cent in the building and allied industries, and by smaller amounts elsewhere. Arab wages also increased in the building and some other trades.² As a result of the boom unemployment was virtually non-existent in 1934 and the early part of 1935; but in the autumn of that year the Italo-Abyssinian dispute caused some check to prosperity, and by the end of the year Jewish unemployment was estimated at 6,000; Arab unemployment had also increased, but no reliable statistics are available.³ On the other hand Jewish immigration caused a phenomenal rise in land values and

(1) The output of petroleum in Iraq has risen as follows:

1933	0.1 million metric tons
1934	1.0 " " "
1935	3.7 " " "
1936	4.0 " " "
1937	4.3 " " "
1938	4.2 " " "

This output passes through the pipe-line via its two branches to Haifa and to Tripolis (Syria); at present the quantities pumped through to each port are about equal.

(2) "The difference between Arab and Jewish rates in unskilled labour may be 100 per cent or more, but in skilled labour is not nearly so great." *Economic Conditions in Palestine*, D.O.T. Report, 1935, p. 77.

(3) *Report for 1935*, p. 117.

also a rise protective duties designed to assist local industries.¹ As a result, rents and prices of some commodities have been forced up.

The position has been far more serious in the rural areas, which include 70 per cent of the Arabs.² "The prosperity of the country was not reflected in the rural population, and that applied to Jews and Arabs alike both of whom were suffering as a result of four years drought. . . . The winter months and the early spring of the year 1934 found a large proportion of the fellahin in a state of destitution, approaching starvation in some cases, and their livestock dying in large numbers."³ The situation was particularly acute in the hill country, which is scarcely remarkable when the Director of Development's estimate of 130 dunums as the minimum holding of unirrigated land required to support an Arab cultivator and his family at a reasonable standard of living is compared with the actual holding in the (unirrigated) hill country of 88 dunums. In order to relieve the situation the Government was compelled for several years to remit taxes and to grant short-term loans for the purchase of seed.

The fundamental causes of these hardships were clearly the succession of droughts and bad harvests and the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices⁴ on top of the Arabs' permanent handicaps of capital shortage and heavy debts bearing a rate of interest of 30 per cent or more. For these factors the Jews cannot in any way be held responsible. Moreover, "the boom which Jewish activities in Palestine were now producing had manifestly relieved the pressure upon the Arab agricultural population by opening to it new urban markets, as well as a more lucrative alternative field of employment."⁵

In fact, on balance the immigration boom probably slightly relieved the position of the rural population as well as considerably benefiting the urban workers.

But there are factors which mitigate the benefits. One thing which prevents the Arabs from appreciating the advantages derived from the country's greater prosperity is Zionist exclusiveness, both economic and cultural; for prosperity alone does not appeal to Arabs as a final argument in favour of Jewish immigration.

(1) Total duties collected in 1936 represented 29 per cent of the value of dutiable imports.

(2) Only 30 per cent of the Jews are in rural areas. 35 per cent of the Jews in Palestine are in Tel-Aviv alone.

(3) Statement by the British Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1934; *Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Session*, pp. 14 and 18.

(4) The fall in prices was the more serious since the tithe had recently been commuted to a fixed money value.

(5) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 275-6.

VII. THE WORKING OF THE MANDATE

1931-37

THE social and economic facts set out in the preceding chapters throw light upon the subsequent history of the Mandate, and help to explain why, though comparative calm prevailed throughout the boom period, an underlying tension continued, manifested in the disturbances of 1933 and 1936. In 1934 Sir Herbert Samuel wrote: "Every one in Palestine agrees that the economic development is astonishing; no one thinks that the political situation shows any appreciable improvement."¹ Three years later the verdict of the Peel Commission was even more uncompromising: "With almost mathematical precision the betterment of the economic situation in Palestine meant the deterioration of the political situation."²

Nevertheless, by comparison with the turbulence of 1929, the next six years were a peaceful period. The High Commissioner endeavoured to "bring the two peoples of Palestine and the Administration into closer touch with each other,"³ and succeeded in getting Jewish and Arab unofficial members to work together on the Agricultural Council, the Road and Railway Boards, the Labour Legislation Committee, and the Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry, the co-operation being at its best among Government officials, particularly among postal and railway employees.

*Progress
towards Self-
Government*

A representative institution in the shape of the promised Legislative Council⁴ seemed as far away as ever, but the Mandatory began to work towards it along a new line of approach—municipal autonomy. In 1932 the High Commissioner announced to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Council would be established "when the new Local Government Ordinance has been brought into working order . . . I hope . . . early in 1933."⁵ But owing to subsequent condemnation of the Ordinance by both Jewish and Arab bodies—partly as placing them in leading-strings and partly on old scores connected with national antagonisms—the Ordinance did not finally enter into force until January 12, 1934. The municipal elections, which had been due to be held in 1930, but which had

(1) *The Observer*, July 8, 1934.

(2) Peel Report, p. 86.

(3) Statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission, December 1932; *Minutes of the Twenty-second Session*, p. 80.

(4) See Shaw Report Recommendations, pp. 41-2 above.

(5) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Twenty-second Session*, p. 82.

been postponed because of the 1929 disturbances, were held during the year, and by the beginning of 1935 twenty newly-elected councils were in being, "wherein representative Palestinians of all communities and races might acquire training in the common management of public affairs under a modern code of municipal legislation."¹ Haifa and Tiberias were the place in which this worked first and most satisfactorily, and by June 1935 a council composed of Arabs and Jews in equal numbers was operating in Jerusalem, owing, chiefly, to the moderation of the new mayor, Dr Khalidi, who had been elected in 1934.

But the Jews and Arabs actively working for co-operation were few in number,² and there was plentiful evidence of continued high feeling. Perhaps the most reliable indication of this was the Government's security policy; between 1929 and 1936 they did not see fit to reduce either the garrison or the police forces.

The unrest took various forms; in August 1930 there was a minor Arab outbreak at Nablus, and the years 1930 and 1931 were marked by a series of terrorist murders of Jews. The rejection of the French Reports on Development³ and the holding up of the entry into force of the Local Government Ordinance⁴ were in part due to mistrust of the Administration, but can also in fact be ascribed to racial feeling. The rank and file of the Arabs showed their animosity by resort to agrarian crime—the uprooting of trees, the wounding of cattle, and trespass in the form of squatting and grazing as a method of obstructing the sale of land to Jews. Arab scouts also patrolled the coast in order to defeat illegal immigration, claiming that the steps taken by the police to that end were designedly inadequate.⁵

The disturbances of October 1933 were the first serious manifestation of high feeling. The immediate cause of the riots, shooting, and strikes which took place in that month "was the resolution of the Arab Executive calling upon the Arabs to hold demonstrations to protest against the policy of Government, the ground for which was prepared by a general feeling of apprehension amongst the Arabs engendered by the purchase of land by the Jews and by Jewish immigration."⁶ A vigorous campaign against immigration was

(1) *Report for 1934*, p. 7.

(2) The best known Jewish group was the *Bris Shalom* or Covenant of Peace, a group of intellectuals and younger men inspired by the ideas of the Chancellor of Jerusalem Hebrew University.

(3) See above, p. 53.

(4) See above, p. 71.

(5) For these and other instances see the "Public Security" chapters of the *Reports* for the years 1931-5.

(6) *Report of the Murison-Trusted Commission of Inquiry*, published as a supplement to *Palestine Gazette*, February 7, 1934, p. 104.

launched in the Arab press, and "Arab spokesmen found material to hand in press reports of arrivals of Jewish immigrants at the ports; the Jewish press displayed no reticence in the publication of this kind of news, and at the Zionist Congress at Prague immigration was discussed in such terms as to inspire alarm in the minds of the Arab population."¹ The result was the declaration by the Arab Executive of a general strike on Friday, October 13; subsequent rioting, which was confined to urban Arabs, took place in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Nablus. But the Administration proclaimed emergency measures under the Palestine Defence Order in Council of 1931, and the disturbances never assumed the dimensions of the 1929 disorders. Nevertheless, they constitute a milestone, for they were for the first time a manifestation of Arab feeling against the Government as well as against the Jews. The cause of this seems to have been despair in face of what the Arabs regarded as the entrenched Jewish influence in London, of which they saw evidence in the White Paper controversy and in the MacDonald letter of 1931.²

The history of 1934 provides good evidence of the difficulties with which the Administration is faced in framing its immigration policy. In the first months of the year, adjusting supply to demand, it drastically cut down the number of Jewish labour immigration permits asked for by the Jewish Agency; the step occasioned protests and strikes amongst the Jewish communities. In December, an Arab delegation to the High Commissioner submitted that sales of land to Jews and Jewish immigration had reached such an extent as to be contrary to the promises to preserve Arab rights given in the Mandate. The High Commissioner (Sir Arthur Wauchope) replied with a statement that the Government's policy was to increase the productivity of the country and that Jewish immigration (36,000 in ten months) was not excessive. At the same time he announced that the concession for draining some 40 dunums in the Huleh basin had been transferred from the original Arab concessionaires (who had obtained it before the War) to a Jewish group which had agreed to increase the area reserved for Arab settlement from the 9,200 dunums under the old concession to 15,000 dunums.

Throughout 1935 the Arabs showed restlessness and dissatisfaction, a chief indication of this being the tendency of the parties to crystallize,³ and to combine in the interests of making strong representations. Inflammatory articles appeared in the press, and in

Arab Unrest,
1935

- (1) *Report for 1933*, p. 5.
- (2) See above, pp. 49-53.
- (3) Cf. above, pp. 24-5.

November 1935, following an arms-smuggling incident at Jaffa, all the Arab leaders united to present a memorandum to the Administration calling for:

1. The establishment of democratic government;
2. Prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews and the enactment of a law similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt¹;
3. (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and the formation of a competent committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for immigration;
(b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards;
(c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.

*Proposal of
a new Con-
stitution,
1935*

In the meantime, the Administration had been making some progress with a proposal for the promised Legislative Council. The High Commissioner had announced in December 1934 that he would shortly be ready to discuss the matter with the leaders of the various parties. In December 1935 he judged that the municipal councils were working well enough to warrant the next step. He therefore communicated to the Jewish and Arab leaders respectively a new Constitution representing a practical step towards representative institutions.² The proposal was for a Legislative Council with a large unofficial majority; the twenty-eight members were to be made up as follows: 5 officials, 2 commercial representatives, 8 elected and 3 nominated Moslems, 3 elected and 4 nominated Jews, and 1 elected and 2 nominated Christians, plus an impartial president from outside Palestine who would neither debate nor vote. But, just as happened in 1929, the outbreak of serious trouble was once again to cause the postponement of further progress towards self-government.

*British Reply
to the Arabs,
1936*

On February 1, 1936, the Colonial Office, through the mouth of the High Commissioner, replied to the Arab demands of the previous November: (i) that its offer of a new Constitution made in December 1935 represented a practical step towards democratic government in that it proposed a Legislative Council with a large unofficial majority; (ii) that as regards sales of land, it intended to enact a law prohibiting these unless the Arab landowner retained a "viable minimum"—i.e. sufficient land to afford a means of subsistence to himself and his family; and (iii) that the rate of Jewish immigration was carefully gauged according to the country's capacity, and that a new Statistical Bureau was being established for estimating this.

The views on this reply were various. Those of the Arab leaders

(1) Lord Kitchener's Homestead Exemption Law of 1912, which gave the small cultivator protection against expropriation for debt.

(2) Published as a British White Paper (Cmd. 5119) in March 1936.

differed; some, and notably Dr Khalidi, the Mayor of Jerusalem whose moderation has already been mentioned, were for adopting a policy of co-operation without racial bias, and for accepting the proposed Legislative Council; others demanded drastic alterations in the plan, contending that it was farcical to describe as democratic a document which left such excessive powers to the High Commissioner.

*Reception of
the proposed
Constitution,
1936*

The Jews were unanimous in condemning the proposed Constitution and the Government's reply to the Arabs. An influential delegation protested in London, and the Jewish Agency issued a memorandum on the subject. The gist of their argument was that the proposed Arab majority on the Council precluded the establishment of the promised National Home, and that the suggested "interference" with the free disposal of land by its owner was an infraction of the clause in the Mandate which bound the British Government to encourage Jewish land settlement. The non-Zionist Jews of Palestine, through the mouth of the spokesman of the Agudath Israel, expressed equal disapproval of the scheme.

The question aroused feeling in England; it was discussed in debates in the House of Lords on February 28 and the House of Commons on March 25, 1936; considerable opposition was manifested, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr J. H. Thomas) was forced to defend the High Commissioner against criticism levelled from all sides of the House. One of the chief points made in his reply was that the Council would have very limited powers; it would not, for instance, be permitted to discuss the Mandate or the Jewish Agency or to interfere with immigration. He contended that the representation proposed on the Council was fair in proportion to the population of 825,000 Moslems, 100,000 Christians and 320,000 Jews.

The proposal was also criticized at the meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1936, disapproval being expressed in particular by M. Rappard and Lord Lugard. The latter viewed as "extremely inadvisable" and as "a fertile source of friction" a system in which the majority was unable to enforce a majority decision, and did not control the executive staff.¹

The debates in the two Houses of Parliament in February and March 1936 had caused a new wave of despair among the Arabs, who saw in them fresh evidence of Jewish influence in London, and proof that the self-governing institutions for which they were asking were as far away as ever. Until this feeling was manifested in open

*Growing
Arab Unrest*

(1) *P.M.C.: Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Session*, p. 145.

disorder, its extent was little realized in Great Britain. The visit to London of the Arab delegation invited by the British Government to discuss the Legislative Council proposal never materialized on account of the outbreak of the disturbances.

The actual disorders had their beginning in a hold-up of Jews by Arabs on the road from Nablus to Tulkarm on April 15. A Greek Jewish immigrant was killed, and his funeral was the occasion of more serious riots in Jaffa and Tel-Aviv.¹ Curfew regulations were imposed in both towns and an emergency decree was issued prohibiting dealings in arms, ammunition, and explosives.

By the end of the month it was clear that the trouble was of more than normal dimensions. On April 26 the Arab party leaders met and united to form a Higher Arab Committee and once more formulated the demands issued in the previous November.² A strike committee was set up; a general strike was declared, and a series of local committees—an important new development³—representing Arab views all over the country, gave the Higher Arab Committee authority to maintain this strike pending the granting of the demands.

The strike, which began among shopkeepers in Jaffa and Jerusalem, soon spread to the ports and to other Arab workers, and before long it was impossible to retain any illusion that it was confined to the leaders, or to a few extremists; the other towns were soon affected, and then the country districts, until by May 20 disorder was general throughout the country. Peasant cultivators inaugurated sabotage and attacks on troops and police and on Jewish colonies, while small organized bands carried on a guerilla warfare from the hills. The prohibition of the sale of arms does not seem seriously to have affected Arab supplies, for the damage was done with pre-War and War rifles which had never been surrendered, and with arms acquired during the summer by gun-running from Transjordan.

On May 11, at the request of Sir Arthur Wauchope, a battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers arrived from Egypt, the beginning of a steady stream of reinforcements from Egypt and Malta, which continued throughout June and July. But the presence of the troops and the action of the Government in extending the curfew, imposing

(1) The High Commissioner's official communiqué regarding the events of April 19 runs as follows:—"Owing to false rumours, which were at once officially contradicted, that Arabs had been killed, crowds assembled about 11 o'clock in the Manshia quarter of Jaffa, and disturbances arose, in the course of which several attacks were made upon Jews."

(2) See above, pp. 73-4.

(3) See above, p. 25.

collective fines, interning Arab agitators in concentration camps, and taking other emergency measures, were alike unsuccessful in restoring order. Reports of acts of violence against the Jews and the police, of the destruction of crops and property, the cutting of telegraph wires, the blowing-up of railway tracks and bridges, and the ambushing of trains and car convoys succeeded each other almost daily.

There was a lull in hostilities at the beginning of August, but after a week of comparative calm the situation deteriorated again. Towards the middle of August came the first reports of acts of reprisals by Jews, but these were by comparison few and quickly checked; indeed, the Mandatory publicly acknowledged the self-restraint of the Jewish population, giving concrete evidence of this in its decision to enrol 2,800 Jews as supernumerary constables, and in its issue of a number of licences for rifles in addition to the supplies in the sealed armouries which it had for some years past permitted in Jewish settlements.

Against this background of disorder negotiations for a settlement were carried on. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had already on May 6 appealed unsuccessfully to the Arab Strike Committee to help the Government in maintaining order, interviewed the leaders again on May 15; it was subsequently learnt that he had stated that, if the strike were stopped, a Royal Commission would be set up to examine the conditions in Palestine and inquire into Arab and Jewish grievances. In their reply the Arabs stated that from past experience they had no confidence in a new inquiry.¹ They would continue the strike until Jewish immigration was suspended. This the High Commissioner refused to do, and on May 18 a Labour Schedule of 4,500 immigrants for the next half-year was approved. The negotiations thus early reached a deadlock, the Arabs insisting on the stoppage of immigration before the strike was called off, the Government making all inquiry into the question of immigration dependent on the restoration of law and order.

Attempts to solve the dilemma were not confined to the discussions between the High Commissioner and the Arab Strike Committee. On June 30, a memorandum was submitted to Sir Arthur Wauchope, signed by 137 Arab Government officials, including all the senior members of the Judiciary and the Administration. It stated that the Arab population had been driven into a state border-

*Feeling
among Arabs
of all Classes*

(1) For some years past Arab spokesmen have been at pains to point out that the British Government have appointed no less than six commissions of inquiry but that little or no action has been taken on their findings.

ing on despair, and that this feeling was largely traceable to loss of faith in official pledges and alarm at the extent to which the British Government had given way to Zionist pressure. The signatories believed that the Arabs' complaint under this head was substantially justified. The unrest could not be crushed by force, and the document recommended the stoppage of immigration as the only fair, humane, and honourable solution.

Judging by the statements on Palestine made by the Government in the House of Commons during the summer, it would seem that the British authorities for some time ignored or discounted the determination which was inspiring all sections of the Arab population, and remained hopeful that the trouble would die down. In reply to a question on May 18, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr J. H. Thomas) stated that the Government had decided that the suggested Arab delegation to London would no longer meet the case. The Government had therefore decided, as soon as order was restored, to appoint a Royal Commission which, without bringing into question the terms of the Mandate, would investigate the causes of unrest. Again on June 16 and 20, and on July 2, it was emphasized that the Commission would not be sent till all was quiet. On July 22, in answer to a question on Jewish immigration, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (now Mr Ormsby-Gore) announced that there could be no change of policy until the Royal Commission's report was issued, but added:

"As regards, however, the suggestion that there should be a temporary suspension of immigration while the Commission is carrying out its inquiry, I am not at present in a position to make any statement as to the intentions of the Government."

The names of the members of the Royal Commission¹ were announced on July 29; its terms of reference, announced simultaneously, were as follows:

"To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being, implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence."²

These various items of news were received without enthusiasm in Palestine. Arab feeling had gone too far to be checked by any-

(1) The Right Hon. Earl Peel, G.C.S.I., G.B.E., The Right Hon. Sir Horace Rumbold, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.O., Sir Laurie Hammond, K.C.I.S., C.B.E., Sir Morris Carter, C.B.E., Sir Harold Morris, M.B.E., K.C., Professor Reginald Coupland, C.I.E.

(2) *The Times*, July 30, 1936.

thing less than an announcement of the cessation of immigration; the Jews were apprehensive at what they regarded as a concession to Arab fears and Arab violence, and feared that the guarded reply with reference to immigration during the Commission's sittings foreshadowed unwelcome restrictions.

One of the most serious aspects of the trouble was the possibility that it would inflame feeling elsewhere in the Moslem world. The increasing consciousness of the bond between the Arabs in the States of the Near East is evident from the efforts at mediation made by all neighbouring Arab rulers.

*Mediation of
the Arab States*

On June 6 the Emir of Transjordan invited the Arab Higher Committee to a meeting at Amman. When questioned as to whether they were in a position to stop the disorders if they wished, the Arab leaders replied that this would only be possible if certain definite concessions could be promised. The minimum was the suspension of Jewish immigration during the period of the Royal Commission's inquiry.

On August 7 the Emir again invited the Arab leaders to Amman and endeavoured to persuade them to call off the strike, urging the probability that this would be followed by a gesture on the part of the British Government respecting immigration. The Arab Committee stated that they were summoning a congress of town committees to discuss the situation, but fresh outbursts of violence which followed showed that the extremists were not willing to accept this proposal.

On August 30 the Arab Higher Committee unanimously accepted the intervention of the King of Iraq—a move initiated, it is said, by the King of Sa'udi Arabia¹ and the Imam of the Yemen. The Palestinian Arabs welcomed this general interest; they felt that they were calling in the Moslem world to redress a balance which they had long felt to be unfair. The negotiations were placed in the hands of General Nuri Pasha es-Said, Foreign Minister of Iraq.

The exact proposals made by Nuri Pasha were never known, but for several days the Palestine press was full of rumours. The Arabs were optimistic as to the outcome of the negotiations, and believed that the British Government would concede to Nuri Pasha what it had hitherto withheld, and that a suspension of Jewish immigration was at hand. There was a widespread belief that, following a

(1) This seems likely from the statement made in the British Government's Statement of Policy of September 8, 1936 (see below, p. 81), that he had offered to "use his good offices."

proclamation by the Arab Kings, the strike would be called off in the next few days, although the announcement on August 30, in which the intervention of Iraq had been welcomed, contained the words: "In the meantime the country will continue the strike with the same steadfastness and conviction as heretofore."

The elation of the Arabs was reflected in a corresponding depression among the Jews, many of whom believed that the Government's resistance to the Arab demands had been broken, and that Nuri Pasha had British approval for the proposals he was making. So strong was this feeling that on September 1 Dr Weizmann sent a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies enclosing a report from the *Palestine Post* containing the terms alleged to have been accepted by the High Commissioner.

But during the interval of awaiting the reply, two incidents took place which prejudiced the attempts of the moderate Arabs to reach a settlement. First, the Arab Higher Committee met on September 2 to discuss whether the country should be consulted, through the local committees, on the subject of Nuri Pasha's proposals; it decided to postpone calling the Congress of National Committees—a body which would have formed, as it were, the Parliament from which the Arab Higher Committee derived its authority—until it had received confirmation of Nuri Pasha's authority to mediate, and, pending this, it issued a proclamation exhorting continuance of the strike. Secondly, on September 3 one of the most serious encounters of the whole campaign took place between Arabs and British troops near Tulkarm. Most of the Arabs killed in this engagement were from Syria and Transjordan, and there were rumours, subsequently confirmed, that the well-known Syrian revolutionary Fawzi Kawkji¹ had transferred his activities to Palestine.

These events foreshadowed two shattering blows to Arab hopes which followed in the next few days. The first was the publication of Mr Ormsby-Gore's reply to Dr Weizmann stating not only that the alleged terms had never been accepted by the High Commissioner or by the Government, but also that Nuri Pasha had not been authorized to give any assurances regarding the suspension of

(1) Fawzi el-Din Kawkji is a Syrian who served with distinction in the Turkish Army during the Great War. After the French occupation of Syria he entered the French Service as intelligence officer and was decorated with the *Légion d'Honneur*, but on the outbreak of the Druze Revolt he joined the rebels. He was sentenced to death by the French authorities, but when the revolt was finally crushed he escaped to the Hejaz and became military adviser to King Ibn Sa'ud. Later he obtained a commission in the Iraqi Army, being appointed instructor at the Iraqi Staff College. He resigned his commission in the summer of 1936.

immigration; the second was the report of the cancelling of the manoeuvres of the First Division, followed, on September 4, by the announcement from the War Office that the Government had under consideration the question of reinforcing the military garrison in Palestine. The division in question was dispatched during the third week in September.

On September 8 the British Government issued a Statement of Policy.¹ This, after describing the course of the disturbances, gave its reasons for sending the reinforcements. It was stated that "all efforts to introduce a reasonable spirit of accommodation" had hitherto failed, and that the discussions initiated by Nuri Pasha had led to no satisfactory result; the Arab determination to continue the strike pending the stoppage of immigration, together with the continued outrages, had rendered the use of force inevitable. The Statement also referred to the British aim of maintaining relations of friendship and confidence with the Moslem peoples. It reiterated the affirmation made to the League in 1930 that Great Britain viewed her obligations to the two sections of the population as "of equal weight," and that she felt the two obligations to be "in no sense irreconcilable."

*Arab Decision
to end Strike*

The Arab leaders were in a quandary. The strike had not achieved its objective, yet it was obviously useless to continue it in the face of overwhelming force. They decided to consult the country on the issue and summoned the postponed Congress of National Committees for September 17, meanwhile issuing a proclamation protesting against the British Statement of Policy. But the Government prohibited any joint meeting of the Congress, stipulating that the local meetings must confer individually; this they did. The period of consultation gave prominence to a sentiment which had been cherished by most Arabs throughout the strike. Both "the Arabs who understand what it will mean to go forward . . . and the common people always return to the same point and ask: 'Can we trust the Government to implement the findings of the Royal Commission, if they should be in our favour, when on so many previous occasions results favourable to us have been set aside?' It is unfortunate that confidence in the British sense of fair play should have been so undermined."²

The strike, which was remarkable amongst other things for the length of time the Arabs held together, was called off on October

(1) *The Times*, September 8, 1936.

(2) Jerusalem correspondent in *The Times*, September 17, 1936.

12. This decision was due to three main factors—one military, one economic, and one political.

*The Military
Factor*

The most important consequence of the strengthening of the British force in Palestine from under 10,000 to nearly 30,000 was that the military authorities were enabled to adopt an offensive as well as a purely defensive policy. This was immediately apparent; the first reinforcements arrived on September 24, and on September 25 the first offensive action against Arabs was taken. Moreover, although martial law was never actually declared, the Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council issued on September 29 authorized the High Commissioner to make any regulations which he might consider necessary for public safety, or to delegate such powers to the G.O.C. Palestine Forces. In fact, it was made quite clear that any further Arab terrorism would be forcibly suppressed.¹

*The
Economic
Factor*

But a no less urgent incentive prompting the Arab leaders was provided by the growing restlessness of the Arab rank and file at the economic hardships caused by the strike. This became particularly evident with the approach of the orange export season, which normally opens in November. Even if the strike was officially prolonged, it was clear that many Arabs would be unable to resist the prospect of an excellent orange season made probable by the civil war in Spain, the chief rival producer.

*The
Political
Factor*

In fact, the one thing needed was an excuse for ending the strike in spite of failure to secure its proclaimed object—the cessation of Jewish immigration. This excuse was opportunely provided by the continued attempts at mediation on the part of the Arab kings. On October 11 an appeal to the Arabs of Palestine from the rulers of Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, Transjordan, and the Yemen was published as follows:

“Through the President of the Arab Higher Committee to our sons the Arabs of Palestine:—

“We have been deeply pained by the present state of affairs in Palestine. For this reason we have agreed with our Brothers the Kings and the Emir to call upon you to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice. You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you.”²

(1) The figures for total casualties up to October 15 were announced as follows in the House of Commons on October 29, 1936:—

Civilians:—Moslems, 955, including 187 deaths; Jews, 388, including 80 deaths; Christians, 65, including 10 deaths.

Navy, Army, and Air Force—British, 125, including 21 deaths.

Palestine Police and Transjordan Frontier Force—British, 47, including 7 deaths; Palestinians, 49 Moslems, including 8 deaths; 13 Christians (wounded); 9 Jews, including 1 death. The known Arab deaths recorded above are certainly less than the total number killed; this has been estimated at 800.

(2) *The Times*, October 12, 1936. In the appeal from the King of Iraq the word “ally” is substituted for “friend.”

The Arab Higher Committee published with the message a manifesto stating that the "noble Arab nation in Palestine" had carried on the strike because of the dangers which beset it as the result of British policy. The Committee believed, however, that the Arab rulers would not have bidden their sons to abandon that struggle unless they believed that it was in their interest to do so. Realizing, therefore, "the great benefit to accrue from their intervention and support" it called upon the community to comply with these orders which had no aim except the welfare of the Arabs.

With the calling-off of the strike, the tension in Palestine visibly relaxed. Isolated sniping still occurred, but there were few further large-scale acts of terrorism. Under the guise of manoeuvres British troops closed in on Fawzi Kawkji's armed band and drove him over the Transjordan frontier.

The improvement in the situation was regarded as sufficient to justify the departure of the Royal Commission for Palestine on November 5. On the same day it was announced in the House of Commons that the Government had rejected on economic grounds, and as likely to prejudice the work of the Royal Commission, the view that immigration should be suspended. The Government had therefore accepted the High Commissioner's recommendation that the labour schedule for the six months to come should be fixed at 1,850, as compared with 4,500 in the previous April. The Higher Arab Committee saw in this decision the defeat of its objective, and accordingly decided to boycott the Royal Commission.

*Departure of
the Royal
Commission*

Nevertheless, the members of the Commission were able to pursue their work. From the moment of their arrival in the country on November 15, they began to collect evidence from British and Jewish witnesses. They held thirty public and forty private sessions; they travelled in order to familiarize themselves with the different parts of the territory; and they amplified the knowledge so gained by consulting the long and valuable reports submitted by Government officials. Happily, too, they were able before the end of their stay to hear the views of the third party concerned. The Arab boycott was called off on January 6, 1937, that is, twelve days before the Commission's return to England.

*Its
Procedure*

The six months which elapsed before the Commission produced its findings were marked by a lessening of unrest but a growth of tension. Terrorist attacks continued on a scale sufficient to warrant wider powers for the High Commissioner in defence matters,¹ but

*Internal
Security,
January-
June 1937*

(1) Defence Order in Council of March 19, 1937.

on the whole the country was quiet. Travel by road became relatively safe and could be undertaken without danger, and the sentries manning the watch-towers of Jewish settlements enjoyed a much-needed rest because all attention, Jewish and British as well as Arab, was focused on London.

VIII. THE PEEL REPORT AND THE QUESTION OF PARTITION

THE vast report which the Commissioners issued in July 1937 has been described as "a great State Paper . . . direct, outspoken, incisive, showing remarkably sympathetic understanding both of the Zionism of the Jews and the nationalism of the Arabs." Unfortunately time was to show that these two forces were in no mood to be reconciled by mere sympathy and understanding.

Since the first of the Commissioners' terms of reference had been to "ascertain causes" of the 1936 disturbances, they devoted the first part of their Report to a historical analysis of the trouble, as a result of which they came to the following conclusions¹:—

*Analysis of
the Causes of
Trouble*

The underlying causes were [in their opinion] the same as those which brought about the disturbances of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933, namely the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the Jewish National Home. But other factors had aggravated these two causes and helped to determine the time at which the disturbances broke out. These factors were:—

(i) The effect on Arab opinion in Palestine of the attainment of national independence first by Iraq, to a less complete extent by Transjordan, then by Egypt and lastly envisaged for Syria and the Lebanon. The weight of this factor has been augmented by close contact between Arabs in Palestine and Arabs in Syria, Iraq, and Sa'udi Arabia and by the willingness shown by the Arab Rulers to do what they properly could to assist them.

(ii) The pressure on Palestine exerted by World Jewry in view of the sufferings and anxieties of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. The increase in this pressure from the beginning of 1933 onwards, and the consequent high figures of Jewish immigration had gravely accentuated Arab fears of Jewish domination over Palestine.

(iii) The inequality of opportunity enjoyed by Arabs and Jews respectively in putting their case before the British Government, and before Parliament and public opinion in England; and the Arab belief that the Jews could always get their way by means denied to the Arabs.

(iv) Associated with this factor, the growth of Arab distrust, dating back to the time of the McMahon Pledge and the Balfour Declaration, in the ability, if not the will, of H.M. Government to carry out their promises.

(v) Arab alarm at the continued purchase of Arab land by Jews.

(vi) The intensive character of Jewish nationalism in Palestine; the 'modernism' of many of the younger immigrants; the provocative language used by irresponsible Jews and the intemperate tone of much of the Jewish as well as the Arab press.

(vii) The general uncertainty, accentuated by the ambiguity of certain phrases in the Mandate, as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power. This uncertainty had (a) stimulated the Jewish desire to expand and consolidate their position in Palestine as quickly as might be, and (b) made it possible for the Arabs to interpret the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government and the sympathetic attitude of some of its officials as proof that the British determination to implement the Balfour Declaration was not whole-hearted.²

In view of these conflicting interests the Commissioners described the Mandatory as forced to "govern by arithmetic" in order to hold

(1) For an account of the Report as a whole and its recommendations, see below, pp. 86-7 and Appendix IV.

(2) Peel Report, pp. 110-12.

the balance between, on the one hand, a Jewish National Home which had long passed the experimental stage, and, on the other, an Arab community which, though it had prospered and increased since 1920, was showing a nationalistic and anti-Jewish mood from which it could not at the moment be deflected by considerations of material gain.

Having painted this depressing picture of the state of the country, they turned to the second part of their Report—a survey of the different fields in which the Administration had attempted to carry out its mandate; here they dealt in turn with administration, public security, finance, the land, immigration, education, and other no less thorny subjects. They were not blind to the grave practical obstacles which nationalism placed in the way of good government; amongst other handicaps they instanced the existence of three official languages, three weekly days of rest and three sets of official holidays—Friday for the Moslems, Saturday for the Jews, and Sunday for Englishmen and for Christian Arabs. While admitting such difficulties, they did not scruple to criticize the Administration for certain of its practices: for instance, they found some justification for the charges of leniency and partiality which was sometimes discernible in the behaviour of officials. But their severest strictures were reserved for the educational system of the country.¹ They described the existing provision for Arabs as “inadequate” and the educational outlook as “disquieting,” especially on account of the nationalist character of the educational system which they considered its worst feature. But they recognized that since the Mandate prescribed the right of each community to maintain its own schools, the ideal arrangement of a single bi-national system for both races was impossible, and they could not, therefore, see and remedy under the Mandate, for the nationalist spirit in education which they so much deplored.

On each subject as they dealt with it they made detailed recommendations of which little need be said here since they are printed as an Appendix to this Paper.² One only is so revolutionary as to warrant special emphasis. When discussing immigration, they recommended that the number of Jews admitted should be regulated not only by “economic absorptive capacity” but also in accord-

(1) Peel Report, pp. 292-4. According to the *Report for 1938*, in that year still only 50 per cent of Arab applicants could be admitted to Government schools in towns and villages. There were, in 1938, 779 Arab Schools with 87,498 pupils, as against 1,401 Jewish Schools with 158,874 pupils. Net Government expenditure on Jewish education was £P50,207 and £P216,435 on Arab (p. 145). See also p. 29 above.

(2) See p. 127 below.

ance with political considerations. They even specified a figure: in their view the Mandatory should envisage a "political high level" of 12,000 per annum during the ensuing five years.

In the third and last section of their Report the Commissioners abandoned the idea of palliatives; for the first time in an official British Government Paper the promises to Jews and Arabs were described as irreconcilable and the Mandate in its existing form as unworkable. They, therefore, suggested its transformation into some more practical system. "Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can see none in any other plan."¹ Accordingly, they laid down a scheme of partition (which is summarized in full in Appendix V below) to which they were bold enough to attach a map² outlining the frontiers of a Jewish State, an Arab State, and a neutral enclave in which the British Mandatory should continue to safeguard the Holy Places at Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

*An
Alternative
Proposal*

So revolutionary a proposal left most observers gasping. For some forty-eight hours—the minimum time required to digest the document—public comment was largely withheld. The one body which, thanks to foreknowledge, had had time to make up its mind on the matter was the British Government. In a White Paper³ accompanying the publication of the Report, they declared themselves satisfied that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Royal Commission represented the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.

*Reception
of the
Report*

When the Royal Commission's Report and its recommendations were debated in Parliament, several speeches betrayed anxiety lest partition might involve undesirable military and strategic consequences. One of the few constructive proposals made during the debates came from Lord Samuel,⁴ who pointed out that partition would not bring peace and order to Palestine since it involved the creation of a Jewish State containing 225,000 Arabs as against 258,000 Jews, which would involve a compulsory exchange of population, unfair and unpopular in Arab eyes. He added that there would also be a permanent "pull" exercised by the surrounding Arab States on the Arabs in the Jewish State which must inevitably work against a settlement. Further, the proposed frontiers would prove almost impossible to defend, and, finally, the diffi-

*British
Attitude*

(1) Peel Report, p. 376.

(2) Reproduced at end of this Paper.

(3) Cmd. 5513.

(4) Lord Samuel, who held office as High Commissioner for Palestine from 1920-5, is himself a Jew.

culties of administering a partitioned Palestine would be almost insuperable. Lord Samuel declared that the partition scheme would have the effect of creating "a Saar, a Polish Corridor, and half a dozen Danzigs and Memels in a country the size of Wales."¹ He then made alternative proposals based on agreed mutual sacrifices by Arabs and Jews in order to obtain conditions on which settlement could be achieved:—

(i) Limitation of immigration to maintain the present balance of population between Jews and Arabs for a period of years, during which the Jewish population should not exceed say 40 per cent of the total population.²

(ii) Recognition of Arab national aspirations and the attitude of Islam towards the Holy Places. The ultimate aim of Great Britain should be to build up, with the assent of France and full co-operation of the Zionist movement, a Great Arab Confederation (to include Sa'udi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, etc.).

(iii) Opening of Transjordan to development and settlement both by Arabs and Jews, with the financial assistance of the British Government (possibly in the form of a guarantee loan).

(iv) A solemn guarantee in perpetuity by the League of Nations of the Holy Places of Islam in Palestine.

(v) Formation of two communal organizations (i.e. an Arab Agency in addition to the existing Jewish Agency). The Arab Agency should have *inter alia* power to prohibit land-sales within the Territory.

(vi) A Central Council for Palestine should be set up, not elected and not based on numbers, but representative of the two communities, i.e. a kind of Federal Council with British members acting in an advisory capacity.

Reactions in Palestine

The immediate reaction to the Report on the part of both communities was one of disapproval, alike of the assumptions underlying the Royal Commission's Report and of its partition proposal.

The Jews

The Executive of the Jewish Agency declared, in a statement published on July 7,³ that the supreme representative bodies of the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency would "discuss and decide" on the subject in conference at Zurich in August. There is some evidence, however, that before the Conference met certain officials of these bodies became convinced that it would not be politic to allow the partition proposal to be rejected out of hand.

The Arabs

Similarly, the Arab Higher Committee announced that it awaited the opinion of the rulers of the other Arab States. But in the Arab view the position was made doubly difficult by the fact that the Royal Commission had included in its Report a map showing provisional frontiers under their partition scheme. The Arabs were themselves unwilling to accept these frontiers; they felt convinced beyond all doubt that the Jews would now never accept a Jewish

(1) *Hansard*, House of Lords, July 20, 1937, col. 638.

(2) It is interesting to note that Mr Norman Bentwich (in his *Fulfilment in the Promised Land*, 1938) declares a primary condition of future settlement to be a "recognition that both Jews and Arabs are in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, together with an interim limitation of immigration to give the Arabs an assurance against being 'swamped'."

(3) *Manchester Guardian*, July 8, 1937.

State comprising a smaller or less advantageous area in Palestine.

While opinion in England was at first hopeful that the partition scheme would provide a basis for settlement, opinion in the rest of the world was on the whole unfavourable to it, either from a direct or an indirect partisanship, or from a sentimental dislike of the dividing of the Holy Land.

*International
Repercussions
of the Report*

Speaking before the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva,¹ the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Ormsby Gore, emphasized the incompatibility of the aims and demands of the Jews and Arabs with regard to Palestine, and the changed situation in surrounding countries since the Mandate had been drafted seventeen years earlier. He also referred to the strong plea for the Arab case made at the Imperial Conference held in London² by the principal Indian delegate, a Punjab Mohammedan, and an elected member of the Council of State, and used this fact to illustrate his contention that the continuation of a policy of repression in Palestine was likely to embroil not merely Great Britain, but Jews all over the world in conflict with the Mohammedans. Tinkering with the Mandate would give no finality and certainly would not give peace. Partition was, the British Government believed, the best and most hopeful, though not the only conceivable, solution; it had, moreover, the great merit that the establishment of even the small Jewish State contemplated by the Royal Commission would make it possible to find room for more refugees than by a continuation of the Mandate. The wider implications of the Palestine problem were thus admitted to the world by His Majesty's Government as a decisive factor in their new endeavour to find its solution, and it became apparent that since the publication of the Royal Commission's Report "things had happened to weaken the stand of His Majesty's Government on the subject of partition."³

*Permanent
Mandates
Commission*

The Permanent Mandates Commission, in the "preliminary opinion" on Palestine which they drafted for the Council of the League of Nations, pointed out that the present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission, more especially since that Commission spoke with the two-fold authority conferred on it by its impartiality and its unanimity, and was endorsed by the Government of the Mandate itself.⁴ At the same time the Permanent Mandates Com-

(1) *Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session*, July 30–August 18, 1937 (C. 330. M. 222. 1937. VI.), pp. 13–18.

(2) In May–June 1937.

(3) *Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session*, p. 140, speech by M. Rappard.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 229.

mission damned the idea of partition with faint praise by expressing themselves as favourable in principle to an examination of a solution involving partition, but as opposed to the immediate creation of two independent States. The Commission believed that a prolongation of the period of political apprenticeship by the continuation of the Mandate would in any case be essential, and that this could best be done either by provisional cantonization or by two new Mandates. Finally, they stressed the need for immediate measures to carry out the "urgently needed reforms in the administration of Palestine" recommended by the Royal Commission.¹

On July 30 the Government of Iraq addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,² in which they solemnly protested against the proposals of the Royal Commission, and, in particular, against the proposal to partition Palestine. Such partition would be, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government, an injustice to the people of that country which could not be viewed without the gravest alarm. The letter further asserted that the hope of a permanent settlement depended upon the recognition of an integral independent Palestine in which the Jews accepted once and for all the position of a minority. So far as the control of immigration could secure this end, the proportion of the Jewish population in Palestine should be fixed approximately as at present, since in every essential the promises of the Balfour Declaration had already been fulfilled. The Iraqi Government justified the strong terms of its appeal by reference to the grave moral responsibilities towards the Arabs of Palestine, which had been undertaken by the King of Iraq, together with the Kings of Sa'udi Arabia and the Yemen, and the Emir of Transjordan, when they had intervened in October 1936 to secure peace in that country. In addition to this protest, the Permanent Mandates Commission also had before it a petition³ asserting the right of the Arabs to complete independence in the whole of Palestine, and demanding the end of the "Jewish National Home and an immediate cessation of immigration and land-sales, till the conclusion of a treaty like those existing between Great Britain and Iraq and Great Britain and Egypt, to replace the existing British Mandate."

On September 11, 1937, an Arab National Conference,⁴ meeting

(1) Minutes of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session, p. 233.

(2) *League of Nations Official Journal*, August–September 1937, pp. 660–1.

(3) A petition from the Arab Higher Committee communicated by His Majesty's Government on July 30.

(4) This Arab National Conference consisted of 500 representatives from Syria and

at Bludan in Syria, passed a resolution closely following the petition of the Arab Higher Committee to the League of Nations, accompanied by a solemn declaration that the Arab nation and the Moslem people would continue the struggle for the Arab cause in Palestine, to achieve the liberation of the country and the establishment of an Arab Government.¹ In India, the All-India Moslem League condemned the Royal Commission's Report,² and a committee of defence for Palestine was set up, while, at a Palestine Conference organized at Calcutta in September by the League, the partition proposal was bitterly attacked and one delegate condemned it as "putting 80,000,000 Indian Moslems in the difficult position of choosing between loyalty to the State and loyalty to their faith."³

Meanwhile, the 20th Zionist Congress, which met at Zurich from August 3-17, debated the Royal Commission's Report, together with the accompanying British Statement of Policy, which had included as an interim measure the restriction of Jewish immigration in Palestine. The Congress revealed a division of opinion in Jewry. While some speeches concentrated, with religious fervour, on the Jewish right to Eretz Israel dating back for many centuries before the Balfour Declaration, others reflected the desperate need to save those millions of Jews to whom the right to live and work was being denied elsewhere, and the conviction that Jewish achievements in Palestine proved that "Jews could do on one dunum of land what other nations could not do on a hundred dunums," thus making possible large-scale immigration.⁴

Zionist
Congress

Dr Weizmann reminded the Congress that now for the first time the world was discussing the problem in terms of a "Jewish State," and for this reason appealed for support on a modified partition proposal. Representatives of the persecuted Jews of Central and South-Eastern Europe urged that at least as much attention should

neighbouring Arab countries, including Egypt, under the presidency of Nabih bey Azmey, President of the Palestine Assistance Committee. Very few of the delegates were official representatives of their respective Governments. See Montagne, "Pour la paix en Palestine", in *Politique Etrangère*, August 1938, p. 393.

(1) Montagne, p. 394.

(2) *The Times*, July 12, 1937.

(3) *Ibid.*, September 25, 1937.

(4) Figures as high as 1½-2 million were suggested in a speech by Mr Ben Gurion as the number of Jews who could be settled in the Jewish State in the near future. But during a discussion on economic development in Palestine an estimate by Dr Ruppin of 200,000 during the next two or three years was accepted as a reasonable figure. (*New Judea*, August-September 1937, pp. 220-9). A recent independent estimate, however, suggests that immigration on this scale would mean a density of population in Palestine two and a half times as great per square mile as that in Great Britain. (See letter in *The Times*, August 18, 1937.)

be paid to the grave distress of millions of Jews at the present day as to the traditional aspirations of former Jewish generations. The resolution finally adopted by the Congress denied that the Mandate had become unworkable and, while condemning the "palliatives" recommended by the Royal Commission, more especially those concerning the "political high level for immigration and limitation of land purchase," authorized the Executive to enter into negotiations "with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State."¹ The resolution concluded with a rejection of the thesis that the national aspirations of the Jewish people and the Arabs of Palestine were irreconcilable, and attributed the existing *impasse* to general uncertainty in regard to the intentions of the Mandatory Power and to the vacillating attitude of the Palestine Administration.

At the close of the Congress, the Council of the Jewish Agency² met in session and passed a resolution on the same lines as the Zionist Organization, but whereas the latter authorized negotiations with the British Government, the former in addition directed the Executive to request His Majesty's Government to convene a conference of Jews and Arabs with a view to "exploring the possibilities of a peaceful settlement between Jews and Arabs in and for an undivided Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate."³ Subsequent events gave an added importance to this constructive proposal, which had first taken shape in the speech of Dr J. L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who had urged the appointment of a committee composed equally of Zionists and non-Zionists "to negotiate with Great Britain, the Arabs, the League of Nations, and the United States of America."⁴ Although Dr Magnes's resolution was not adopted and he himself was severely criticized for basing his opposition to the partition scheme chiefly on the ground that it was against the wishes of the Arabs, it is important to recognize the existence of a moderate element in the Jewish Agency which was prepared to emphasize the complexity of a problem too often represented as a simple case of bad faith and injustice.

Since the United States is not a Member of the League of Nations,

(1) *New Judaea*, August-September 1937, p. 227.

(2) See above, pp. 24-6, for the relations between the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency.

(3) *New Judaea*, pp. 235-6. The Council set up a Political Commission of thirteen, including six non-Zionists, to undertake future investigations and negotiations.

(4) *New Judaea*, p. 234.

the relations between Great Britain, as the Mandatory Power, and the United States Government in regard to the position of American nationals in Palestine had been regulated by a Convention signed on December 3, 1924.¹ When the Mandatory régime in Iraq was terminated in 1932 the United States Government set forth in some detail the view that "the termination of a Mandatory régime necessarily involves the disposition of the Territory, and affects the interests of American nationals therein," and claimed that they had, therefore, a right to be consulted as to the conditions under which the Territory is subsequently administered.² Equally, the United States Government regarded the possibility of a change in the status of Palestine as a matter which directly affected the interests of American nations, and just before the publication of the Royal Commission Report they therefore requested from the British Government "elucidation of the official British position" with respect to any change proposed in Palestine as arising out of that report.³ An exchange of correspondence followed in which the United States Government made it plain that their position was "based exclusively on their obligation and purpose to provide for the protection of American interests in Palestine on a basis of equality with those of other Governments and their nationals," but that any proposal for a modification of the Palestine Mandate was a matter which directly concerned them.⁴ Although the Government are thus chiefly concerned with the protection of the rights of American citizens in Palestine, the fact that the Jewish population of the United States is 4½ million makes plain the extent of that country's interest in the "great purpose of a National Jewish Home in Palestine."⁵

*United States
and the
Report*

Proof, if any be needed, that strong pressure was being exerted on His Majesty's Government from outside is also to be found in the resolution passed by the Council of the League of Nations on September 29, 1937. The Council authorized the United Kingdom Government to explore the idea of partition, while pointing out that the Mandate must remain in force "until such time as it may be otherwise decided." In other words, the British Government received the necessary authorization from the League of Nations to work out detailed schemes for partition, without being committed

*Assembly of
the League of
Nations*

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 2559, 1925.

(2) Quoted in British White Paper, Cmd. 5544, 1937.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) President Roosevelt in a message of greeting to the National Conference for Palestine, February 1, 1936.

to carrying them into effect. But at the same time there was a significant proviso in the Council's resolution "recalling the assurances given by His Majesty's Government on the subject of immigration." The hope that partition would make possible the admission of a greater number of Jews into Palestine was its chief commendation in the eyes of representatives alike of those countries which have a large and unpopular Jewish population and of those which were likely to be embarrassed by an influx of refugees. On the other hand, speeches made in the League debate by representatives of the Moslem countries of the Near East showed that they, for their part, could not remain indifferent to the hopes and fears of the Arabs of Palestine.¹

By the end of September 1937 the period of stocktaking, which followed the publication of the Royal Commission Report, was over. World opinion was clearly indifferent neither to the need for a settlement in Palestine, nor to the form that settlement might take, but there was no unanimous conviction that the "surgical operation" of partition was an essential preliminary to its attainment. Rather, there appeared to be apprehension at the prospect of the termination of the Mandate, whether or not it had, in fact, become unworkable, and uncertainty with regard to the suggested alternatives. In these circumstances, the British Government played for time and postponed a final decision.

*Partition
Commission*

A technical commission was, therefore, sent to Palestine to work out a detailed scheme of partition on the basis of the scheme recommended by the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications. By its terms of reference the Commission was required to bear in mind that the boundaries it suggested must afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States; include the fewest possible number of Arabs and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area, and *vice versa*; enable His Majesty's Government to carry out their Mandatory responsibilities, including their obligations with regard to the Holy Places; and create no insuperable difficulties.

Its Report

The Report of this Partition Commission, published in October 1938,² examined, and found wanting, three plans of partition, that

(1) *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplements, No. 169 (Records of the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly), and No. 175 (Minutes of the VIth Committee). See especially speeches by Hr. Lange (Norway), M. Komarnicki (Poland), Wacyf Boutros-Ghali Pasha (Egypt) and Tawfik el Sawaidy (Iraq).

(2) *Palestine Partition Commission: Report*, Cmd. 5854 (afterwards cited as Woodhead Report). The Commission consisted of Sir John Woodhead (Chairman), Sir Alison Russell, Mr A. P. Waterfield, and Mr I. Reid, with Mr S. E. V. Luke as secretary. The personnel of the Commission was announced in March 1938 and its terms of

of the Peel Commission,¹ and two modifications of its own devising. The Commission found it impossible so to divide Palestine as to avoid leaving Arabs in the Jewish State, and *vice versa*, without at the same time doing injustice to either Jews or Arabs.² Moreover, it seemed impossible to devise a self-supporting Arab State without an annual deficit amounting to perhaps £P550,000,³ or so to draw its frontiers as to avoid excluding the bulk of the Arab-owned citrus areas.⁴ If the Arab State were to be self-sufficing, it must either have a subvention from the Jewish State—a solution which the Commission rejected as inequitable⁵—or it must form part of a Customs union.⁶ This Customs union would be an essential part of any scheme involving partition from the standpoint alike of the Arab and Jewish States and the Mandated areas. The northern and southern Mandated Territories (forming part of the partition plan which seemed to the Commission the least objectionable of the available alternatives) would be a charge on His Majesty's Government and must, therefore, have control of the Customs union which would, of course, infringe the sovereignty of the independent Arab and Jewish States.

The Commission, in concluding its Report, put forward the suggestion of economic federalism,⁷ an arrangement by which Palestine would be partitioned into Arab and Jewish States, northern and southern Mandated Territories, and a Jerusalem enclave, without fiscal autonomy, and under which the Customs service should be administered and fiscal policy determined by Great Britain as Mandatory.

A White Paper⁸ was issued by His Majesty's Government at the same time in which they rejected the partition scheme on the ground that the political and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine

*Rejection of
Partition*

reference had been published in a White Paper (Cmd. 5634) on January 4, 1938. For a summary of its findings, see Appendix V.

(1) With slight alterations of frontiers, suggested by considerations of defence.

(2) For example, it appeared to them impossible to include Galilee in the Jewish State, because to do so would involve putting approximately 90,000 Arabs under 3,000 Jews; but Galilee could not be in the Arab State by reason of its geographical position without dominating, and constituting a menace to, the Jewish State. On the other hand, to make it into Mandated Territory would be to sacrifice the Arabs in the interests of the Jews. (Woodhead Report, pp. 86–92.)

(3) Woodhead Report, p. 193.

(4) Sir John Woodhead in *International Affairs*, March–April 1939.

(5) Woodhead Report, pp. 193–4.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp. 238–40.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 244.

(8) Cmd. 5893. 1938. This White Paper was, whether by accident or by design, entitled: "*Palestine: Statement by His Majesty's Government*," in place of the more usual "*Palestine: Statement of Policy*."

were so great as to make such a solution of the problem impracticable. Since the surest foundation of peace and prosperity in Palestine would be an understanding between Jews and Arabs, His Majesty's Government declared their intention, as an alternative means of meeting the needs of the situation, immediately to invite representatives of these two communities,¹ and of the Arab States, to confer with them in London. The Conference would consider future policy including the question of immigration. If, however, the discussions did not produce an agreement within a reasonable time, His Majesty's Government would themselves come to a decision on policy and proceed to implement it.

*Influence
of International
Situation*

By November 1938 it was less than ever possible to consider the Palestine problem without regard to the international situation as a whole. The political climate into which the Woodhead Report emerged was not inappropriate to the month of its birth; in comparison even the Peel Commission had seen the light, politically as in point of time, in summer weather. The autumn of 1938 was one of tension, in spite of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German and Franco-German Peace Pacts. In particular, the Jewish pogrom in Germany poisoned the international atmosphere, in addition to initiating a more acute phase of an already serious refugee problem. At the same time Italian demands on Tunis, Corsica, and Nice increased the difficulties of Franco-Italian relations, and impressed on British minds by implication the military and strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean.

*Jewish
Comment*

Jewish comment on the Woodhead Report and the British Government's proposals reflected this situation. The Jewish Agency pointed out that the Commission's proposals dismembered the existing Jewish settlements by excluding from the "Jewish State" which would comprise less than one-twentieth of Western Palestine and less than one-hundredth of the area designated by the Peel Commission as having been intended in 1917 for the National Home), the greater part of Jewish land holdings, and the most important area of colonization.² The Zionist General Council³ deplored the lack of understanding of "Jewish homelessness and the deep Jewish tragedy" shown by the Woodhead Commission; the Zionist Organization would not, because it could not, retreat on the

(1) The British Government expressly stated that they retained the right not to invite those Arab leaders whom they held responsible for the campaign of violence and assassination in Palestine.

(2) For Arab and Jewish views of the Report, see *Bulletin of International News*, November 19, 1938, p. 12.

(3) *Manchester Guardian*, November 12, 1938.

question of immigration. Thus, while the Jews thought that they saw in the Woodhead Report and the invitation to the Arab States signs that Arab violence had successfully intimidated British opinion in the hour of Jewry's greatest need, all but the most intransigent among them welcomed the idea of a round table conference.¹

Arab and Jewish critics were united in complaining that the White Paper had no policy to state. Otherwise the Arabs in general were less critical of the Report and of His Majesty's Government's proposals for the future than were the Jews, although Arab leaders in Jerusalem declared that a conference without the Mufti would be useless, and the Palestine Defence Committee in Damascus maintained that the future of Palestine must be settled between the British and the Arabs without intervention of the Jews, and must involve the cession of no Arab territory. Subsequent developments, however, caused a considerable modification of Arab criticism,² in spite of increasing apprehension lest the urgency of the Jewish refugee problem should induce the British Government to relax their immigration restrictions. The Arabs in New York, for example, drew up a protest in which they asked the American nation not to "play up" the situation at the expense of one small country. It soon became apparent that the Arabs had no intention of boycotting the proposed Conference, but that interest was centring, in view of the exile of the Mufti and the Higher Arab Committee and of the existence of rival factions in Palestine itself, on the important question of the composition of the Arab delegation.³

*Arab
Comment*

Debates in the House of Commons on November 24 and December 8 once more revealed, through pro-Jewish and pro-Arab spokesmen, the various forces influencing the British Government in regard to Palestine. They also revealed that Government's intention to continue the search for a compromise, but to seek it this time with the help of the other Arab States in the hope that they would exercise a moderating influence on their Palestinian brothers. There was criticism of the apparent inability of the Government to produce an effective and constructive policy over a period during which the dangers inherent in a discontented and rebellious Palestine had become increasingly visible. The Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out⁴ that a "strong" policy could not alone

*British
Opinion*

(1) The Board of Deputies of British Jews had themselves suggested a round table conference as early as October. (*Manchester Guardian*, October 22, 1938.)

(2) See below, p. 107.

(3) See below, p. 108.

(4) *Hansard*, House of Commons, November 24, 1938, coll. 1989-98.

bring peace; British troops could restore order but not peace. British policy must recognize that the argument of material gain was of no avail against Arab nationalism¹ and must aim at removing from the Arabs their fear of Jewish domination, just as it must reject any solution which would involve putting Jews under any form of Arab rule. Concessions from both sides would be an essential pre-requisite of any settlement.² To give up the struggle to find a compromise would, in the Government's view, merely mean locking up a great part of the British Army in Palestine indefinitely.

In short, if the immediate situation tended to distort the true proportions of the problem, British opinion was in general alive to its urgency, and welcomed the proposed Conference as offering the best hope of compromise.

(1) Speaking in the House of Lords, Lord Samuel stressed the same point. "The Arab movement exists; it is a reality and not an artificial creation fostered by British timidity and foreign intervention." (*Hansard*, House of Lords, December 8, 1938, col. 425.) See Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 405-9, for a further discussion of the nature of Arab nationalism.

(2) After the pogrom of November 1938, the Jewish Agency for Palestine declared itself prepared to undertake the financial responsibility and organization involved in the immediate absorption into Palestine of 100,000 German Jews (*The Times*, November 24, 1938), and also requested the British Government to grant facilities for the admission to Palestine of 10,000 German Jewish children for whom homes had already been found. The Government were unable to agree to the immediate immigration of these refugees, in view of their refusal of Arab demands for a complete cessation of all Jewish immigration into Palestine until the proposed Conference had met and come to a decision on future policy (cf. *Hansard*, December 14, 1938, col. 1979).

IX. THE ARAB REBELLION

DURING the first part of 1937, Palestine awaited, in comparative tranquillity, the publication of the Royal Commission's Report. After its appearance a gradual increase of tension was noticeable, and travel in Palestine, which had been relatively safe during the period of waiting, once more became hazardous. The murder on September 26 of Mr Andrews, Acting District Commissioner for Galilee, and of his police escort,¹ marked the renewal of a terrorist campaign of murder and intimidation.

A twofold task of restoring public order and removing the causes of lawlessness thus devolved upon the Government. In addition, it must be presumed that the administrative reforms recommended by the Royal Commission's Report and underlined by the Permanent Mandates Commission were under consideration during this period. At all events, the closing months of 1937 were marked by a radical and striking departure from the policy of conciliation, which had been hitherto pursued by the Mandatory Power. Apart from the adoption of certain measures, described below, the retirement in November of Sir Arthur Wauchope from the post of High Commissioner² might reasonably have been interpreted as a sign that his departure from Palestine would see the end of the experiment of "gentle handling" which he had consistently and with conviction tried to carry out.

*Government
Measures*

An official *communiqué* was published on October 1 announcing the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee and all National Committees, and the issue of warrants for the arrest of six prominent Arab leaders,³ members of the Arab Higher Committee. At the same time Haj Amin Effendi al Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, was deprived of his office as President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of membership of the General *Waqf* Committee, of which he was chairman.⁴ Five of the prosecuted leaders were arrested and subsequently deported to the Seychelles⁵; Jamal Husseini escaped and fled to Syria, and the Mufti left Palestine secretly for the Lebanon. The dismissal of the Mufti from his

*Action against
Arab Leaders*

(1) *Report for 1937*, p. 8.

(2) The appointment of Sir Harold MacMichael as his successor was announced in March 1938.

(3) Jamal Effendi al Husseini, President of the Arab Party; Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Director of the Arab Bank; Fuad Effendi Saba; Yacoub Effendi Ghusein; Dr Husseini Fakhri Effendi al Khalidi, Mayor of Jerusalem; and Haj Rashid Effendi Ibrahim. See *Report for 1937*, p. 21.

(4) See above, p. 25.

(5) *The Times*, October 4, 1937.

office meant that he was no longer able to administer the funds of the Supreme Moslem Council and the *Waqf* Committee,¹ amounting to £P60,000 annually, or exercise the extensive rights of patronage, and the local influence resulting therefrom, which the Presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council carried with it. When the ban on press comment, which had accompanied this drastic action, was lifted (October 6) Arab reaction was seen to be one of disillusionment and there was talk of "a long struggle ahead." On the other hand, in spite of the state of tension in Palestine *The Times* correspondent felt able to write that "a good beginning has been made and the field is clear for constructive, firm, and impartial administration in the future."²

Unfortunately, this comment was shortly to prove over-optimistic. Disorders increased rather than decreased. If the British Government were at last prepared to take strong action showing that they did not intend to be intimidated by terrorism, the Arab leaders were able to demonstrate that their removal from office, and their exile, did not necessarily constitute the first steps towards either the appeasement or the repression of Arab opposition as a whole. The British authorities, however, quickly took another step to grapple with disorder by setting up Military Courts³ throughout Palestine. These Courts, established under the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1937,⁴ were set up to try offences against law and order such as discharge of firearms, carrying arms or bombs (both these sets of offences being punishable by death), and causing sabotage or intimidation. All sentences pronounced by the Courts were to be subject to confirmation by the General Officer Commanding the Troops, from whose decision there would be no appeal. In addition, the regulations empowered any commissioned officer of His Majesty's Forces to issue a warrant for the arrest of suspects. A week was allowed to elapse between the issue of the order and the actual setting up of the Courts; during this week the *Communiqué* explaining the measure was broadcast and published daily. But the hope that this period of grace would induce those possessing arms to surrender them was not fulfilled.⁵ It should be noted, moreover, that this measure was only "half-way to martial law"; ordinary civil rules of evidence were used as under English

(1) See below, pp. 22-3.

(2) *The Times*, October 4, 1937.

(3) Official *Communiqué* issued November 10, 1937, to take effect on November 18. *Report for 1937*, p. 23.

(4) See above, p. 33.

(5) *Manchester Guardian*, December 8, 1937.

law and "the extraordinary power of reticence which can be exercised by one community in protecting one of its members" was able in some measure to curtail the activities of the Military Courts.¹ But figures given in the House of Commons towards the end of December showed that 26 Arabs had been tried. 21 sentences and 3 acquittals resulted from these trials, and by the end of the year 4 death sentences had been inflicted.² During 1938, 382 persons were tried; these were 54 death sentences, 38 life imprisonments, and 141 acquittals.³

Lawlessness in Palestine, unfortunately, still did not decrease in spite of these stronger measures⁴; and there were signs that the restraint previously shown by the Jews was beginning to break down⁵ under the provocation of increasing Arab violence. Nor were Jews the only victims; in December Arab notables at Tulkarm petitioned the District Commissioner for permission to bear arms against Arab extremists,⁶ while in the previous month Jewish and Arab members of the Jerusalem Municipal Council had issued a joint appeal to stop terrorism.⁷ Such welcome departures from precedent, however isolated and unsuccessful, deserve to be put on record, although the year 1937 ended with further outrages.

*Deterioration
of Situation*

The outlook for 1938 was thus far from encouraging. The British Government had, it is true, shown that they were prepared to take whatever action might prove necessary to stamp out terrorism, although a certain reluctance to adopt adequate military measures may not unfairly be imputed to them. Perhaps they still hoped that time and the threat of force would be effective. But the political atmosphere did not improve and the general situation remained unaffected by the presence in Palestine of the Woodhead Commission.⁸ The preface of their Report laconically states that no Arab witnesses came forward to give evidence to them,⁹ and goes on to

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, December 8, 1937.

(2) *The Times*, December 31, 1937.

(3) On November 1 an order was issued prohibiting any male person from traveling by train or motor car in rural areas without a military permit, and later in the month (23rd) a curfew from 6 p.m. to 5 a.m. was imposed on all Palestine, except in municipal and built-up areas, while in October Sir Charles Tegart, former Commissioner of Police in Calcutta, arrived in Palestine to advise the Administration as to the best methods of dealing with terrorism.

(4) *Report for 1938*, p. 24.

(5) Forty-five Jews were arrested in various parts of Palestine on November 15 after an outburst of terrorism the previous day. *The Times*, November 16, 1937.

(6) *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*, December 17, 1937.

(7) *Ibid.*, November 17, 1937.

(8) See above, p. 94.

(9) Woodhead Report, p. 8.

record an intensification of violence after their departure on August 15, 1938.

Throughout 1937 British armed forces in Palestine had amounted to no more than two infantry brigades. In July 1938 two additional infantry battalions, two squadrons of the Royal Air Force, an armoured car and cavalry unit, and a battle cruiser were endeavouring to suppress terrorism which, since April, had become open rebellion.¹ By the end of October there were in the country eighteen infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, a battery of howitzers, and armoured car units, or a total of 18,000 to 20,000 troops,² while some 2,930 additional British police were recruited during the year.³ A virtual military reoccupation of the country proved necessary to deal with the explosion of bombs and land mines, the murders and snipings which were almost daily occurrences. Heavy military concentrations alone preserved a semblance of order in the northern and central parts of the country, while the Jerusalem and southern districts were entirely out of hand. Armed gangs were lodged in all the main cities and rebel bands openly dominated the smaller centres. Communications were everywhere interrupted by bold attacks and by sabotage, and throughout the summer the administration passed more and more into the hands of the military, and civil life was progressively dislocated. Early in September the High Commissioner was given new power over property and land for defence purposes, and later permitted to seize and demolish the property of rebels. A rigorous press censorship was also established. Every traveller and motor driver was required to possess an identity card and permit. In short, civil life was severely hampered; communications were disorganized, railway services were curtailed, and trains ran only with armed escorts. The main military campaign culminated during the first weeks of October,⁴ when troops peacefully occupied the old city—or Arab quarter—of Jerusalem. This operation, which might have been dangerous owing to the narrow streets, was accomplished without

(1) In May the authorities announced the erection of a wall of barbed wire (known as "Tegart's Wall") across the frontiers of Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, and the Lebanon, to prevent illegal entry of armed bands. This scheme had been turned down in 1937 because of the cost, which was estimated at £90,000.

(2) *Hansard*, November 1, 1938, col. 40. On November 16, 1938, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated the personnel of the Army and Royal Air Force in Palestine to be 15,500 and 700 respectively, and that of the police 7,300. He gave the cost of maintaining the additional military forces then in Palestine as about £175,000 a month. *Hansard*, November 16, 1938, col. 861.

(3) *Report for 1938*, p. 111.

(4) During the first fortnight of October casualties amounted to 350 killed and 100 injured. *Manchester Guardian*, October 17, 1938.

serious loss, and by the end of that month all Palestine was under military control. The country was thereupon divided into four districts, each under a military governor, for the purpose of restoring order in as short a time as possible by the capture or driving out of armed rebel bands, a process which unhappily proved long and fraught with unsuspected difficulties.

The nature and extent of the Arab rebellion of 1938 can be gauged not only from the figures given above of British armed forces in the country, but also from the fact that casualties during the year reached a total of 3,717,¹ as against 246 in 1937. In a strictly military sense the difficulties encountered during the process of restoring order in Palestine were probably expected and inevitable. But the organization and disposition of the rebels complicated the task of the authorities in several ways.

*Disposition
and Methods
of Rebels*

The permanent active rebels probably amounted to no more than 1,000 or 1,500, split up in small bodies and mixed among peaceful citizens in towns and villages—though it may well be that the operations of these rebels would never have been possible without the sympathy of the bulk of the Arab population.² Two elements of the population, however, gave support which went far beyond this general sympathy. These were educated *effendi* and terrorist “thugs,” of whom the former, chiefly engaged in organizing supplies and finance, were unfortunately not in effective control of the latter. The two principal rebel leaders were: Abdul Rahim Haj Ibrahim,³ titular commander in chief, an honest genuine patriot who endeavoured to conduct his campaign on decent lines, and the more unprincipled and ruthless Aref Abdul Razzik.⁴

*Arab Parties
and Feuds*

Both these men were in touch with and largely directed by the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee from outside Palestine,⁵ but Abdul Rahim was alleged to dislike the policy recently developed by his superiors, of intimidating and assassinating the so-called moderates, supporters of Nashashibi. It may be that this conflict arose in the first instance out of family or even personal feuds; it was certainly concerned with methods rather than underlying principles of the Arab opposition to the Jews, but the rivalry between the leaders and the struggle of Arab against Arab obviously added to the difficulties of the situation.

(1) These figures included 69 British, 92 Jews, 486 Arab civilians, and 1,138 armed rebels killed. *The Times*, January 2, 1939.

(2) *Round Table*, March 1939.

(3) Killed March 27, 1939. *The Times*, March 28, 1939.

(4) Surrendered to the French in Syria on April 12, 1939 (*The Times*, April 14, 1939), but later escaped.

(5) See British War Office Statement, *Manchester Guardian*, January 10, 1939.

The rebels were scattered among the civil population and in many cases protected by them. It was, therefore, necessary for the authorities to check and search every district or village suspected of being a centre of rebel activity; this in itself was no easy task in a countryside where olive groves provided admirable cover and a rifle could be exchanged for a hoe, and hidden, before a British patrol could approach. Moreover, all males had often to be rounded up in order to identify a wanted man; sometimes innocent persons were marched away, to the distress of their womenfolk. Punishment for harbouring of rebels or for attacks on the military from a given village were usually collective, in the form of fines, or demolition of houses, and inevitably inflicted suffering on innocent as well as guilty.

It is easy to see the political and international implications of this state of affairs. The nature of the rebel organization made a perfect weapon, intelligently directed, for those who wished to use terrorism to draw attention at a given moment to any specific unwelcome change in the aims or methods of British policy. There was, for example, a recrudescence of violence in Palestine in January and February 1939, while the Round Table Conference was meeting in London.¹ This account of the nature of the rebellion, and the circumstances in which it had to be suppressed, may serve to show, in the first place, the nature of the task which faces the British authorities in the absence of an "agreed settlement" between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Secondly, it reveals the injustice done to the British Army by the violent and continued propaganda in the German press and wireless bulletins at the close of 1938 and in the first half of 1939.² The German authorities did not confine themselves to describing the difficulties confronting Great Britain in Palestine, or the defects of British policy, but chose to dwell persistently on the heartrending maltreatment of an innocent civil population by a brutal soldiery, characterizing an official statement³ by the British War Office refuting the charges against the British Army in Palestine as an open admission of terrorism by the military.⁴ From April onwards regular broadcasts in Arabic were given from Berlin. According to a report from Jerusalem, the first (April 24) included the statement that Arab women were being

(1) See below, p. 109.

(2) It is not without interest that German propaganda began to increase in extent and intensity soon after the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1938.

(3) *Manchester Guardian*, January 10, 1939.

(4) *Angriff*, January 10, 1939, and *Berliner Tageblatt*, January 12, 1939.

dispersed by jets of water from hoses when on a protest march through the Old City (the falsity of which could be attested by all local listeners who cared to investigate), and a list of British "atrocities."¹

But in spite of such propaganda, and of assistance from abroad in the form of money and weapons, there were signs by the middle of May that the "combing out" operations were being effective. Of still greater significance, however, were the unmistakable indications that the revolt was disintegrating from within. There was evidence of dissension between the Palestine terrorist leaders and the Arab Higher Committee in Damascus over the question of funds which the terrorists believed the latter were using for their own benefit. Mohil Zawati, a lieutenant of Aref Abdul Razzik, was alleged to have stated openly in Transjordan that he could no longer obtain money or help from the Committee and that he had no further interest in the rebellion, but would return to Palestine to extort money for his own benefit.²

*Disintegration
of Rebellion*

(1) *The Times*, April 29, 1939. For an account of German propaganda in the Near East, see Vernier: "*La Politique Islamique de l'Allemagne*," (Paris, Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939), and Viton: "Hitler goes to the Arabs." *Asia*, July 1939, pp. 419-22.

(2) *The Times*, May 10, 1939.

X. THE LONDON CONFERENCES, FEBRUARY—MARCH, 1939 AND THE NEW BRITISH POLICY

*Issue of
Invitations
by H.M.G.*

INVITATIONS to attend the Round Table Conference in London were sent by the British Government to the Palestinian Arabs; the neighbouring Arab States of Egypt, Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, and the Yemen and Transjordan; and to the Jewish Agency.¹ Mr MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, made it clear that the Jewish Agency was at liberty to select whatever Jewish representatives it wished.² But the White Paper announcing that a conference would be held had stated that the Government would reserve the right to refuse to receive those leaders whom they regarded as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence.³ In actual fact, although the Mufti himself was regarded as "unacceptable," members of the Arab Higher Committee in exile in the Seychelles⁴ were set at liberty and, although refused permission to return to Palestine, were free to consult with the Mufti and to act as delegates of the Palestinian Arabs at the Conference.

*Arab Party
Differences*

The differences of opinion between those Palestinian Arab parties which accepted the leadership and policy of the Mufti on the one hand, and the National Defence Party⁵ on the other, appeared to have been intensified and embittered during the Arab revolt.⁶ These differences were clearly revealed during the period preceding the Conference in which the parties were manœuvring for position. It is, however, essential to realize that they were differences of method and policy, rather than of principle, and accentuated by family rivalries. For example, Fakhri Bey Nashashibi, cousin and political assistant of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, former Mayor of Jerusalem and leader of the Palestine Arab Defence Party, addressed a letter to the High Commissioner on behalf of "many of the Party leaders compelled to leave as a result of the campaign launched against them and their followers by the faction of Haj Amin Al-Husseini" in which he claimed that these moderate elements represented 75 per cent of the interests of the country and

(1) For the composition of the Jewish Agency, see above pp. 20-1.

(2) *Hansard*, House of Commons, November 10, 1938, col. 304.

(3) Cmd. 5893, 1938. See above, p. 96.

(4) See above, p. 99.

(5) See above, p. 25.

(6) For an account of Arab organization, see above, pp. 22-6.

more than half the Arab population of Palestine.¹ Ragheb Bey immediately disowned this letter on the grounds that its author did not represent the Palestine Arab Defence Party. There was no person in Palestine nor in any other Arab countries, he declared, who did not oppose to the death the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate; during the present critical situation the Arabs stood as one man desperately defending their sacred existence, and it was a chimaera to divide the Palestine Arabs into extremists and moderates.²

After discussions between the Mufti and the Palestinian leaders recently returned from the Seychelles, delegates were chosen representing five of the six Arab parties who were members of the former Arab Higher Committee; but in spite of the indefatigable efforts of Nuri Pasha, the Prime Minister of Iraq, and other non-Palestinian Arabs, it was not until after the opening of the Conference in London and as a result of the direct intervention of Mr Malcolm MacDonald, that the representation of the National Defence Party was finally settled. The Party had at first claimed six representatives; the Mufti and his supporters were prepared to allow them two, provided that Fakhri Bey Nashashibi was not one. In the end, Ragheb Bey, President, and Yakub Effendi Farraj, Vice-President, of the National Defence Party, took their places as members of the Palestinian Arab delegation at St James's Palace.

From an early stage in what may be described as the Conference preliminaries, the Arab States showed themselves ready to play an active part. Reasons for their interest, and indications of the nature of the influence they might be supposed to exercise, are not far to seek.³ Iraq and Egypt, for example, have but recently acquired independence. Both have treaty relations and close connections with Great Britain, which they do not appear to regard as derogating from their independent status. The latter is concerned⁴ to obtain a settlement which, while satisfying Arab aspirations, would lead to the creation, in the shortest possible time, of a peaceful and stable Palestinian State, on the flank of the Suez Canal.

In the middle of January all the delegations (except that of the Palestine Arab Defence Party) met in Cairo; and Nuri Pasha

*Policy of
the Arab
States*

(1) *The Times*, November 16, 1938; *Great Britain and the East*, December 8, 1938. Judging by subsequent Arab intransigence this figure is almost certainly an over-estimate.

(2) *The Times*, November 19, 1938.

(3) See above, pp. 1-2.

(4) A glance at the map will show the danger to Egypt of a disturbed Palestine in the event of a general war.

flew to Beirut to confer with the Mufti. Nuri had already put forward a plan for Palestine,¹ which envisaged an independent State, allied by treaty with Great Britain, governed under a Constitution drawn up by a constituent assembly, and embodying guarantees of full civil and religious rights to all communities. Each community would, under this plan, enjoy communal rights on a basis of equality; local autonomy and education and municipal affairs would be granted to Arab and Jewish towns. Jewish immigration would cease at once, although the transfer of the administration would be gradual. The rights of the communities would be guaranteed by the British Government for the duration of the proposed Anglo-Palestine treaty.

*Composition
of Arab
Delegation*

The Palestinian Arab Delegation finally consisted, as indicated above, of representatives of all the Palestinian Arab parties, and included the four leaders who had been exiled to the Seychelles in the autumn of 1937,² as well as the two members of the National Defence Party about whose choice there had been so much dispute. Egypt was represented by Prince Mohamed Abdul Moneim; the Egyptian Ambassador to London; and the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, Minister to the Iraqi and Sa'udi Arabian Governments. Iraq's representative was Nuri es Said, her Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and that of Sa'udi Arabia was the Emir Feisal, son of Ibn Sa'ud.

*Composition
of Jewish
Delegation*

The Jewish Delegation to the Conference was composed of a body of "negotiators," of whom five were chosen by the Jewish Agency from its Executive to be a permanent nucleus throughout the Conference, while the remainder were drawn from a wider conference committee of leading Jewish personalities, both Zionist and non-Zionist, representing the Jews of the British Empire and of foreign countries. This committee consisted of Dr Weizmann, the four members of the Jewish Executive just referred to; three other members of the Executive; eleven representatives of Palestine organizations; thirteen representatives of Zionist and non-Zionist bodies in Great Britain; two from the United States, and one each from France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Eastern Europe, and South Africa. At the first business meeting of the Conference, for example, the Jewish Delegation numbered nineteen and was composed as follows:—Executive of Jewish Agency, 7; Palestine, 5;

(1) This plan was communicated to the British Government in October 1938. It is interesting to compare these proposals with the Arab demands put forward at the London Conferences, and with proposals alleged to have been sent to the British Government at the end of April. See below, pp. 109-10.

(2) See above, p. 99.

Great Britain, 4; United States, 1; France, 1; Eastern Europe, 1. But the personnel and number of the Delegation varied at succeeding meetings. It has been claimed that the Delegation was representative of every aspect of Jewish life and thought:—

“Non-Zionist leaders who have hitherto shown no practical interest in Palestinian affairs [will] co-operate with life-long Zionists. Great industrialists and labour leaders, spokesmen of extreme orthodox and Reform Rabbis, representatives of the great emancipated Jewries of the West and the leader of the Jews in Germany, a Sephardi leader of Oriental Jewry, and spokesmen of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe . . .”¹

But the Conference, when it met at St James's Palace, London, on February 7, 1939, became in effect two parallel conferences, for the Palestinian Arabs refused to sit at the same conference table with the Jewish Delegation. The first two weeks were occupied by statements of the Arab and Jewish cases, and discussions between the British Government and each of the parties on points of detail arising from these claims. Both sides stated their case in its extreme form, and showed little sign of any readiness to compromise. Dr Weizmann, leader and spokesman of the Jewish Delegation, made no specific proposals. But while he stressed the right of the Jewish people (recognized in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate) to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine, he laid even greater emphasis on their present urgent need of that Home in “this the blackest hour of Jewish history,” and described Jewish homelessness as the root of the problem. The spokesman of the Arab Delegation, Jamal Effendi Husseini, made demands which also contained little that was new,² but revealed the enduring Arab fear of domination by the Jews and a determination to secure recognition of their right³ to complete independence in their own country.

*The
Conferences*

On February 23 the first meeting between the Jews and representatives of the Arab States took place, in a friendly atmosphere, but without positive results in narrowing the gap between the two standpoints. During the next week the British put forward proposals for an agreed settlement, which were rejected by the Jews. More discussions followed and another meeting took place between

(1) *New Judaea*, February 1939, p. 95.

(2) His demands were nearly identical with Arab demands put forward in 1930 and 1935. See pp. 43 and 74 above.

(3) The question of British War-time promises was thoroughly investigated during the course of the Conference. The relevant documents were published and a committee, composed of representatives of the Arab Delegation and of His Majesty's Government, set up to investigate and report to the Conference on the subject. See above, p. 6, footnote 2, and below, Appendix I. The Jewish Delegation also published “Documents relating to the McMahon Letters” (Jewish Agency for Palestine, London, March 1939), containing a collection of material from various sources, including pronouncements during the period 1917–21 and more recent statements throwing light upon them.

the Arab States, the Jewish, and the British leaders, also without definite results. Finally, the British laid revised proposals before the Delegations, which were rejected by both parties, and the Conference came to an end.

Some weeks elapsed before the White Paper containing the final proposals of the British Government was published on May 17, 1939.¹ These weeks saw a serious crisis in Europe arising out of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on March 15, and the invasion of Albania by Italy on Good Friday, April 7. During this period a conference of representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the Arab States, and the Moslems of India met in Cairo and submitted unofficial proposals to the British Government in an endeavour to bridge the gap between the latter's London Conference terms and the demands of the Palestinian Arabs. These Cairo proposals are understood to have differed little on questions of immigration and land-sales from those contained in the British White Paper, but to have asked for the immediate appointment of a National Government of Palestinian Ministers with British advisers, and a National Assembly at the end of three years to draw up a Constitution for an independent Palestinian State.²

The British Government's proposals, on the other hand, envisaged the creation of an independent Palestinian State, in treaty relations with Great Britain, only at the end of a period of ten years. They proposed that, five years after the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government should be set up to make recommendations with regard to the Constitution of the new State. During the transition period Palestinians would gradually be given an increasing part in the government of their country, acting as heads of certain departments, with British advisers, and becoming members, in this capacity, of an Executive Council. The powers of local government bodies would, at the same time, be increased.

The exact form of the Constitution ultimately to be given to the new State was not laid down in the White Paper, because the British Government were unable to foresee it, although the measures proposed during the interim period seemed at first sight to foreshadow a unitary and centralized type of government.³ But the land regula-

(1) Cmd. 6019. For a summary of its contents, see Appendix VI.

(2) *The Times*, May 2, 1939.

(3) The Secretary of State for the Colonies, speaking in the Debate on the White Paper in the House of Commons, emphasized that the form of the future State had been in no way prejudged; it might be federal, or a State consisting of autonomous provinces. The vote at the end of this Debate, on a motion approving the Govern-

tions appeared to indicate that there would eventually be three clearly defined areas in Palestine—Arab, Jewish, and mixed, since from the moment of publication onwards land-sales would be prohibited in certain districts and restricted in others at the direction of the High Commissioner. It seems reasonable to suppose that the best hope for the future of a Palestinian State would lie in some sort of federation and that these areas might ultimately constitute autonomous areas. It has, moreover, been suggested that perhaps the only hope for the successful co-operation between Jews and Arabs during the next few years, upon which that future itself depends, lies in the immediate introduction of some measure of communal autonomy.¹

But the existence of a will to co-operate is still dependent, in the last analysis, upon agreement with regard to immigration. The British Government's new proposals on this subject constituted a complete and drastic reversal of policy. By the terms of the White Paper, approximately 75,000 Jewish immigrants were to be admitted into Palestine during the next three years, and included in this total would be the number of illegal immigrants who entered the country in the period. At the end of five years further Jewish immigration would be subject to Arab consent. The Government justified these new restrictions on the ground that the Balfour Declaration did not intend that Palestine should become a Jewish State, or that the whole of Palestine should be converted into a Jewish National Home. It further declared that nothing in the Mandate, or in the obligations binding on His Majesty's Government, requires that Jewish immigration should be permitted up to the *economic* absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of other factors such as *political* absorptive capacity, that is, regardless of Arab fears and Arab goodwill.

Immigration

As the British Government correctly surmised in the White Paper, the new proposals satisfied neither the Arabs nor the Jews. That the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab States should refuse to accept a policy which, at the same time, held out promise of an independent Palestinian State and removed their fear of being outnumbered by the Jews is at first sight not a little surprising. Possibly the instantaneous rejection of the proposals was merely a tactical move. Possibly also certain non-Palestinian Arabs had staked their

*Reception
of the
Proposals*

The Arabs

ment's Palestine policy, resulted in a small majority of 89. *Hansard*, May 22 and 23, 1939, coll. 1962 and 2204.

(1) See especially letters from Mr A. H. Hyamson in *The Manchester Guardian*, June 5, 1939, and from Professor N. Bentwich in *Time and Tide*, June 9, 1939. The latter was in Palestine when the White Paper appeared.

reputation as statesmen on British acceptance *in toto* of their demands, and felt that they could not agree to British rejection of part of their plan. Moreover, the British Government's recent decision¹ to prolong indefinitely the ban on the Mufti's return to Palestine was probably not without influence on Arab opinion. Finally, it must be admitted that the Arabs would have had some justification for reserving judgement until such time as the new British policy should be translated into action, since they could point to previous occasions, notably in 1930 and 1935, when a proposed policy, described by its opponents as "pro-Arab," was never put into effect in its original form.

The Jews

The Jews not unnaturally rejected the new policy. They condemned it firstly as a breach of faith, since they claimed that it denied to the Jewish people the right, specifically given to them by the Balfour Declaration, to reconstitute their National Home in their ancestral country, and secondly as a surrender to Arab terrorism.² The Jewish community in the United States, in particular, expressed strong resentment at the policy and endeavoured to induce the United States Government to make representations to the British Government for its modification.

Conclusion

The British Government's proposals for future policy in Palestine close the chapter in the post-War history of that country which opened with the publication of the Peel Commission's Report in July 1937. To say this is not to attribute to the new proposals a finality which the British Government themselves expressly disclaimed. They are the outline of a new policy, which will, like its predecessors, be modified by the development of ideas and of events both within and without Palestine itself. But the actions of Arabs and Jews; the comments and criticisms in Great Britain and the rest of the world; the deliberations of the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, arising out of this new policy—all belong to a new chapter of Palestinian history which cannot yet be recorded in due perspective.

(1) *Hansard*, House of Commons, May 18, 1919, coll. 1442-3.

(2) Official statement issued by the Jewish Agency, May 17, 1939.

APPENDIX I

1. EXTRACTS FROM THE McMAHON CORRESPONDENCE OF 1915-16

The McMahon correspondence¹ consists of ten letters exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, from July 1915 to March 1916. The extracts from these letters particularly relevant to the question of Great Britain's promises with regard to Palestine are as follows²—

No. 1. Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915.

To his Honour:

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;

And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest, also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;

For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations:—

Firstly—England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam. . .

No. 2. Letter from Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, August 30, 1915.

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity of your feeling towards England. We rejoice, moreover, that Your Highness and your people are of one opinion—that Arab interests are English interests and English Arab. To this intent we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener's message, which reached you by the hand of Ali Effendi, and in which was stated clearly our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Khalifate when it should be proclaimed. We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true race. With regard to the questions of limits and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective occupation . . .

No. 3. From the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, September 9, 1915.

With great cheerfulness and delight I received your letter dated the 19th Shawal, 1933 (August 30, 1915), and have given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point.

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 5957, 1939. In addition to the letters, the White Paper included a map of the pre-War Turkish Administrative Districts comprised in Syria and Palestine, which is printed at the end of this Paper.

(2) Letters 9 and 10 dealt only with matters relating to the prosecution of the War.

It is necessary to make clear to Your Excellency our sincerity towards the illustrious British Empire and our confession of preference for it in all cases and matters and under all forms and circumstances.

Nevertheless, Your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coolness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling them, etc., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort. . .

No. 4. From Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, October 24, 1915.

... I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

I have realized, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:—

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

- (1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.
- (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.
- (3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.
- (4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.
- (5) With regard to the *vilayets* of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests. . .

No. 5. From the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, November 15, 1915.

I received with great pleasure your honoured letter, dated the 15th Zil Hijja (October 24, 1915), to which I beg to answer as follows:—

1. In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships—seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain—we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the *Vilayets* of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the two *Vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab *Vilayets*, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather. . .

No. 6. From Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, December 14, 1915.

I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the districts of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of the Arab territories.

. . . With regard to the *vilayets* of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood and taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course. . .

No. 7. From the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, January 1, 1916.

We received from the bearer your letter, dated the 9th Safar (December 14, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood its contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which had made me uneasy.

. . . As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts.

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peaceful conditions. In addition to which the citizens¹ of Beirut will decidedly never accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the identity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions. . .

No. 8. From Sir H. McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, January 25, 1916.

. . . As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty. . .

2. STATEMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT DURING THE YEAR 1918 IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE²

(i) *The Hogarth Message*

(a)

The following is the text of a message which Commander D. G. Hogarth, C.M.G., R.N.V.R., of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was instructed on January 4, 1918, to deliver to King Hussein of the Hejaz at Jeddah:—

“(1) The *Entente* Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

(1) Former reading: “people”.

(2) British White Paper, Cmd. 5964.

"(2) So far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to another, but—

- (a) In view of the fact that there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs, and Holy places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special régime to deal with these places approved of by the world.
- (b) As regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

"(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and, further, as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of this ideal.

"In this connection the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside."

(b)

The following is the record of the conversation which Commander Hogarth had with King Hussein about the message which he had delivered:—

"I read Foreign Office Formula¹ No. 1 (Arab Nation and need of unity). King assented cordially saying it expressed the basis of all our Agreement. I said that owing to long lapse of time Allies thought it well to repeat it now.

"King then said that if any minor modifications of our Agreement with him were imposed on us by war necessities he would frankly recognize such necessity, but asked he should be as frankly informed of modification and necessity.

"I then introduced Formula¹ No. 2 (International Administration in Palestine) by reminding King of proviso in original Agreements safeguarding special interests of our Allies and especially France. He interpolated humorous reference to Fashoda, implying doubt of real and permanent community of interest between France and us. I let this pass with gesture of dissent and said France had come to see eye to eye with us in Arab matters, favoured as much as we Feisal's plans, took the view so strongly held in America that people should have the government they desire, and wished only to protect and assist the development of independent Government in Syria.

"I then read No. 2. King assented, saying that brain which could formulate this could devise form of administration to safeguard all interests. He lauded Great Britain's action in case Omar Mosque, comparing Caliph Omar's abstention from Christian shrines in Jerusalem. If we could draw up statement similar to No. 2 with omission of reference to political administrative control, he would publish it to all Islam.

"I passed to Formula¹ No. 3 (Jewish Settlement in Palestine) prefacing it by statement of growth of Zionism during war and great value of Jew interest and alliance. King seemed quite prepared for formula and agreed enthusiastically, saying he welcomed Jews to all Arab lands. I explained that His Majesty's Government's resolve safeguarded existing local population."

(c)

The following are some notes by Commander Hogarth bearing on his conversation, which he addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo:—

"*Arab unity and the King's actual and possible relation to it.*—It is obvious that the King regards Arab Unity as synonymous with his own Kingship, and (for reasons given above) as a vain phrase unless so regarded. He treats our proclamations and exhortations about it as good intentions but no more, and has no faith in their effect until we support the embodiment of the idea in one single personality—himself.

"*International control of the Palestine Holy Places.*—The King left me in little doubt that he secretly regards this as a point to be reconsidered after the peace, in spite of my

(1) i.e. paragraphs No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 in the Message.

assurance that it was to be a definitive arrangement. He compared ourselves and himself (in his habitual homely way) to two persons about to inhabit one house, but not agreed which should take which floor or rooms! Often in the course of our conversations he spoke with a smile of accounts which he would settle after the war, pending which settlement he would press nothing. I doubt if he had any fixed plan or foresees his way; but I have no doubt that in his own mind he abates none of his original demands on behalf of the Arabs, or in the fullness of time, of himself.

"Settlement of Jews in Palestine and common cause among Arabs, Jews and Armenians in Syria.—The position in regard to this matter is, I think, very much the same as in the preceding case. The King would not accept an independent Jew State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows little or nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine and his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews."

"January 15, 1918."

(ii) *The Declaration to the Seven*

The following is the text of a message which His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo was instructed to convey to seven Arab leaders resident in Cairo who had presented a memorial to His Majesty's Government. The message was delivered to representatives of the seven memorialists on about June 16, 1918, by Commander D. G. Hogarth, C.M.G., R.N.V.R., and Mr O. Walrond, C.M.G.:—

"His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the Seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their anonymity, and the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attribute to the document.

"The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories:—

- "1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war;
- "2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
- "3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied forces during the present war;
- "4. Areas still under Turkish control.

"In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognize the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

"In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief on the taking of Bagdad and Jerusalem. These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed, and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

"In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence, and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour.

"His Majesty's Government are fully aware of, and take into consideration, the difficulties and dangers which beset those who work for the regeneration of the populations of the areas specified.

"In spite, however, of these obstacles His Majesty's Government trust and believe that they can and will be overcome, and wish to give all support to those who desire to overcome them. They are prepared to consider any scheme of co-operation which is compatible with existing military operations and consistent with the political principles of His Majesty's Government and the Allies."

(iii) *Certain Assurances given by General Sir Edmund Allenby*

The following are the terms in which General Sir Edmund (afterwards Viscount) Allenby reported to His Majesty's Government on October 17, 1918, a communication,

which he made to the Emir Faisal, on the occasion of the evacuation of Beirut by the Sherifian forces, regarding occupied enemy territory:—

"I gave the Emir Faisal an official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during the period of military administration they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice the final settlement by the Peace Conference, at which no doubt the Arabs would have a representative. I added that the instructions to the military governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found any of them contravening these orders. I reminded the Emir Faisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endeavour to reach a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned, and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith."

3. THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 7, 1918¹

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and Administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX II

1. ARTICLE 22 OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late War have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

(1) *Report of a Committee set up to consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, March 16, 1939* (British White Paper, Cmd. 5974), Annex I, pp. 50-1.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates.

2. MANDATE FOR PALESTINE¹

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the Mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the Mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate.

(1) British White Paper, Cmd 1785.

ARTICLE 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 4. An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

ARTICLE 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the Mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of *Waqfs* shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such Agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be

utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue *exequaturs* to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites, and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this Article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 14. A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define, and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

ARTICLE 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion, or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 17. The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the force of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the Mandated area.

Subject, as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this Mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and Customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special Customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Pales-

tine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ARTICLE 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A.D. 1700.

(2) The law for the production of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ARTICLE 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ARTICLE 26. The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this Mandate.

ARTICLE 28. In the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

Certified true copy:

FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
RAPPAUD,
Director of the Mandates Section.

APPENDIX III

THE CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 3, 1922, AND THE JEWISH AND ARAB REPLIES THERETO

(a) THE CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM¹

• The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine the following statement has been drawn up. It summarizes the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a Delegation from the Moslem Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November 2, 1917. Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in September 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionists aims "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

(1) *Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization* (British White Paper, Cmd. 1700), pp. 17-21.

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization in Article IV of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the Organization may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its Government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the War His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national Government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated October 24, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self-government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will be again reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the Constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (*Waqfs*), and of the Moslem religious Courts. To this Council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestered by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that spirit of co-operation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.

(b) THE JEWISH REPLY¹

The Executive of the Zionist Organization, having taken note of the statement relative to British policy in Palestine, transmitted to them by the Colonial Office under

(1) No. 7 in British White Paper, Cmd. 1700, pp. 28-9. This consists of a letter (dated June 18, 1922) from Dr Weizmann, transmitting the above resolution, as adopted by the Executive of the Zionist Organization.

date June 3, 1922, assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organization will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth.

(c) EXTRACTS FROM THE ARAB REPLY¹

... (2) We wish to point out here that the Jewish population of Palestine who lived there before the War never had any trouble with their Arab neighbours. They enjoyed the same rights and privileges as their fellow Ottoman citizens, and never agitated for the Declaration of November 1917. It is the Zionists outside Palestine who worked for the Balfour Declaration, and who, now that the world sees its impracticability, are apprehensive of its abolishment. . .

(4) The Memorandum goes on to discuss the existing Jewish Community in Palestine, which it says possesses "national characteristics" because it has "its own political organs, an elected assembly for the direction of its own domestic concerns, elected councils in the towns, an organization for the control of its schools, an elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs, business which is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, a Hebrew Press to serve its needs, etc., etc."

We would here remark that all these outward signs of a "national" existence are also possessed by the other communities in Palestine, and if these are to be considered as a reason why the Jews outside Palestine should be allowed into Palestine "as of right and not on sufferance," it is the more reason why the Arabs should be confirmed in their national home as against all intruders and immigration placed in their control. . .

We have shown over and over again that the supposed historic connection of the Jews with Palestine rests upon very slender historic data. The historic rights of the Arabs are far stronger than those of the Jews. Palestine had a native population before the Jews even went there, and this population has persisted all down the ages and never assimilated with the Jewish tribes, who were always a people to themselves. The Arabs, on the other hand, have been settled on the land for more than 1,500 years, and are the present owners of the soil. . .

(6) . . . Nothing will safeguard the interests of the Arabs against the dangers of immigration except the creation of a Representative National Government, which shall have complete control of immigration.

(7) The Memorandum then raises the question of the pledges given to the King of the Hejaz, and states that "this promise (to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs) was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope the country lying to the west of the *Vilayet* of Damascus. That *Vilayet* included the whole of the territory of Transjordan, but neither the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, nor those parts of the then *Vilayet* of Beyrout which are now included in Palestine. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge."

To this we reply:—

In the first place the word "district" and not *Vilayet* was used. In the second place the word "district" and not *Vilayet* was also meant since the letter says "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." Now since Homs and Hama were districts included in the *Vilayet* of Syria it would be superfluous to mention "Homs" and "Hama" specifically if the "*Vilayet*" of Damascus as against the "district" of Damascus were meant.

Moreover, the "*Vilayet*" said to have been meant was called "*Vilayet* of Syria" and not "*Vilayet*" of Damascus, as there was no *Vilayet* of Damascus.

Palestine thus comes within the scope of the promise. . .

(8) Speaking of self-government the Memorandum says:—"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that in the special circumstances of that country this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. . ."

We are to understand, then, that self-government will be granted as soon as the Jewish people in Palestine are sufficiently able through numbers and powers to benefit to the full by self-government, and not before. We fail to see any other reason.

We therefore here once again repeat that nothing will safeguard Arab interests in Palestine but the immediate creation of a national government which shall be responsible to a Parliament all of whose members are elected by the people of the country—Moslems, Christians, and Jews. . .

(1) Cmd. 1700, pp. 22-8.

(10) The hope is finally expressed in the Memorandum that "a policy upon these lines cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population."

We would heartily wish this were so. But what do we see as the result of this policy? Discontent of 93 per cent of the population, dislike of the Zionist policy, a strong feeling against those who enter Palestine through the sheer might of England.

At last, the Memorandum proceeds to explain that "this policy will serve to establish a spirit of association on which depends the development and prosperity of the country in future."

Whereas we see division and tension between Arabs and Zionists increasing day by day and resulting in general retrogression. Because the immigrants dumped upon the country from different parts of the world are ignorant of the language, customs, and character of the Arabs, and enter Palestine by the might of England against the will of the people who are convinced that these have come to strangle them. Nature does not allow the creation of a spirit of co-operation between two peoples so different, and it is not to be expected that the Arabs would bow to such a great injustice, or that the Zionists would so easily succeed in realizing their dreams.

The fact is that His Majesty's Government has placed itself in the position of a partisan in Palestine of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept because it means his extinction sooner or later. Promises avail nothing when they are not supported by actions, and until we see a real practical change in the policy of His Majesty's Government we must harbour the fears that the intention is to create a Jewish National Home to the "disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language, and culture in Palestine."

APPENDIX IV

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, 1937

(a) THE UNDERLYING CAUSES¹

... This seems to us to be an appropriate point to deal with the first of our terms of reference, which requires us "to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances" ...

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE MANDATE²

Administration

There should be no hesitation in dispensing with the services of Palestinian officers whose loyalty or impartiality is uncertain.

There should be more decentralization.

A British Senior Government Advocate should be appointed.

The Jaffa-Haifa road should be completed as speedily as possible.

Public Security

Should disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention of the military, there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law. In such an event the disarmament first of the Arabs and then of the Jews should be enforced.

In mixed areas British District Officers should be appointed.

Central and local police reserves are necessary. A large mobile mounted force is also essential.

A more rigorous Press Ordinance should be adopted.

(1) *Palestine Royal Commission: Report, 1937* (British Blue Book, Cmd. 5479), p. 106, §31.

(2) Owing to considerations of space these are reported from the official Summary of Report (pp. 38-9), and not from the original Report.

Financial and Fiscal Questions

Negotiations should be opened to amend the provisions of Article 18 of the Mandate and put the trade of Palestine on a fairer basis.

Land

The High Commissioner should be empowered to prohibit the transfer of land in any stated area to Jews. (The amendment of the Mandate may first be necessary.)

Until survey and settlement are complete the sale of isolated and comparatively small plots of land to Jews should be prohibited. The Commission favour a proposal for the creation of special Public Utility Companies to undertake development schemes.

An expert Committee should be appointed to draw up a Land Code.

Settlement should be expedited.

In the event of further sales of land by Arabs to Jews, the rights of any Arab tenants or cultivators must be preserved. Alienation of land should only be allowed where it is possible to replace extensive by intensive cultivation, i.e. in the plains, and not at present in the hills.

Legislation vesting surface water in the High Commissioner is essential. Possibilities of irrigation should be explored. The scheme for the development of the Huleh district is commended.

Measures of afforestation are recommended.

Immigration

The volume of Jewish immigration should continue to be restricted in the first instance by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, but it should be subject to a "political high level," covering Jewish immigration of all categories. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum. Amendments in the categories under the Immigration Ordinance and in the definition of "dependency" are proposed.

Education

The Administration should regard the claims on the revenue of Arab education as second in importance only to those of public security. The present proportion between the grant to Jewish education and the amount spent on the Arabs should not be altered: an increase in the grant to the Jews should result from an increase in the total expenditure on education.

In any further discussion of the project of a British University in the Near East, the possibility should be considered of locating it in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem or Haifa.

Local Government

An attempt should be made to strengthen those few local councils which still exist in Arab rural areas, but not to revivify councils which have broken down, or to create new ones unless there is a genuine demand for them. The more important local councils and all the municipalities should be reclassified, by means of a new Ordinance, into groups according to their respective size and importance.

The services of an expert on local government should be obtained to assist in drafting the new Ordinance and improving the relations between Government and the municipalities.

The need of Tel Aviv for a substantial loan should be promptly and sympathetically reconsidered.

Self-governing Institutions

The Commission do not recommend that any attempt be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative Council, but they would welcome an enlargement of the Advisory Council by the addition of Unofficial Members.

Conclusion

The above recommendations for dealing with Arab and Jewish grievances under the Mandate will not "remove" them or "prevent their recurrence." They are the best palliatives the Commission can devise, but they will not solve the problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE ON
A BASIS OF PARTITION¹

Having reached the conclusion that there is no possibility of solving the Palestine problem under the existing Mandate (or even under a scheme of cantonization), the Commission recommend the termination of the present Mandate on the basis of Partition and put forward a definite scheme which they consider to be practicable, honourable, and just. The scheme is as follows:—

The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria.

Under Treaties to be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Transjordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand, and with the Zionist Organization on the other, it would be declared that two sovereign independent States would shortly be established—(1) an Arab State consisting of Transjordan united with that part of Palestine allotted to the Arabs, (2) a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine allotted to the Jews. The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for admission to the League of Nations made by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities. Military Conventions would be attached to the Treaties.

A new Mandate should be instituted to execute the trust of maintaining the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. An enclave should be demarcated to which this Mandate should apply, extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending from Jerusalem to Jaffa. The policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply to the Mandated Area.

The Mandatory should also be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias, and similarly with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments, and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively.

The frontier between the Arab and Jewish States recommended is as follows: Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues down the river to a point rather north of Beisan. It then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern edge of the Valley of Jezreel to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carmel Ridge in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road. It then runs southward down the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain, curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches the Jerusalem-Jaffa Corridor near Lydda. South of the Corridor it continues down the edge of the Plain to a point about ten miles south of Rehovot, whence it turns west to the sea.

Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Acre should be kept for a period under Mandatory administration. Jaffa should form an outlying part of the Arab State, narrow belts of land being acquired and cleared on the north and south sides of the town to provide access from the Mandatory Corridor to the sea.

The Jewish Treaty should provide for free transit of goods in bond between the Arab State and Haifa.

In view of possible commercial developments in the future, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory administration, and the Arab Treaty should provide for free transit of goods between the Jewish State and this enclave, as also to the Egyptian frontier at Rafah. The Treaty should provide for similar facilities for the transit of goods between the Mandated Area and Haifa, Rafah, and the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State. A Finance Commission should be appointed to advise as to its amount and as to the division of the public debt of Palestine and other financial questions.

In view of the backwardness of Transjordan, Parliament should be asked to make a grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State.

As a part of the proposed Treaty System, a Commercial Convention should be concluded with a view to establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of

(1) Owing to considerations of space these are reported from the Official Summary of Report (pp. 40–2), and not from the original Report.

imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible interchange of goods between the three territories.

The rights of all existing Civil Servants, including rights to pensions or gratuities, should be fully honoured.

Agreements entered into by the Government of Palestine for the development and security of industries, e.g. that with the Palestine Potash Company, should be taken over and carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security of the Power station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.

The Treaties should provide that if Arab owners of land in the Jewish State or Jewish owners in the Arab State wish to sell their land, the Government of the State concerned should be responsible for purchases at a price to be fixed, if required, by the Mandatory Government.

An immediate inquiry should be undertaken into the possibilities of irrigation and development in Transjordan, the Beersheba District, and the Jordan Valley. If it becomes clear that a substantial amount of land could be made available for the resettlement of Arabs living in the Jewish Area, strenuous efforts should be made to obtain an agreement, in the interests of both parties concerned, for an exchange of land and population. To facilitate such an agreement the United Kingdom Parliament should be asked to make a grant to meet the cost of the necessary development scheme.

For the transition period which would intervene before the Treaties came into force, the Commission's recommendations are as follows: Land purchase by Jews within the Arab Area or by Arabs within the Jewish Area should be prohibited. No Jewish immigration into the Arab Area should be permitted. The volume of Jewish immigration should be determined by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine less the Arab Area. Negotiations should be opened without delay to secure amendment of Article 18 of the Mandate and place the external trade of Palestine on a fairer basis. The Advisory Council should, if possible, be enlarged by the nomination of Arab and Jewish representatives. The municipal system should be re-formed on expert advice, as recommended. A vigorous effort should be made to increase the number of Arab schools.

The Commission point out that, while these proposals do not offer either the Arabs or the Jews all they want, they offer each party what it wants most, namely, freedom and security . . .

(d) CONCLUSION¹

1. "Half a loaf is better than no bread" is a peculiarly English proverb; and, considering the attitude which both the Arab and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving evidence before us, we think it improbable that either party will be satisfied at first sight with the proposals we have submitted for the adjustment of their rival claims. For Partition means that neither will get what it wants. It means that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion from their sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them. It means that the Jews must be content with less than the Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped to rule again. But it seems to us possible that on reflection both parties will come to realize that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For, if it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security.

2. The advantages to the Arabs of Partition on the lines we have proposed may be summarized as follows:—

(i) They obtain their national independence and can co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of the neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress.

(ii) They are finally delivered from the fear of being "swamped" by the Jews and from the possibility of ultimate subjection to Jewish rule.

(iii) In particular, the final limitation of the Jewish National Home within a fixed frontier and the enactment of a new Mandate for the protection of the Holy Places, solemnly guaranteed by the League of Nations, removes all anxiety lest the Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control.

(1) Cmd. 5479, pp. 394-6.

(iv) As a set-off to the loss of territory the Arabs regard as theirs, the Arab State will receive a subvention from the Jewish State. It will also, in view of the backwardness of Trans-Jordan, obtain a grant of £2,000,000 from the British Treasury and, if an arrangement can be made for the exchange of land and population, a further grant will be made for the conversion, as far as may prove possible, of uncultivable land in the Arab State into productive land from which the cultivators and the State alike will profit.

3. The advantages of Partition to the Jews may be summarized as follows:—

(i) Partition secures the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieves it from the possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule.

(ii) Partition enables the Jews in the fullest sense to call their National Home their own: for it converts it into a Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to admit as many Jews into it as they themselves believe can be absorbed. They will attain the primary objective of Zionism—a Jewish nation, planted in Palestine, giving its nationals the same status in the world as other nations give theirs. They will cease at last to live a “minority life.”

4. To both Arabs and Jews Partition offers a prospect—and we see no such prospect in any other policy—of obtaining the inestimable boon of peace. It is surely worth some sacrifice on both sides if the quarrel which the Mandate started could be ended with its termination. It is not a natural or old-standing feud. An able Arab exponent of the Arab case told us that the Arabs throughout their history have not only been free from anti-Jewish sentiment but have also shown that the spirit of compromise is deeply rooted in their life. And he went on to express his sympathy with the fate of the Jews in Europe. “There is no decent-minded person,” he said, “who would not want to do everything humanly possible to relieve the distress of those persons,” provided that it was “not at the cost of inflicting a corresponding distress on another people.” Considering what the possibility of finding a refuge in Palestine means to many thousands of suffering Jews, we cannot believe that the “distress” occasioned by Partition, great as it would be, is more than Arab generosity can bear. And in this, as in so much else connected with Palestine, it is not only the peoples of that country that have to be considered. The Jewish Problem is not the least of the many problems which are disturbing international relations at this critical time and obstructing the path to peace and prosperity. If the Arabs at some sacrifice could help to solve that problem, they would earn the gratitude not of the Jews alone but of all the Western World.

5. There was a time when Arab statesmen were willing to concede little Palestine to the Jews, provided that the rest of Arab Asia were free. That condition was not fulfilled then, but it is on the eve of fulfilment now. In less than three years’ time all the wide Arab area outside Palestine between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean will be independent, and, if Partition is adopted, the greater part of Palestine will be independent too.

6. There is no need to stress the advantage to the British people of a settlement in Palestine. We are bound to honour to the utmost of our power the obligations we undertook in the exigencies of war towards the Arabs and the Jews. When those obligations were incorporated in the Mandate, we did not fully realize the difficulties of the task it laid on us. We have tried to overcome them, not always with success. They have steadily become greater till now they seem almost insuperable. Partition offers a possibility of finding a way through them, a possibility of obtaining a final solution of the problem which does justice to the rights and aspirations of both the Arabs and the Jews and discharges the obligations we undertook towards them twenty years ago to the fullest extent that is practicable in the circumstances of the present time . . .

APPENDIX V

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE PARTITION COMMISSION, 1938¹

*Terms of Reference*²

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications of that plan, including variation of the areas recommended for retention under British Mandate,

And taking into account any representations of the communities in Palestine and Transjordan—

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under British Mandate which will—

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States;

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa; and

(c) enable His Majesty's Government to carry out the Mandatory responsibilities the assumption of which is recommended in the Report of the Royal Commission, including the obligations imposed by Article 28 of the Mandate as regards the Holy Places;

(ii) to examine and report on the economic and financial questions involved in partition upon which decisions will require to be taken, including—

(a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between the various areas of the public assets and public debt of Palestine and other "financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate" referred to in Article 28 thereof;

(b) means to ensure that the financial obligations referred to above will be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28 of the Mandate;

(c) the administration of the railways, ports, postal, telegraph and telephone services;

(d) currency arrangements;

(e) Customs administration and tariffs;

(f) the budgetary prospects of the various Administrations to be established;

(g) the preservation of the rights of civil servants in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the Mandate;

(h) the treatment of industrial and other concessions;

(i) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and population, and the prospects of providing by works of land development room for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring to move from one area to another;

(j) the provision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection of religious rights and prosperities.

Summary of Findings

The Commission examined three plans of partition which they called A, B, and C. *Plan A* is the plan of partition proposed by the Royal Commission, illustrated by their Map,³ with the boundaries adjusted for purposes of defence.

It was rejected for the following reasons:

(a) It would involve the inclusion of 294,700 Arabs in the proposed Jewish State, as against 304,900 Jews, and of 7,200 Jews in the proposed Arab State.

(b) The proposed distribution of land would result in there being 37,000 dunums owned by Arabs.

(c) The inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State would also mean the transfer to Jewish rule of a population almost entirely Arab and land almost entirely Arab-owned. The Arabs would, in the Commission's opinion, almost certainly resist such inclusion by force.

(1) *Palestine Partition Commission: Report, October 1938*. British Blue Book, Cmd. 5854.

(2) British White Paper, Cmd. 5634, pp. 3-4.

(3) See maps at end.

Plan B is a variant of *Plan A*, in which Galilee and the area at its southern extremity would be excluded from the Jewish State—the former becoming Mandated Territory and the latter part of the Jerusalem enclave.

It was rejected for the following reasons¹:

(a) Although Galilee could come under Arab control without endangering the Jewish State, to make it a Mandated Territory would be to do an injustice to the Arabs for the sake of the security of the Jewish State.

(b) Haifa, the only deep-water harbour in Palestine, could not be included in either the Jewish or the Arab States without serious detriment to the interests of whichever were deprived of it.

(c) Even with the exclusion of Galilee and the area in the south from the Jewish State, there would still be 188,000 Arabs in it, as against 300,000 Jews.

(d) In the north-eastern portion (excluding Haifa) of the Jewish State, the Arabs would be in a majority, the Jews forming only 24 per cent of the population.

Plan C proposed the division of Palestine into three parts:

(1) Northern Mandated Territory;

(2) Southern Mandated Territory;

(3) A central part (the Negeb) to be divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and the Jerusalem Enclave. (Here the proposed boundaries are identical with those of *Plan B*, except for slight changes across the Carmel Ridge and on the Negeb boundary).

It was preferred by the Commission, subject to the following recommendations:

(a) The Mandate for the Northern Territory should last until both races agree to ask that it should surrendered, and that the territory should be given independence as part of the Arab or Jewish States, or as a separate Palestinian State.

(b) In the Southern Mandated Territory no independent State should be set up in opposition to the wishes of the minority (unless it was so small that its wishes ought not to be allowed to prevail), and the Mandate should continue for at least ten years.

(c) The Jerusalem Enclave should be retained under permanent Mandate.

(d) Jewish acquisition of, or settlement on, land in the Northern Mandated Territory should be controlled. In Galilee no transfer of land by non-Jew to Jew should be allowed. But Haifa, Tiberias, and other urban areas should be "free areas." Such control should be reviewed after ten years, but not withdrawn without Arab consent. Elsewhere in this territory transfers without Government approval for the consolidation of Jewish holdings should be permitted.

(e) The Government should be prepared to spend sums on development and on education, with the primary object of facilitating Jewish settlement, but any surplus land made available by such schemes should be shared between Jews and Arabs.

(f) The Southern Mandated Territory should be divided into:—

(i) Unoccupied area, to be declared a public domain, of which parts could be leased to a Jewish Company for development.

(ii) Occupied area, in which at present no Jews should be allowed to acquire land. Should closer settlement of this area prove possible in future, Beduin should have first claim to benefit from improvements.

(g) Immigration into the Mandated Territories should be regulated by political, social, and psychological, and not by purely economic, considerations. Preference should be given to Jews. Permits of residence for inhabitants of the rest of Palestine and Transjordan should be regulated by an inter-Palestine quota, preference being given to Arabs leaving the Jewish State.

(h) No subvention should be paid by the Jewish to the Arab State.

Conclusion

The Commission believed that any plan of partition which could be devised would have the following objections:—

(1) The Arab State would be far from self-supporting. It would be faced with difficulties of supporting a rising population without existing opportunities of obtaining supplementary employment in Mandated Territories, which would be limited by the absence of sufficient inflow of Jewish capital.

(1) *Plan B* was preferred to *Plan C* by one member of the Commission—Sir A. Russell. See Report, p. 249.

(2) The Mandatory Power, in addition to defence expenditure, would have to provide financial assistance to the Mandated Territories.

(3) An essential condition of the prosperity of both Arab and Jewish States would be to enter into a Customs union with the Mandated Territories. Such a Customs union between a Mandated Territory and an independent State, would not only create serious constitutional difficulties, but would only be possible under conditions which ensured that the wishes of the Mandatory Power with regard to tariff policy should prevail, and that Customs for the whole Territory should be administered by it—i.e. conditions which would be inconsistent with fiscal independence of the Arab and Jewish sovereign States.

(4) Any frontiers which could be drawn for a Jewish State would be inadequate for purposes of defence.

They therefore proposed a modified form of partition ("Economic Federalism") which would permit the setting up of a Customs union on lines referred to under (3) above, and of some arrangement on similar lines for control of internal communications.

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APPENDIX VI

SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT OF POLICY, MAY 1939¹

In the Statement on Palestine, issued on November 9, 1938,² His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries, and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy . . . In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission³ and the Partition Commission,⁴ certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish Delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish Delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the Conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish Delegations.

2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations . . . There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:—

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.

(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

3. The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression

(1) British White Paper, Cmd. 6019.

(2) Cmd. 5893.

(3) Cmd. 5479.

(4) Cmd. 5854.

"a National Home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.

1. THE CONSTITUTION

4. It has been urged that the expression "a National Home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922¹ which reads as follows:—

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated . . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*."

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:—

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development

(1) Cmd. 1700.

and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

7. In the recent discussions the Arab Delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October 1915, undertook to recognize and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent Conferences in London. Their Report, which has been published,¹ states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

8. His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9. The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:—

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the indepen-

(1) Cmd. 5974.

dent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the Constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the Constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:—

(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(b) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

II. IMMIGRATION

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home

"it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment."

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter¹ which Mr Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force.

(1) Quoted in the House of Commons. *Hansard*, February 13, 1931, coll. 751-7.

Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore, His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:—

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

III. LAND

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas

such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this Statement of Policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill, and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews, and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

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
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PALESTINE AND SYRIA IN 1915



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